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Abstract 
 
The 2002 National Security Strategy of the US (NSS 2002) appeared to have presented 
a momentous approach to self-defense. To many, the doctrine of preemptive self-
defense seemed to challenge the legal and political foundations of the post-World War 
II international order. Some saw in the US stated reliance on preemption a direct threat 
to the international system embodied in the UN Charter. The prima facie case that the 
US position was novel and even dangerous appeared persuasive.  
 
This thesis attempts to assess the exceptionality of NSS 2002 in its formulation and 
implications. This question of exceptionality is broadly divided into two sections. The 
first section deals with internal exceptionality, in terms of means (the deliberation and 
drafting processes) and ends (the US defense posture). The second section deals with 
external exceptionality in the broader terms of possible consequences outside the US.  
 
Section One begins by establishing the grounds for looking into the formulation of NSS 
2002, and provides the background for that Strategy's mandated precursors. After 
exploring how National Security Strategy documents are conceived and framed, Section 
One discusses the Strategy as it was published, and examines a sampling of 
contemporaneous reactions to its publication. Section Two concentrates on the second 
part of the research question, and utilizes a thematic approach – in terms of the use of 
force, the international security environment, and international law. Possible 
consequences of the proposed US response to contemporary security challenges are 
considered in these three key areas.   
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Is the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States exceptional in its 
formulation and implications? 
 
Preface      
 
Introduction 
 
My interest in the use of force, and responses to the use of force, began a number of 
years ago. As an undergraduate, I spent a semester on a Tibetan Studies course in India, 
Nepal and Tibet. As I gained a deeper understanding of the history and plight of the 
Tibetan nation, I pondered the seeming unwillingness of the international community to 
somehow right what I perceived as a clear wrong: China's invasion and annexation of 
Tibet. Although no simple solution presented itself, I was intrigued by the nature of the 
question: were there sometimes ethical and moral grounds for the international 
community to refrain from responding to acts of state aggression and violations of 
human rights? I remained interested in the interplay between justice and international 
order, and spent my final undergraduate year in Israel, studying and working as an 
intern for the Israel Section of Amnesty International. The intricacy of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict was fascinating to me, and I found myself once again gravitating 
towards questions to do with the quality of the "international peace and security" we 
strive for, as well as explanations for state action or inaction in responding to particular 
situations or conflicts. It was this continuing interest that led me to enroll in the 
Department of Peace Studies MA course at the University of Bradford. The course 
greatly informed my understanding of international order. My dissertation, "The 
Tension Between Morality and Legality in NATO's 1999 Intervention in Kosovo", 
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reflected my continuing interest in issues surrounding the use of force and a newfound 
appreciation for the importance of international law in regulating conflict and ensuring 
international security.  
 
Rationale 
 
The National Security Strategy of the US published by the Bush administration in 2002 
appeared to have presented a momentous approach to self-defense, and so one 
deserving of investigation. To many, including this writer, the doctrine of preemptive 
self-defense appeared to challenge the legal and political foundations of the post-World 
War II international order. Some saw in the US stated reliance on preemption a direct 
threat to the international system embodied in the UN Charter.1 The prima facie case 
that the US position was novel and even dangerous appeared persuasive. A permanent 
member of the UN Security Council had openly declared its intention of acting with 
unilateral military force against perceived threats whenever it saw fit. Further, this 
intention was asserted as a sovereign right of self-defense, even in the absence of an 
armed attack upon it.  
 
The US is not the only state to have claimed the right to act preemptively; Israel 
claimed this same right when it acted in bombing a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, 
which it claimed would have initiated a nuclear strike against Israel at some point in the 
future.  There have been a number of similar unilateralist initiatives carried out by 
states. Many of these incidents did not bring about the opprobrium of the international 
community of states.   
 
                                                
1 Thomas M. Franck, "What Happens Now? The United Nations after Iraq," American Journal of 
International Law 97, no. 3 (2003). 
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While these preemptive initiatives were unilateral in nature, they were also case-
specific. Therefore, they appeared to be of a different order than the sweeping right of 
preemptive self-defense laid out by the US in 2002. Thus it was not simply the use of 
preemption itself that drew attention, but the apparent intent to depend on preemption as 
a standard – rather than an exceptional – policy response.  
 
Initially, the conception of my current research area followed on directly from the 
subject of my MA dissertation. I originally intended to focus my research solely on the 
deleterious effects that a stated US preference for preemptive self-defense would have 
on the integrity of international law. However as I began to explore possible structures 
for such a project, I realized that I was basing my thinking on two unsupported 
assumptions. The first was that the effects of such a stated preference would necessarily 
be harmful, at some point, if not immediately. The second was that in announcing a 
preemptive disposition, the US had introduced an unprecedented policy – and that this 
would not be difficult to establish.  
 
This realization led me to take a step back. I refocused on a logically prior question, 
whether the recently published National Security Strategy of the US was exceptional – 
at least in part.  Yet new questions continued to arise:  exceptional as viewed from 
within the US? Exceptional to other states? Exceptional in how it had been drafted and 
published? Exceptional in its import or implications? It became clear to me that it would 
be important to look at dynamics internal to the US as well as the implications of the 
Strategy, since even the most careful reading of the document could not reveal how 
much weight to assign to ideology, bureaucratic infighting and other dynamics internal 
to the deliberation and drafting process. 
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This line of thinking delivered what became my key research question: Is the 2002 
National Security Strategy of the United States exceptional in its formulation and 
implications? For the purposes of this thesis, "implications" is understood with regard to 
the asserted right of preemptive self-defense. The two-pronged structure of the question 
– asking if NSS 2002 is exceptional in its formulation and implications – led directly to 
the structure of the thesis (discussed in more detail below). The thesis focuses first on 
"internal exceptionality" in Section One, and then moves on to "external exceptionality" 
in Section Two.  
 
It should be noted that for the purposes of this thesis, American "exceptionalism" refers 
to the perceived inconsistency between NSS 2002 and preceding US national security 
policy and/or international law. It is not used in the well-worn sense of "American 
Exceptionalism" as used to denote either unique standing or inevitable prominence, or 
in any other historical particular such as Manifest Destiny. To aid in keeping this 
distinction clear, the thesis favors the word "exceptionality".  
 
As mentioned, the more US-centric, or "internal", focus of Section One was necessary 
to ascertain whether NSS 2002 was an aberration at odds with preceding US rhetoric 
and policy, or simply the result of a particular ideology unique to the administration that 
produced it. It was also desirable, to the extent possible, to consider whether the process 
that was used to produce NSS 2002 was itself remarkable. Section One, then, required a 
consideration of the US security disposition in the UN Charter era that began after 
World War II. While my initial concern was with what appeared to be an exceptional 
challenge to international law, on investigation, a detailed study of the creation of 
national security strategies was necessitated.  
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The more international, or "external", focus of Section Two turns to the implications of 
NSS 2002. Yet again, I found it untenable to confine evaluation of the Strategy to 
international legal considerations. It was not possible to adequately judge the external 
exceptionality of NSS 2002 solely in terms of international law, especially as 
international law itself is bounded within a political arena. This led to the thematic 
approach taken in Section Two. Implications are discussed in terms of the use of force, 
the contemporary security environment, and finally international law.  
 
It seems self-evident that the research question is worthy of investigation since it is 
apparent that there is a prima facie case that NSS 2002 offers a fundamental challenge 
to the rule of law. Yet in its phrasing, the question is careful not to assume that such a 
challenge is an inevitable implication of the Strategy; nor does the question assume that 
the way in which NSS 2002 was formulated was extraordinary. What had begun as an 
investigation centered almost exclusively on how state practice could damage 
international law had evolved, or been reduced, to a more basic question – but a 
question that remained nuanced and complex, all the same.  
 
Contextually, it was important to consider the prospects of law-based international 
stability in light of the responses of the US to the challenges that terrorism poses.  
Likewise, the humanitarian intervention debate, while not the central subject of my 
research, nonetheless encapsulates many of the themes that were of necessity explored 
in Section Two, and so forms a part of the current study to some degree. This is because 
of the similarities with the way in which large-scale humanitarian emergencies also 
pose fundamental questions of imperative action in the face of legal stricture. However, 
the thematic considerations do not carry through to a detailed examination of either the 
political dynamics or legal considerations of humanitarian intervention.  
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NSS 2002 contains a wide ranging discussion of national security issues facing the US. 
For example, in the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001, it is not surprising that 
the struggle to eliminate global terrorism and prevent future terrorist attacks from being 
carried out against the US and its allies is featured in the Strategy.2 However, issues 
related to terrorism are not the exclusive concern of NSS 2002. The need to reduce 
conflict around the world and increase regional stability, and engaging constructively 
with other great powers in order to develop "agendas for cooperative action", are both 
major components.3 Other sections deal with subjects that the US has long been 
committed to. These areas include support for aspirational human rights, the promotion 
of global economic growth in line with US-style free market capitalism, and the 
expansion of democracy alongside development around the world.4 Although all these 
issues are included in the document, the emphasis here is on the US asserted right to act 
preemptively – not the various other aspects of the Strategy that are either more broad 
and less contentious in their applicability or more general in their expression.5 The fact 
that the asserted right of the US to engage in preemptive self-defense has not been 
invoked in the six years since the document was published does not diminish the focus 
of the dissertation or importance of the research question.  
 
                                                
2 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), "The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America,"  (2002). This concern figures into more than one area discussed in the document, but 
see especially Chapter III, "Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks 
Against Us and Our Friends" 5.  
3 Ibid. See Chapter IV, "Work with others to Defuse Regional Conflicts" 9, and Chapter VIII, "Develop 
Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power" 25.  
4 Ibid. See Chapter II, "Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity" 3. See also Chapter VI, "Ignite a New 
Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade" 17. See also Chapter VII, 
"Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy" 
21.  
5 Ibid. United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), "The National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America," 13-16.The section that deals most directly with the use of preemption is 
Chapter V, "Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of 
Mass Destruction" 13-16.  
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Methodology 
 
A comprehensive review of all instances of preemption in international politics was not 
deemed necessary, although several of these are discussed in later chapters to the extent 
that NSS 2002 displays a level of continuity with past state practice. However, the 
question of continuity is not exhausted by other instances of preemption, and in any 
event it is preemption as a publicly announced disposition that gives this study its 
purchase. Except for relevant cases in international law, the examination is confined to 
the post-World War II era and the signing of the United Nations Carter, with which an 
asserted right of preemption apparently conflicts. It hardly required research to discern 
that preemption is not novel in international affairs since 1945. What is central to my 
research is not recorded instances of preemption, but the fact that it has been announced 
as a policy disposition by a country with the military reach and standing of the US.  
 
I employed all the necessary secondary sources, drawing on the literatures of 
international law, international relations theory, security studies, US history, US foreign 
policy, diplomacy, and military history. A range of official documentation was drawn 
upon, including policy documents issued by the US government. Documents produced 
by other entities, such as the United Nations Charter and various International Court of 
Justice rulings were examined as well. The research also included pertinent speeches 
from US government officials. In addition, every mandated National Security Strategy 
that has been published was obtained, most through research undertaken at the US 
Library of Congress. I looked at contemporary affairs pertinent to preemption, including 
the humanitarian intervention debate because of its connection to state sovereignty 
under Article 2.4 of the UN Charter. The divisions among leading international legal 
scholars were also considered, as were ways in which evolutionary changes occur to the 
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body of international law as a whole. There was no empirical research to be conducted 
as such.  
 
In the course of investigating Section One, I conducted interviews with individuals 
directly involved in the drafting of NSS documents, including of course NSS 2002. In 
addition I interviewed former members of the present and recent administrations who 
have knowledge pertinent to the framing of NSS documents. Scholars with expertise on 
facets of national security and US government policy were also interviewed. The in-
place interviews were conducted in Washington, DC on two occasions, the first from 23 
March 2006 to 06 April 2006, and the second from 06 November 2006 to 10 November 
2006. Subsequent interviews conducted by telephone and written correspondence 
bolstered these discussions. None of my interviewees insisted on anonymity; and all are 
listed in the bibliography whether or not they are quoted in the text.  
 
I had privileged access in obtaining interviews with several Bush administration 
officials who had recently left government service. Mr. Andrew Hoehn, Director of the 
Strategy and Doctrine Program of Project Air Force at RAND, served as Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy from 1998 to 2004. Mr. Franklin Miller, 
Senior Counselor at The Cohen Group, served as Special Assistant to President George 
W. Bush and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control on the National 
Security Council staff from 2001 to 2005. Professor Philip Zelikow, White Burkett 
Miller Professor of History and Director of the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the 
University of Virginia, helped draft NSS 2002 in an unofficial capacity and 
subsequently served as Counselor of the US Department of State under Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice from 2005 to 2007.  
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The invasion of Iraq in 2003 is not considered here as a case of preemption as declared 
allowable by the US in NSS 2002. This is because there remains a great deal of 
contestation over whether the invasion was legal or illegal. There are authoritative 
individuals who have cogently argued that the invasion was legal.6  Nevertheless, there 
remain at least as many who contest its legality.7  
 
There also remains fundamental disagreement over whether the invasion was 
preemptive, preventive, or simply a war of aggression. It has become more clear over 
time that the conditions that NSS 2002 foresees as necessitating preemption – the rogue 
state-WMD nexus – did not exist in Iraq at the time of the US invasion, at least in the 
manner and magnitude feared by the US and its allies. In the years since 2003, the US 
invasion of Iraq has increasingly been viewed as having been anticipatory rather than 
responding to an immediate threat, particularly since the US has had to publicly temper 
earlier assertions of an Iraqi terrorist connection with al Qaeda. Nor were any 
significant active WMD programs or stockpiles discovered in the aftermath of the US 
military action. So the military action itself is viewed by most individuals as preemptive 
in character whether they supported the invasion or were skeptical of the wisdom of 
undertaking the action – notwithstanding the disagreement noted above about whether it 
should be classed as preemptive, preventive, or in some other way.  
 
                                                
6 Richard N. Gardner, "Neither Bush nor the 'Jurisprudes'," American Journal of International Law 97, no. 
3 (2003). See also Christopher Greenwood, The Legality of Using Force against Iraq [Memorandum] 24 
Oct 2002 [cited 24 Jan 2009]); available from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/196/2102406.htm. See also 
William H. IV Taft and Todd F. Buchwald, "Preemption, Iraq, and International Law," American Journal 
of International Law 97, no. 3 (2003). See also Ruth Wedgwood, "The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security 
Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense," American Journal of International Law 97, no. 3 
(2003). See also John Yoo, "International Law and the War in Iraq," American Journal of International 
Law 97, no. 3 (2003). 
7 Richard Falk, "What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?," American Journal of 
International Law 97, no. 3 (2003). See also Tom J. Farer, "The Prospect for International Law and Order 
in the Wake of Iraq," American Journal of International Law 97, no. 3 (2003). See also Franck, "What 
Happens Now? The United Nations after Iraq." See also Miriam Sapiro, "Iraq: The Shifting Sands of 
Preemptive Self-Defense," American Journal of International Law 97, no. 3 (2003). 
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Whatever threat Iraq was believed to have posed, it was not imminent in the 
conventional legal sense of the term. For these reasons, a case study of the invasion of 
Iraq would shine little light on the research question, much though a great deal of 
research needs to be done on the causes and consequences of the 2003 Iraq War. What 
matters most is the announcement of preemption as an enabling policy.  
 
Structure 
 
The question of exceptionality had to be broken down, and was broadly divided into 
two sections. The first section deals with internal exceptionality, in terms of means (the 
deliberation and drafting processes) and ends (the US defense posture). The second 
section deals with external exceptionality in terms of possible consequences. This 
division aided in demarcating how NSS 2002 might be exceptional in US-specific 
policymaking terms from how it might be exceptional in broader terms outside the US. 
 
Chapters One through Five establish the grounds for looking into the formulation of 
NSS 2002, and provide the background for that Strategy's mandated precursors (those 
published National Security Strategies since 1986) and other antecedents in US foreign 
and security policy. In order to investigate whether NSS 2002 was exceptional, it was 
necessary to explore how NSSs are conceived and framed. This comprised the 
substance of Chapters One through Three.  
 
NSS 2002 identifies threats which are perceived as revolutionary. It also describes the 
intended US response in meeting them. After offering a rationale and frame of reference 
for examining NSS 2002, Chapters Four and Five discuss the Strategy as it was 
published, and a sampling of contemporaneous reactions to its publication. On the 
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whole, then, Section One addresses the first phase of the research question dealing with 
"internal" exceptionality.  
 
Chapter One discusses what national security means in general, and focuses on the US 
in particular – including the approach the US has taken to national security since the 
end of World War II. Those basic national security concerns that are universal in 
character, such as survival and standing, are explored. Particular US national security 
objectives that were brought about by changes to – and within – the international system 
are considered, such as the advent and conclusion of the Cold War. Chapter Two begins 
to tighten the focus of the study by examining the national security structures and 
processes that the US has developed or that have grown up around US needs. The focus 
remains internal, and includes the formation and evolution of the national security 
apparatuses in the US, such as the National Security Council. The interplay between the 
distinct branches of the US government, in terms of formulating national security 
policy, is also surveyed. Chapter Three concentrates on national security reports and 
pronouncements. These products are a crucial context for evaluating NSS 2002. Both 
modern pronouncements made by US Presidents about national security, and the 
modern NSS reports that Presidents are mandated to produce, are studied. The place of 
NSS reports as tools for forming and announcing policy (and their place as a product of 
compromise and negotiation) is also explored.  
 
As mentioned, Chapter Four presents the various facets of the NSS that was issued by 
the Bush administration in September 2002. Although straightforward, the chapter 
provides context for the release of NSS 2002. It does this by including a consideration 
of some of the features of the Bush administration that were apparent from its early 
days. A very brief review of the events of 11 September 2001 is included. The chapter 
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then reviews the statements and speeches given by senior administration officials that 
prefigured NSS 2002. Finally, NSS 2002 itself is discussed. Chapter Five brings Section 
One of the thesis to a conclusion by reviewing the reactions to the release of NSS 2002. 
Special attention is given to those reactions enunciated before the US invasion of Iraq. 
While it is difficult to draw a stark line separating opinion before and after March 2003, 
earlier reactions tend to give more attention to the logic of the document itself, and to 
possible legal and political implications. After Spring 2003, discussion of preemptive 
self-defense took on a less document-specific character.   
 
Section Two concentrates on the second part of the research question, the implications 
of NSS 2002. When investigating whether NSS 2002 was exceptional in the 
international arena, I found I could not abstract it from its several contexts. This led to a 
thematic approach – in terms of the use of force, the international security environment, 
and international law. Possible consequences of the proposed US response to 
contemporary security challenges are considered in these three key areas.   
 
Chapter Six reviews the use and threat of force in international affairs. As no 
universally accepted vocabulary exists in the literature, the chapter begins by laying out 
the terminology employed in this work. The utility of the threat of force is considered, 
especially in terms of signaling intent and influencing behavior. The threat of force is 
almost omnipresent in international politics. This fact is discussed with particular 
emphasis on the use of deterrence and preemption. The chapter concludes with a 
consideration of the very real constraints on the use and threat of force. Chapter Seven 
assesses the international security environment, and does so in a way that acknowledges 
the particular dangers identified in NSS 2002. The chapter also reviews the current state 
of WMD, a crucial part of the logic underpinning the case for preemption in NSS 2002. 
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WMD capacity has expanded in recent years, as advancements (particularly in the 
biosciences) have allowed for increasingly lethal agents to be conceived and developed. 
A related matter is the potential extension of WMD capacity to states, groups and even 
individuals; not only are WMD potentially more lethal than ever before, but they are 
also potentially more available than ever before. Thus the expansion, and the extension, 
of WMD capacity must both be considered when gauging the threat posed by weak 
states and terrorist groups. The extent to which the intersection of terrorism and WMD 
poses an unprecedented threat is evaluated in this context.  
 
Finally, Chapter Eight explores the prima facie case that NSS 2002 offers a direct 
challenge to international law. The chapter first provides a legal context in which to 
view NSS 2002 by reviewing the several varieties of self-defense as they exist under the 
UN Charter, in light of the Charter's standing as codified international law. The next 
section begins with a consideration of how customary international law and codified 
international law are related. The customary behavior of states can either challenge 
codified law or reinforce it over time. However, there is no universally agreed means by 
which to determine what has standing as customary international law. For this reason, 
assertions that state custom has legal standing are a particularly interesting and 
contentious source of legal debate. While customary international law has not usually 
been cited to justify preemptive self-defense, it has nevertheless been a line of 
argumentation employed for another class of challenges to Article 2.4 of the UN 
Charter – the humanitarian intervention debate. Similarities can be discerned between 
the humanitarian intervention debate and the debate around the use of preemptive force, 
and the significance of this fact is discussed in terms of evaluating the legitimacy of 
preemptive self-defense. The chapter concludes by emphasizing the fact that legal 
challenges can themselves be developmental.  
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As the final draft of this thesis was being prepared, Barack Obama was inaugurated as 
President of the United States. At the conclusion of that ceremony, George W. Bush 
boarded a US Marine Corps helicopter and was whisked away from Washington. The 
administration that had responded to the attacks of 11 September 2001, and overseen 
the launching of two wars – and the publishing of NSS 2002 – had ended. As the 
Obama administration begins its tenure, it faces an expanded set of challenges, and will 
doubtless develop its own unique approach to national security.  
 
Yet, this transition of power does not cast the dissertation as an historical study. 
Preemption is unlikely to disappear in international politics. We can not know whether 
the disposition evinced in NSS 2002 might still have an effect on the disposition of 
other states, even in the absence of a WMD-terrorist incident. Further, it is unclear just 
where the new administration will draw its own parameters around the use of force. The 
new American administration has yet to produce its own National Security Strategy. 
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I.  The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the US      
1.0  National Security Disposition of the US – Purposes  
1.1  "Fixed" Purposes In Common With All Other States  
 
All states have a basic security concern: their continued existence as a functioning 
political entity. The purpose of ensuring the survival of the state is a primary purpose of 
governments. Yet this basic requirement quickly becomes complex, if not problematic.  
 
For as soon as a leader begins to ponder how to ensure the survival of their state, the 
means identified give rise to additional security concerns and goals. Sometimes the 
means by which a security objective is to be met themselves become objectives. If a 
certain means is viewed as vital to obtaining an objective of overriding importance, then 
retaining the ability to effect that means becomes a critical objective in its own right.  
 
So states must consider what they view as vital to their existence, and identify the 
requirements for ensuring it – a process that may well breed more vital interests.8 As 
part of this, states are cognizant of the environment around them. To the extent that they 
can, they ascertain the strengths and weaknesses of their neighbors, and the security 
concerns that are held by these potential competitors. By seeking this information, states 
hope to identify the intentions of other states, and their ability to act on those intentions.  
 
Changes in the overall international environment have the potential to affect the 
character of the threats confronting states. For example, advances in technology may 
                                                
8 One working definition of what constitutes "vital interests" is the objectives that a state identifies as 
being its most important – the ones which it is prepared to go to war to protect. See Robert Gilpin, War 
and Change in World Politics (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 25. 
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greatly increase the power of some states over others. Fluctuations in the relative power 
of states – diplomatically, economically, militarily, or even in terms of "soft power" – 
occur regularly rather than exceptionally. Historically, all such changes have forced 
states to reevaluate both the threats facing them, and their vital interests. States have 
ignored such changes in their environment at their peril. In addition, the various 
changes that occur in the international environment all interact and influence one 
another; for example, an advance in the technology held by a state may lead to 
increased economic power, or vice versa.  
 
Of course, when it attempts to identify its most crucial concerns, the concerns of others, 
and their existing and potential ability to obtain certain objectives, the perceptions held 
by a state are of paramount importance. To say that comprehensively understanding the 
objective reality of the international system is elusive would be an immense 
understatement. Even if one were able to put aside the constant flux present in a world 
of interrelated actors and circumstances, and isolate a fixed point in time, the 
complexity and number of variables to be considered simply render any sort of absolute 
knowledge impossible. The "reality" of certain situations may be ascertained to a 
greater or lesser degree; it may be possible to identify and comprehend some facts with 
much more certainty than others. Nevertheless, in the vast and ever-changing world in 
which states operate, it is their perception of circumstances – of threats, intentions, 
abilities, and context – that states use to form beliefs and to plan. In the end it is facts as 
they are perceived that are fed into the decision-making calculus of states.  
 
And so, ambiguity and imprecision often accompany considerations of "security" and 
"interests". Even temporarily setting aside the role of perceptions, definitional questions 
remain. How does one define a "vital" interest? How does one define "winning" in a 
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conflict? The term "vital interests" is a vague one; not only is it imprecise, but it may 
change significantly over time. Nonetheless, the term is useful when considering the 
interests which a state considers to be "of overriding importance to its security".9 
 
Economic, political, and ideological objectives have been sought by states; foreign 
policy results from the compromises that are made as part of the process of identifying 
and prioritizing these objectives within a certain historical context.10 Foreign policy is 
not synonymous with national security policy and strategy. However, the two overlap 
and influence one another; and in the United States this overlap generally increased over 
the course of the 20th century.11 A recognition has developed that rather than being two 
separate endeavors – with national security policy focusing on the military defense of 
the nation, and foreign policy concerned with the relations of the US with other states – 
the objectives of each impact on the other. What has been written about the US is also 
true of all states: debate revolves around not whether a nation will fight to secure its 
vital interests, but rather in defining what those vital interests are.12 Just as policy results 
from the prioritization of objectives, the formulation of strategy results from 
"discrimination and choice within an environment of limited resources".13  
 
National Survival: Territory and Resources  
 
A fundamental part of a nation's survival is the continued existence of its political 
authority over a distinct territory. Yet the retention or expansion of territory has 
                                                
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid.  23. 
11 Sam Charles Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala, U.S. National Security: 
Policymakers, Processes, and Politics, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002) 15. 
12 Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little Brown, 1943) 87. 
13 Jeffrey Record, Dark Victory: America's Second War against Iraq (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2004) xii. 
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implications beyond the political control of a certain geographical area. Control or 
expansion of territory is a long-standing objective of states; territory often adds to the 
wealth of the state, and to its security. For example, control of territory amounts to 
control of natural resources, and so increases the possessions and productive capacity of 
states; security is enhanced by this increased wealth and economic power, but also by 
the spatial buffer that territory provides from other states. The relationship between the 
amount of land a state controls and the amount of economic power it possesses has 
changed over time, and there is a less direct correlation between territory and wealth in 
modern times than there was before the Industrial Revolution. However, control of 
territory remains one of the basic objectives of states.14 
 
Also, all states try to ensure access to resources. They do this by protecting the 
resources present within their own borders, and by political, economic and diplomatic 
means when feasible. Many natural resources are of great value in terms of trade or 
strategic usefulness. However, over the first half of the 20th century, the single natural 
resource that grew most in importance to states was petroleum. To a greater or lesser 
degree, depending on their consumption needs and the size of their domestic reserves, 
all states have to consider how to maintain reliable access to oil.  
 
Maintaining Or Expanding Power 
 
States tend also to seek the maintenance or expansion of their power, in part by striving 
to maximize beneficial outcomes while working to minimize associated costs. One way 
in which a state maintains its existing power is by protecting the established rights and 
prerogatives of the state. For example, one reason that Woodrow Wilson took the US to 
                                                
14 Gilpin, War and Change  23-24. 
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war in 1917 was that Germany repeatedly did not respect the US asserted right of 
neutrality.15 
 
Though not the sole consideration of policymakers, the relationship of their nation with 
the other great military powers of the world is a primary interest.16 To the degree that a 
state's power relative to others can be increased without adverse effects (such as being 
counter-productively provocative), it is viewed as desirable and something to be 
pursued. The same is true of a state's prestige.  
 
Prestige is distinct from power. Power refers to the capability of a state to enforce its 
will. Prestige refers to whether that state is perceived by others as possessing the 
capability of enforce its will, and the willingness to do so.17 Prestige can flow from the 
particular position of a state, as well. That is, a state's unique ability to engage others in 
its region, or its perceived expertise in a certain area, can also result in the accrual of 
prestige. Thus even when some states seem dwarfed by great powers, they may well still 
possess a degree of power and prestige. This is one reason why "middle power 
internationalism" is worthy of study.18 Relatedly, states both great and small have the 
potential of possessing "soft power" which results from their cultural and moral 
standing, and technological and economic advancement, that augments the "hard 
power" of their military and diplomatic might.19 Regardless of its source, the 
furtherance of prestige is as desirable as the expansion of power.  
 
                                                
15 Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent, 
OH: Kent State University Press, 1986) 120. 
16 Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy  100-101. 
17 Gilpin, War and Change  30-31. 
18 Cranford Pratt, Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension (Kingston; Buffalo: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990). See also Jonathan H. Ping, Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Asia Pacific (Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT, USA: Ashgate, 2005). 
19 Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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Ensuring Economic Well-Being 
 
As mentioned, there is not a direct and constant correlation between geographical size 
and prosperity. Further, although economic power is crucial to security success it is not 
the only factor; others include political and military decisions and mistakes. 
Nonetheless, a decrease in economic well-being due to an ailing economy or inefficient 
use of resources often causes a corresponding decrease in the real power and perceived 
standing of a state. 20  
 
The relationship between resources, wealth and national security is a complicated one. 
The possession of any one does not guarantee a state the ability to secure the others. 
Even when a state is fortunate enough to enjoy all three, the ability to retain them is 
dependent upon numerous factors, not least of which is the ability of the state to defend 
all three against adversaries without overextending itself.  
 
Domestic Purpose 
 
The security disposition of states also has a domestic expression. The domestic purpose 
behind the security posture of states may be the display of its foreign policy posture to 
its own citizenry, a warning against dissent, or it may be intended to cultivate popular 
support for a particular leader or policy. In the case of the United States and other 
nations with governments in the liberal democratic tradition, there is a certain level of 
domestic support that must be maintained for foreign and defense policy to be accepted; 
that is, a state's stated security disposition must in part target a domestic audience and 
                                                
20 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict 
from 1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana, 1989) 450. 
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hope to influence it, since the citizenry must support the disposition of the state to a 
significant degree.  
 
In a democratic state, if a broad portion of the electorate is opposed to a specific 
national security policy, the implementation of that policy will not be sustainable in the 
long term. Any broad national security strategy must be based on broad domestic 
support. A danger for US administrations is to view domestic dissent as a threat to 
national security, and then seek to suppress it by invoking the broad, imprecise terms of 
"vital interest" and "national security".21 For if a national leader is committed to using 
force, whether in the face of domestic opposition or not, it is relatively easy for them to 
position the action as protecting or enhancing vital national interests.22  
 
1.2  US National Security Parameters Arising from Its Status and Position 
 
In addition to objectives held by all states, the US faces a range of issues arising at least 
in part from its position in the international system. These particular issues are often 
unique to the US, although some similarity may be discerned with other great powers. 
The security disposition of the US arises in part as a result of its geographical location, 
its standing as a great power and as a wealthy nation, and the character of its 
international relations which have been tailored to its own situation.  
 
                                                
21 Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, and Michael J. Mazarr, American National Security, 5th ed. 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) 4. 
22 Jeffrey Record, Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from 
Korea to Kosovo (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002) 131. 
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US Values and Interests 
 
As with all other states, the American security disposition is born of values and 
interests. It is expressed as policy and strategy. To the extent that some US values and 
interests are unique from those of other nations, a distinct American security disposition 
can be said to exist. Values may be thought of as principles that give rise to national 
interests. While principles, as such, are not objectives in their own right, national 
interests "determine ends not means".23 It is these ends that find expression in the 
foreign and security policy of the US. National security policy and national security 
strategy are not synonymous; policy refers to ends, and strategy refers to means.24 
 
In terms of its geographical position, the US has an interest in the stability of the lesser 
powers of Central and South America because of their proximity. This has given US 
security policies an historical hemispheric focus, most clearly articulated in the Monroe 
Doctrine.25 Two great oceans help protect it from potential adversaries. The US has 
abundant natural resources that fed its industrial growth. Its huge land mass allows for 
military planning and preparation in depth.26  
 
The geographical demarcations of a state remain constant, although its boundaries may 
expand or contract during the course of historic events. However, the value of its natural 
resources may well vary over time, as known resources are depleted, or new resources 
discovered. The might and wealth of the US are more prone to variance over time than 
                                                
23 David Jablonsky, "The State of the National Security State," Parameters  (2002): 18. 
24 Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala, U.S. National Security  35. See also 5-7.  
25 United States. President James Monroe (1817-1825), President's Annual Message to Congress 
[Delivered 02 Dec 1823] [cited 13 Dec 2006]); available from http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=llac&fileName=041/llac041.db&recNum=4. 
26 A less positive consequence is that the US has to concern itself with defending an immense area, 
geographically. The nation is so big that comprehensively monitoring the entirety of its borders and 
shores is practically impossible. 
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are its borders. Even those aspects of power that are unique to the US are subject to the 
fluctuations in the standing of other states, and the US position relative to them.  
 
The vital interests of, and potential threats to, a state are subject to changes in the 
international environment – both objective and perceived changes. The environment is 
not static, and so such changes occur regularly, though unevenly in historical terms. The 
US, like all other states, must take into consideration changes that alter its strategic 
environment, which in turn informs its strategic outlook. In so doing, it may alter its 
outlook incrementally, in response to relatively minor changes to the international 
environment. Such changes in outlook do not always occur incrementally, however.  
 
The meaning of national security has changed over time, not least because American 
values and institutions have changed – and sometimes quickly.27 And, as with all states, 
the objectives believed by the US to be vital to its security have also changed over time, 
as has its perception of security. Though the term was not in common use at the time, 
concerns with national security existed in the US from the time of its inception. 
Although consideration of the "common defense" figured prominently in the US 
Constitution, US presidents before 1940 talked about security using terms such as 
"safety" and "tranquility".28 The phrase "national security" became common after World 
War II. 
 
When looking at past US strategy and issues that have been the focus of security 
concerns, certain trends are discernible. These trends are a result of the historical 
context in which they occurred and the perceptions of leaders and planners at the time. 
                                                
27 Ernest R. May, "National Security in American History," in Rethinking America's Security: Beyond 
Cold War to New World Order, ed. Graham T. Allison and Gregory F. Treverton (New York; London: 
Norton, 1992), 94. 
28 Ibid., 95. 
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The concept of national security in the US may be viewed as having moved through 
four phases. The first of these, prominent in the years from independence through the 
nation's civil war (from the 1790s to the 1870s), emphasized the safety of national 
borders and the preservation of the federal Union of the states. The emphasis during the 
second phase shifted to the prevention of domestic class conflict, and hemispheric 
independence. This phase occurred during the 1880s to 1930s, although it hearkened 
back to the Monroe Doctrine of the 1820s. The third phase occurred from World War II 
until the 1960s, and so encompassed the first decades of the Cold War. This phase 
focused on the freedom of countries both in and outside of the Western Hemisphere, 
and the health and prosperity of the US economy and political system.  
 
The fourth phase has continued since the 1960s, and has emphasized a modification of 
the concept of national security toward stability and economic growth.29 This last phase 
did not displace either the defense and strategic considerations that persisted through the 
Cold War, or concern with hemispheric or other regional security. Instead, it can be 
understood as illustrating the way in which national prosperity and national security 
have become more interrelated.  
 
Protection of "National Security"  
 
From time to time, states may conclude that the environment, or their relationship to it 
has changed to such a degree that significant readjustment to their strategic outlook is 
needed. The years during and immediately after the Second World War were such a 
period for the US. These years saw a move from a long-standing strategy, or 
                                                
29 Ibid. These past national security trends in the US are drawn from Ernest May's work. May provides an 
overview of US "notions of national security" from George Washington to George H. W. Bush. His 
analysis is based on comparing State of the Union  messages (known as "president's annual messages" 
before the 1930s, and "State of the Union" messages since then).  
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disposition, stressing mobilization capacity to one focusing on more active readiness. 
Until then, there was strong sentiment in the US favoring the maintenance of very small 
standing forces, which could be fortified through the mobilization of the nation when 
needed to respond in times of crisis. This change in disposition resulted in part from the 
increasing perception that the USSR was the principal security threat to the US; that is, 
the state most likely to gain the ability and possess the desire to attack the US. The trend 
toward readiness was also the result of globalization and technological advancement. In 
a world of strategic bombers and nuclear weapons, it was viewed as increasingly 
unlikely that the US would have the time necessary to remobilize in response to an 
attack.  
 
In a book widely read in the US during World War II, Walter Lippmann argued that 
since no single great power would be able to confront and control the others at the 
conclusion of the war, that alliances must be sought to ensure stability. In making his 
argument, Lippmann used the term "national security" to focus thinking on the need for 
the US to be militarily secure in an environment of other great powers: "The ideal of 
peace diverted our attention from the idea of national security."30 The term became 
increasingly used in political discourse around the post-war planning in the US.  
 
The term national security, then, came to have its current meaning and preeminence in 
US politics just after 1945. It was an idea about security that took into account all 
potential variables – military, political, economic – and argued that to demobilize and 
wait for another major conflict to begin before preparing to fight would be too costly in 
terms of risk. Rather, the US needed to maintain a formidable standing force that could 
respond to threats quickly and act itself as a deterrent to other states.  
                                                
30 Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy  47. 
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To do so, the US also needed to maintain cutting edge technology, and maintain its 
technological and military lead over other nations. What resulted from the concept was 
a kind of worldview beset by unlimited threats that could never be neutralized in a 
permanent way. This was interwoven with the belief that the military must be 
maintained at a constant state of readiness to deal with any one of these threats: "The 
nation was to be permanently prepared. America's interests and responsibilities were 
unrestricted and global".31 
 
The Post-1945 Position of the US and International Order 
 
The US was the only participant in World War II to emerge richer rather than poorer at 
the end of the conflict, and it emerged much richer. The US also emerged from that war 
with its greatly increased military force already projected around the world. The 
presence of US troops was widespread; they were rebuilding Germany and Japan, and 
were stationed all across the Pacific Ocean.32  
 
From this unique position of prominence flowed related objectives. These objectives 
were to maintain its dominant position, and also to use its position to improve the 
international order through institutions and processes. This led to support for an 
                                                
31 Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1977) 220. One embodiment of this new, "expansive", conception of national security 
by the US was in its worldwide military base planning; see Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of 
Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War, Stanford Nuclear Age Series 
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1992) 59.  
32 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1946, ed. United States 
Department of State, Historical Office, and Bureau of Public Affairs, vol. I: General, The United Nations; 
Department of State Publication 8573 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1972) 
1110-1196. This section covers "United States National Security Policy: the Extension of Military 
Assistance to Foreign Nations; Estimates of Threats to the National Security; Coordination of Political 
and Military Policy; United States Policy with Respect to the Acquisition of Military Bases and Air 
Transit Rights". See especially "Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Secretary of 
State, November 1 1945" 1111-1112.  
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international order that favored US economic interests, reflected US values, and 
institutionalized a US-dominant position.  
 
The maintenance of the US position itself was viewed as beneficial to the wider 
international community. It was thought that in the first half of the 20th century, US 
diplomacy overemphasized the moral and legal aspects of policy, and neglected power 
calculations that focus on ensuring stability. Planners argued that focusing the US on its 
own national interests, without arrogance or "hostility toward other people", would be 
beneficial for the world as a whole.33 
 
The creation of international economic institutions were also seen to support a stable, 
more secure world order. The establishment of a global order supportive of western 
liberal democratic, capitalist economies – against autarkic regions, advancing free trade, 
and institutionalized – was seen as essential. This arrangement would favor order and 
security, not just economic advancement. US planners had the world depression and 
two global wars in their living memory, and avoiding similar recurrences was a prime 
motivating factor.34  
 
Cordell Hull, who served as US Secretary of State during most of World War II and 
was heavily involved in the creation of the United Nations, saw the economic causes of 
World War II, such as tariffs, "restricted access" to resources, and autarky as some of 
the most important to recognize and work to prevent.35 Yet while liberal capitalist 
economic institutions were seen as a way to increase stability and reduce the likelihood 
                                                
33 George Frost Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago; London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1970) 103. 
34 G. John Ikenberry, "Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order," in International 
Order and the Future of World Politics, ed. T. V. Paul and John A. Hall (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 123-126. 
35 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers  463. 
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of another great war, they also favored the US as the most productive of nations after 
1945, and the least damaged economically. The creation of factors that would help 
ensure the access of industry to foreign markets would also help minimize the chances 
of an economic slow-down. US industry feared that reductions in government spending 
post-1945 would lead to an economic slump; industry had become increasingly 
productive during World War II. These factors form the backdrop for US support for 
the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.36 
 
While economic measures were seen as crucial, they were not viewed as sufficient on 
their own to ensure the maintenance of a stable world order. Political institutions were 
also of immense importance to the US, as evidenced by its leadership in the creation of 
the UN. In fact, discussion around creating a "new League" began soon after the US 
entered World War II. The US hoped that the structure of the new UN would correct 
some of the features of the defunct League of Nations that had rendered that 
organization ineffective.37 With these improvements in its form, and just as importantly 
with an active US participating fully in its functions, it was hoped that the UN might 
succeed where the League had failed.  
 
Yet the US seems to have been pragmatic in its assessment of the UN's ability to ensure 
international peace and security. From the viewpoint of some US planners, the 
usefulness of the UN was seen at least partly in terms of being a mechanism to ensure 
continued US involvement in international political affairs.38 Indeed, it was only shortly 
after the creation of the UN that additional ways were sought to ensure US involvement 
                                                
36 Ibid. 
37 Wilhelm G. Grewe, "The History of the United Nations," in The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary, ed. Bruno Simma (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
38 Leffler, A Preponderance of Power  19. 
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in international postwar military planning, as well. It was in this atmosphere that NATO 
was created as a regional security organization in accordance with the UN Charter. The 
creation of NATO was meant to both deter a Soviet military threat, and to reassure the 
nations of Europe that the US was committed to a continuing security role on that 
continent.39  
 
The security, political and economic institutions created after World War II acted to 
bolster and continue US prominence – some would say dominance – up to the present. 
At a unique and brief moment after the war, in a preeminent position, the US created 
institutions that while limiting its exercise of power, actually consolidated its position.40 
By persuading other states to participate in the institutional order being set up, the US 
was limiting the amount of coercive action it might need to take against other states in 
the future. And indeed the states of Western Europe to varying degrees welcomed the 
new US-led international order just as much as the US promoted it, viewing that order 
as necessary to ensuring their security against the Soviet threat.41  
 
The US may have helped ensure stability and participation by agreeing to limit some of 
its own freedom of action. One could argue that other powers agreed to participate 
because the US is a "penetrated hegemony"; its decision-making is relatively 
                                                
39 Yergin, Shattered Peace  362. 
40 Former Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice has argued that the world 
experienced another such unique moment for change after 11 September 2001, but that it may take 
decades to ascertain the results of recent US actions: "I think that when we look in retrospect at what 
happened after World War II, it all looks very orderly and like the United States was simply able to work 
its will on the international community and that's the way it all came out ... [but] if you go back to that 
period, if you were Acheson or Truman or Marshall, it probably didn't look so inevitable or so permanent 
that these changes would go in that direction ... So I would suggest that when we think about the period 
that we're in now, we not think about this as the outcome but rather as this as the beginning of what is a 
very turbulent time ...". For her part, Judge Rosalyn Higgins, former President of the International Court 
of Justice, perceives a crucial difference between US leadership in the 1940s and the present: "... today 
we have something that we didn't have in the late '40s, which is, for good or ill, part of Europe regarding 
itself as being a counterweight to the United States. And ... it certainly indicates a resistance that was not 
previously there to a major [US] leadership role." Condoleeza Rice and Rosalyn Higgins, Responses to 
Question from the Author, ASIL Conference, 29 Mar 2006. 
41 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, New York: Clarendon 
Press, Oxford University Press, 1997) 285. 
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transparent due to its liberal democratic makeup and processes, and other states often 
have contacts and means of channeling requests to the US during the decision making 
process.42 Participation also enabled them to avoid either domination or "abandonment" 
by the US.43  
 
Access to Resources 
 
Related to the objective of retaining its prominent post-war position, the US also 
intended to protect its ability to access resources. This was to be accomplished by 
maintaining US power and the ability to project it. It has been in the years since 1945 
that the US ability to maintain and project power has become increasingly dependent on 
access to one finite natural resource: oil. Access to a steady supply of oil is a strategic 
necessity for the US. While the US has about 5% of the world's population, and about 
2% of global oil reserves, the nation consumes about 25% of the world's oil 
production.44 Domestic US oil production fell every year in the decade from 1993 to 
2003. By 2003, the US was importing about 63% of its total oil consumption.45 Such is 
the dependence of the US on this resource that experts expect dire economic 
consequences for the country if a disruption in supply were to occur, even if significant 
import-reduction measures are taken in the near future.46 The realization of this coming 
dependence was already growing during World War II.  
 
                                                
42 Ikenberry, "Liberal Hegemony." 
43 Ibid. Ikenberry contends that nothing short of a major war or global economic crisis will upset the post-
1945 international order with the US at its core. It is less clear what might alter the structure of that order 
without completely upsetting it, and how easily the character of the international order might be changed.  
44 Nathanael Greene and et al, "Growing Energy: How Biofuels Can Help End America's Oil 
Dependence,"  (Washington: National Resources Defense Council, 2004). 
45 Robert Pirog, "World Oil Demand and Its Effect on Oil Prices,"  (Washington: Congressional Research 
Service; The Library of Congress, 2005). 
46 Ian Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: America's Relentless Drive for Energy Security (London; New York: 
I.B. Tauris ; Distributed by Palgrave Macmillan in the United States and Canada, 2005) 155. 
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Something called the "conservation theory" developed in the US during World War II, when 
the declining number of new sources of oil in the US – combined with the fact that the US was 
supplying the majority of the oil needs for itself and its allies – led to concern that the US might 
soon face a major shortfall. The conservation theory held that the US must develop and control 
enough foreign oil "in order to reduce the drain on domestic supplies, conserve them for the 
future, and thus guarantee America's security".47  
 
The developing defensive military posture of the US also took into account the 
importance of other natural resources around the world. US planners decided after the 
conclusion of World War II that the US required a global system of military bases and 
air transit rights in order to project its power and provide the capability of defending the 
US far from its own shores, as future attacks were conceived as taking the form of 
strategic bombing, perhaps with nuclear weapons.48 Overseas bases would enable the 
US to ensure stability by quelling unrest and deterring aggression, at the same time as 
ensuring access to resources. The US military emerged from World War II determined 
to protect US access to raw materials such as minerals and oil.49 Access to resources 
would presumably be necessary in the event of another large-scale war; at the same 
time, such access was also desirable in peacetime. There was certainly a hemispheric 
emphasis to this planning around natural resources. While the Department of War and 
Department of State "occasionally" disagreed on tactics, the broad objective of keeping 
                                                
47 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York; London: Pocket 
Books, 1993) 394-396. The Middle East began to be seen by US planners as it had been viewed by 
British planners since World War I: as a prime region from which to obtain this foreign oil.  
48 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1949, ed. United States 
Department of State, Historical Office, and Bureau of Public Affairs, vol. I: National Security Affairs, 
Foreign Economic Policy; Department of State Publication 8850 (Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1976) 249-418. See "United States national security policy", especially material on 
"requirements for military bases and air transit rights in foreign areas".  
49 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1948, ed. United States 
Department of State, Historical Office, and Bureau of Public Affairs, vol. IX: The Western Hemisphere; 
Department of State Publication 8626 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1972). 
See section on "Concern of the United States for assuring an adequate supply of strategic materials in the 
Western Hemisphere" at 233-242; also section on "Interest of the United States in petroleum resources 
with respect to Western Hemisphere defense" at 243-257.  
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Latin and South America stable without any "political, economic, or military" 
interference from outside the hemisphere was acknowledged by both.50 However, 
preoccupation with the stability of regions containing resources that might be needed by 
the US in future conflicts was not limited to the Americas.  
 
1.3  US National Security Adjustments Occasioned by Changes to the 
International Order 
 
There are also purposes of the US national security disposition that are occasioned by 
fundamental changes in the international system, or by specific threats of such 
seriousness as to affect the international environment as a whole. The advent of the 
Cold War was one such change. It is impossible to completely separate the US 
conception of its own security from the environmental context of the years immediately 
following the end of World War II, in which the Soviet Union was increasingly seen as 
a threat to the safety of the US. However, the two – the fundamentals of US national 
security as they were understood at that time, and its perception of the "communist 
threat" – may be seen as combining to herald, if not actually instigate, the Cold War.  
 
Cold War 
 
The beginning of the Cold War was relatively abrupt, although anticipated by US 
planners. The degree to which that anticipation helped to bring the Cold War about 
                                                
50 Leffler, A Preponderance of Power  60. Leffler also notes that "The initial problem facing U.S. officials 
was to reconcile their traditional attachment to the Monroe Doctrine with their support of the new 
principle of collective security," 59. This is an interesting example of the tension present between the US 
preference, at times, to attend to its own security concerns, and its desire to support the multilateral 
structures which it worked to create.  
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remains a source of debate.51 Nonetheless, US planners identified what they perceived 
as a threat, and responded to it by preparing strategies and force levels to counter it.  
 
It was the beginning of an era in which world politics were dominated by two major, 
nuclear-equipped powers. A cushion of time and space existed due to the geographic 
distance between them, and there is no doubt that this helped catastrophic, overt 
confrontation to be avoided at times.52 However, the tension between the superpowers 
was extremely high at some points. The specter of full-scale, global nuclear war was 
always present, though considered more or less likely at certain times. 
 
The ensuing struggle between the superpowers defined international politics in many 
ways for half a century. To a significant degree, it retarded the development of the 
international order in the postwar years. The Cold War was beginning to define 
international politics at the time of the UN's creation as the centerpiece of a new 
international system. This inhibited the UN's effectiveness in decisionmaking and 
negotiation.53 
 
The USSR and US each saw each other as threatening; in particular, the US focused on 
Soviet "capabilities" rather than "intentions" because the intentions were unknown – 
                                                
51 The parameters of the continuing debate over the "origins of the cold war" are discussed in Melvyn P. 
Leffler and David S. Painter, eds., Origins of the Cold War: An International History, 2nd ed. (New York; 
London: Routledge, 2005). No general agreement exists among scholars as to whether Soviet behavior 
and policies, or American behavior and policies, functioned as the primary cause of the Cold War. An 
interesting comparison of US and Soviet documents that highlight the differing perspectives on the cause 
of the conflict, while not supplying a definitive answer to the debate, can be found in Ralph B. Levering, 
Debating the Origins of the Cold War: American and Russian Perspectives, Debating Twentieth-Century 
America (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002). For the view that the posture and 
strategies of the US served to provoke the Soviet Union, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, 
We All Lost the Cold War, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1994). 
52 Glenn C. Buchan, Future Roles of U.S. Nuclear Forces: Implications for U.S. Strategy (Santa Monica, 
CA: Rand : Project Air Force, 2003) 8-12. 
53 Rolf Ekeus, "New Challenges for the United Nations," in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of 
Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001). 
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and so, Soviet intentions were "assumed to the be the worst possible".54 It was fear that 
the Soviet Union might expand into disaffected parts of Europe that was the impetus 
behind the Marshall Plan and the significant US investment in the reconstruction of 
war-torn societies.55 While US analysts found it difficult to ascertain Soviet intentions, 
they worried that a post-war Europe in economic distress and an Asia with defeated 
Japan and weak China would be prone to communism and Soviet influence.56 Were the 
Soviets to be successful in exercising control over all the resources of Europe and Asia, 
there was a belief that the USSR would be able to out-produce the US in military terms 
in very short order.57  
 
Apprehension about the intentions and capabilities of the USSR only increased in the 
years after World War II. Concern was augmented by the perception of some who 
insisted that the situation was growing more dire for the US. Just two years before 
assuming his place as US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles viewed the USSR as 
experiencing more gains than losses in the nascent post-war period. This led him to 
argue that the US foreign policy of the day was not as active or effective as it should 
have been.58  
 
The US strategic response to this threat was what became known broadly as 
"containment". The term was coined by George Kennan, who later became the first 
director of the Department of State's Policy Planning group.59 The term was introduced 
                                                
54 Gwyn Prins, ed., Defended to Death: A Study of the Nuclear Arms Race (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 
Eng.; New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1983) 25. 
55 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers  464. 
56 Leffler, A Preponderance of Power  60. 
57 Ibid.  61. 
58 John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (London: Harrap, 1950). See especially 162-164 and 174, and 
passim.  
59 George Kennan, Long Telegram 1946 [cited 05 Jan 2006]); available from 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm. While Kennan saw the USSR 
as hostile to the US, he did not view the threat it posed as a primarily military one. As policy increasingly 
focused on the danger posed by the Soviet military, Kennan saw US planning seriously diverging from 
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in the context of maintaining the status quo in Europe by allowing the Soviets to retain 
their present sphere of influence but to disallow further expansion. It would be a 
mistake, however, to place too much emphasis on Kennan's role. Even when 
considering its initial conception, it would be inaccurate or draw him as the sole creator 
of the strategy. Although a full plan for US strategic policy was not formulated, the 
OSS and other US agencies were in agreement in voicing similar concerns and 
proposed solutions – and did so prior to 1946.60  
 
The subsequent iteration of the strategy developed and enshrined in NSC-68 – which 
itself would be followed by other changes in policy that amounted to variations on the 
theme – expanded on the original idea of containment, and argued for a large-scale US 
military buildup and a determination to challenge Communist expansion globally.61 The 
move from a regional to a global focus, the mission to greatly expand military 
capability, and the perception of the Soviet Union as more threatening and less 
reasonable were all changes that moved away from Kennan's original concept and the 
sensibility which gave rise to it.62  
 
In addition to developing the details of a strategic response to the burgeoning Soviet 
threat, US officials gave thought to how to foster support for that response. There was 
also a domestic component to early US Cold War planning. Leaders saw a need to 
                                                                                                                                          
his own estimation of the threat. See George F. Kennan and John Lukacs, George F. Kennan and the 
Origins of Containment, 1944-1946: The Kennan-Lukacs Correspondence (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 1997). Kennan grew to disagree with later, more expansive views of the containment 
strategy.  
60 See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National 
Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). See also Leffler, A Preponderance of Power.  
61 The best overview of these variations, which included President Eisenhower's "New Look", the 
"flexible response" explored by the Kennedy administration, and the period of "detente" enjoyed by 
President Nixon, is found in Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
62 Though planners sincerely viewed the Soviet Union as threatening, a calculated effort existed to 
emphasize that threat as much as possible in order to justify greatly increased military spending after the 
conclusion of World War II. See Fred Kaplan, Paul Nitze: The Man Who Brought Us the Cold War. 
Posted in Slate 21 Oct 2004 [cited 02 Dec 2005]); available from http://www.slate.com/id/2108510/.  
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change prevailing American attitudes that favored existing foreign policy, rather than 
extending the commitments and increasing the cost of that policy. President Truman 
sought just such change in public attitudes by his use of ideological rhetoric. His use of 
ideology and his willingness to put the political capital of his administration at stake 
made it difficult for opposition politicians to challenge the strategic response developed 
by his administration.63  
 
Such "ideological fervor" was useful; by drawing the perceived enemy as antagonistic 
and dangerous, it reduced the possibility that alternative courses of action that might 
rely on compromise and dialogue would be proposed in lieu of the administration's 
favored policy. Yet, this employment of ideology to garner public support for the US 
response to the Soviet threat was not simple, cynical manipulation. The fears held by 
the Truman administration were sincere. Although ideological language can amplify 
and consolidate the perception of a threat, the US leadership believed that threat to be 
real and pressing before it first utilized ideological language.64 While not used in 
precisely the same way or scope by successive presidential administrations, the use of 
ideology continued through to the waning days of the Cold War, when Ronald Reagan 
famously proclaimed the USSR an "evil empire".65  
 
In an important way, the upshot of the Cold War period was that it provided relative 
stability for US foreign policy. The Cold War saw structural changes such as the end of 
colonialism and the emergence of new states, but the broad structure of international 
                                                
63 Leffler, A Preponderance of Power  146. 
64 Ibid. 
65 United States. President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), Remarks at the Annual Convention of the 
National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida on 08 Mar 1983 [cited 15 Dec 2006]); available 
from http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech_srch.html. 
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relations remained fairly constant or slow-changing.66 US politics around the nation's 
foreign policy mirrored this constancy. There was broad consensus on the Soviet Union 
and world communism posing a threat to the vital interests of the US, and on the 
appropriate policy response being that of containment and subsequently deterrence, 
which can be regarded as one means of securing the containment of the Soviet Union.67  
 
When considering the goals and objectives of the planners of the post-1945 
international order mentioned above, one can see that US efforts to set up structures 
supportive of a global stability that was conducive to American interests and values 
were compatible – indeed, complementary to – the broad strategy of containment that 
was pursued. After the US emerged as the hegemonic power at the end of World War II 
there were two overarching features of its national security policies. The first was 
containment, which guided foreign policy, bureaucratic and military planning and 
actions in response to the Soviet Union – the only real potential military competitor 
among its peers. Containment of the Soviet threat eventually was no longer needed, as 
the Cold War drew to a close in 1990. However, the second feature – the establishment 
of an international order supportive of western liberal democratic capitalist economies, 
and institutionalized in large part because of US initiative and support – has proved 
more durable and lasting, even into the post-Cold War world.68  
 
                                                
66 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World, 
1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 2001) 264. 
67 Ibid. Within this broad consensus, there were disagreements with "hawks" advocating "rollback" and 
"doves" advocating "engagement", but the overall general agreement remained.  
68 Ikenberry, "Liberal Hegemony," 123-126. 
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Post-Cold War 
 
The end of the Cold War brought with it an end to whatever relative stability may have 
attended US foreign and national security policy. The ambiguity surrounding the 
identification of vital interests became more pronounced. Small-scale conflicts and 
emergency situations have become more commonplace since the end of the Cold War, 
and the US has been confronted with what some have termed small "wars of choice" 
rather than large "wars of necessity".69  
 
The end of the Cold War not only brought to a close the struggle between the 
superpowers, but also affected all of the other relationships in the international 
community. The entire international system had been permeated by the considerations 
and relationships occasioned by the Cold War. It is because of this fundamental change 
that other changes were possible – not all of them either beneficent or clear, both for the 
international system as a whole, or for the US in particular.  
 
Domestically in the US, the end of Cold War produced new political coalitions. 
Politicians and constituencies left without the half century of Cold War threat to unite 
them, began to realign themselves according to more narrowly-held perceptions of 
threat and values. Most elite opinion in the decade after the Cold War came to see an 
opportunity such as existed previously only in 1919 or 1945 to influence the global 
order.70 There were, however, notable differences in emphasis. Some US lawmakers 
                                                
69 The phrases have been used to distinguish between the use of military force as self-defense against an 
evident threat, and other purposes that have a less apparent and more indirect link to self-defense. 
Krauthammer labels the 1999 Kosovo campaign and similar humanitarian actions as "wars of choice", 
while the US War on Terror is one of necessity, as was World War II; see Charles Krauthammer, "Wars 
of Choice, Wars of Necessity," TIME, 05 Nov 2001. See also Richard N. Haass, "Wars of Choice," 
Washington Post, 23 Nov 2003. Haass agrees that the US War on Terror is one of necessity, but argues 
that the US invasion of Iraq constituted a separate "war of choice".  
70 Mead, Special Providence  268. 
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emphasized support for international law, democracy, and the promotion of 
international consensus to counter aggression and protect human rights. Others focused 
on furthering global trade and finance underpinned by US military and economic might. 
There were those, too, who although a small minority, felt that whether taking the form 
of international laws or world trade regimes, that the US was making a mistake by 
seeking such a degree of global involvement.71 While the end of the Cold War may 
have brought about new coalitions in US politics, it did not produce a consensus around 
US priorities and policies.  
 
Disagreement within the US on the fundamentals of foreign and national security policy 
continues. It is impossible to predict the future; and to hope that future trends will be 
more easily discerned in the complex environment of international relations than they 
have been in the past is probably unrealistic. After all, the end of the Cold War took 
diplomats, academics, and military planners by surprise. Still, some factors seem to 
have more staying power than others, and some trends appear more likely to persist than 
others.  
 
Historically, conceptions of US national security have both expanded and contracted. 
Perhaps future conceptions of security will depend on which nations, regions, and issues 
to regard as vital and which not. National security will most likely continue to mean a 
continued emphasis on economic growth and strength. Another aspect that seems 
unlikely to change in the near term is the way in which the US defines (at least in part) 
its security in terms of the democratic independence of other nations in the world. 
Finally, the parameters of US national security have expanded periodically in the 
                                                
71 Ibid.  268-269. Mead views the George H. W. Bush and Clinton presidencies as globalist (reflecting 
"Hamiltonian" and "Wilsonian" elements in Mead's terminology). In contrast, the George W. Bush 
presidency is seen to have modified these elements of policy, and to have courted more isolationist and 
bellicose elements of the US electorate. 
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nation's history, and there are indications that the years of the post-Cold War world are 
such a period of expansion. Therefore the concept of national security will most likely 
continue to expand as it has in the past, but will still be constrained and guided by the 
US liberal democratic tradition.72  
 
Technology and the Proliferation of WMD 
 
Changes in technology affect perceived threats, and alter strategic goals by altering the 
logic or prudence of previous policy. One of the most significant technological 
transformations of the 20th century was the advent of nuclear weapons. While some 
argue that these weapons may have increased international stability in some sense, they 
also brought about the possibility of truly catastrophic conflict.73 In any event, there can 
be no doubt in this case that the advance of technology brought about a qualitatively 
new kind of threat; it also brought with it new conceptualizations of both national 
security and international stability.  
 
The dissemination of knowledge and spread of technology also affect the strategic goals 
of states. This makes the trade in advanced weaponry a serious concern. Even weapons 
that are not classed as WMD have the potential of significantly impacting the military 
capability of rivals. Such is the concern when the US considers the purchase of 
advanced conventional weapons from Russia by countries such as China and Iran.74  
 
                                                
72 May, "National Security in American History," 112-114. 
73 Charles A. Kupchan, "Empires and Geopolitical Competition: Gone for Good?," in Turbulent Peace: 
The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and 
Pamela R. Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 45. 
74 Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala, U.S. National Security  26. 
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Concern about the proliferation of WMD is just as serious, but of a different category. 
In many ways potential proliferation was less problematic to plan for when the primary 
WMD threat was from two monolithic sources: the US and USSR. Since the end of the 
Cold War, an increasing number of possible sources of WMD have come into being. 
This has meant a corresponding decrease in the ability to monitor all likely sources of 
proliferation, plan for them, and prevent any such weapons – or materials which could 
be weaponized – from being transferred to or otherwise acquired by sub-state groups.  
 
While biological and chemical weapons are not as easy to produce as sometimes 
claimed, they are "within the intellectual, financial, and technological reach of many 
groups and individuals".75 Bioterror attacks are relatively easy to mount, requiring only 
a few individuals with specialized skills and access to a lab.76 Sub-state groups and 
individuals have a larger number of potential biological and chemical agents to choose 
from than have professional militaries in the past. A nation's military was somewhat 
limited by the necessity of researching and developing agents that met certain standards, 
such as the ability to be produced in quantity, meet a certain quality required for 
efficient weaponization, and be stable and predictable enough to handle, transport, and 
store safely.77 Experts expect the number of potential biological agents that might be 
used as weapons will continue to increase as developments in bioengineering 
continue.78   
 
                                                
75 Frederick J. Manning and Lewis R. Goldfrank, eds., Preparing for Terrorism: Tools for Evaluating the 
Metropolitan Medical Response System Program (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2002) 18. 
76 National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism., 
Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington, 
DC: National Academy Press, 2002) 32, 67.  
77 Institute of Medicine (US), Committee on R&D Needs for Improving Civilian Medical Response to 
Chemical and Biological Terrorism Incidents, and National Research Council (US) Board on 
Environmental Studies and Toxicology, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Research and Development 
to Improve Civilian Medical Response (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999) 20-21. 
78 Ibid.  22. 
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In addition, chemical, biological, and radiological agents are believed to be attractive to 
would-be terrorists for a number of reasons. One of these is that a relatively small 
amount of such an agent, if dispersed efficiently, can cause as many casualties and as 
large a disruption as an attack using conventional explosives.79 Due to the fact that even 
a small amount can yield a large result, the ease with which an agent can be hidden and 
transported is increased. Further, the fact that some chemical and biological agents are 
difficult to detect and identify, and may remain a long-lasting threat once released, 
increases the potential psychological effect of such an attack.80  
 
Proliferation has been a concern since the first chemical, biological and nuclear 
weapons were developed. Efforts existed during the Cold War to limit proliferation, 
especially of nuclear weapons. However, in the post-Cold War world the threat has 
become more pronounced. There is a fear that the possibility of nuclear proliferation has 
been spreading to parts of the world where it was not a concern during the Cold War 
years.81  
 
In terms of nuclear devices, the type of expertise needed to actually produce a viable 
bomb is more advanced. More importantly, the infrastructure required for a nuclear 
weapons program is much larger than that which is potentially needed for chemical and 
biological weapons. Facilities required for nuclear research, refinement, and enrichment 
take longer to develop and are usually more easily noticed – although certainly not 
                                                
79 Manning and Goldfrank, eds., Preparing for Terrorism: Tools for Evaluating the Metropolitan Medical 
Response System Program. 
80 Adrienne Stith Butler, Allison M. Panzer, and Lewis R. Goldfrank, eds., Preparing for the 
Psychological Consequences of Terrorism: A Public Health Strategy (Washington, DC: National 
Academies Press, 2003) 60. 
81 Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala, U.S. National Security  26. 
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always detected. Overall, this makes the production of nuclear weapons more difficult 
than the production of chemical and biological ones.82  
 
However, while the development of nuclear weapons might be decidedly more difficult, 
a number of nation-states appear to be committed to developing them. This is cause for 
concern, because it is at the state level that adequate expertise and resources can be 
brought to bear to support the infrastructure needs of such a nuclear program. In 
addition, states may shorten the time needed to develop WMD by "hiring in" foreign 
expertise. The possibility of acquiring the required technology and expertise on the 
open market, by states hoping to become nuclear powers or by sub-state terrorist groups 
seeking a nuclear weapon or fissile material, remains a grave and pressing concern.83  
 
Sub-State Terrorism  
 
Likewise, the increase in terrorism by sub-state groups is harder to monitor than the 
Soviet threat. The large number of groups, and the ability of individuals to threaten the 
economic and political stability of a great power such as the US, is also a serious 
concern. These concerns are directly related to the worries surrounding the continued 
development and proliferation of WMD. There exists the very real possibility that such 
weapons might come into the possession of a sub-state terrorist group. Some groups 
have already stated their desire to acquire and utilize such weapons, demonstrating that 
they may well be less constrained in their behavior than nation-states have been.84  
 
                                                
82 Matthew J. Morgan, "The Origins of the New Terrorism," Parameters 34, no. 1 (2004). 
83 Charles D. Ferguson, "On the Loose: The Market for Nuclear Weapons," Harvard International Review 
27, no. 4 (2006). Ferguson notes the network of Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan as the best known 
example of technical nuclear plans and expertise being offered for sale. Iran, Libya, and North Korea all 
availed themselves of the Khan network in seeking nuclear weapons expertise.  
84 Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala, U.S. National Security  26. 
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1.4  US National Security Adjustments Occasioned by Changes within the 
International Order 
 
Some US national security purposes are occasioned by changes in the international 
system. Some of these are slow-moving structural changes that are discernible, but 
gradual. The relative strengthening and weakening of the world's other great powers is 
an example of such structural changes. Changes in relative power can alter a state's 
goals and intentions, and the way in which others perceive it. The perception of a state 
as an antagonist or non-antagonist is changeable, and alters the manner in which others 
attempt to influence its behavior. 
 
Rise Of China 
 
The People's Republic of China is viewed by the US as growing in stature and 
importance. China is the most populous nation in the world. It is generally believed that 
its economy will be the world's largest in a short time. Geopolitically, its influence 
rivals that of the US within its own region, which encompasses the Pacific Ocean and 
Southeast Asia. China is dealing with bridging its past identity as a major communist 
state and international leader in the communist movement, with its economic growth 
and its potential for liberal economic and political reforms in the future.85  
 
That China ranks as one of the world's great powers, and thus must be included in the 
security considerations of the US, is generally accepted. Some would assert that the US 
is guilty of naivety in gauging the true objectives and aspirations of China, and that its 
                                                
85 Ibid.  24. 
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designs are more aggressive than the US estimates.86 Since it is probably impossible to 
ever know with certainty another state's "true intentions", planning often revolves 
around analyzing the capabilities and past behavior of potential antagonists. In terms of 
its relative growth, potential economic and military power, and past behavior, US 
planners find China worrying.  
 
Its growing economy means that China has built a large foreign exchange reserve, and 
in effect uses dollars generated from trade with the US to purchase weapons systems 
from Russia, among others.87 Related to China's growing economic strength is the fact 
that it has taken the lead among Asian nations in effectively propping up a deficit US 
economy.88 The US current account deficit – the difference between the nation's 
national savings and national investment – has been increasing rapidly in recent years. 
This is due partly to consumer spending in the US, which has continued apace although 
private and public saving has declined.  
 
However, the largest factor contributing to the increase in the current account deficit is 
US government borrowing due to the federal budget deficit. From September 2000 to 
September 2005, the total federal debt had grown 2.3 trillion dollars, an increase of 
40%. During this time period, US government debt held by foreign owners almost 
doubled, increasing 1.1 trillion dollars.89 Another way of stating this reliance of the US 
government on foreigners to finance its deficit is that the proportion of the federal debt 
held by other nations increased from 22% in 1995 to over 43% in 2004. This situation 
has potentially negative consequences for the US, as it is unclear for how long central 
                                                
86 Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, 1st ed. (New York: A.A. 
Knopf : Distributed by Random House, 1997). See particularly Chapter 8, "China Versus America: A 
War Game", 186-202.  
87 Ibid.  207-208. 
88 Ray Barrell, Ali Al- Eyd, and Olga Pomerantz, "Dollars and Deficits: The US Current Account Deficit 
and Its Exchange Rate Consequences," National Institute Economic Review, no. 191 (2005). 
89 United States Department of the Treasury, "The Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It" 19 May 2006 
[cited 25 May 2006]); available from http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/opd/opdpdodt.htm. 
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banks in Asia – especially China's – will continue to be "willing to finance the US 
imbalance" in this manner.90  
 
The US and China also have a history of past confrontation, which has not been erased 
by periods of relative rapprochement between the two nations. For example, the 
relationship between China and the US is complicated by a unique feature, the disputed 
and ambiguous status of Taiwan.91 In addition, several actions taken by China in recent 
years are interpreted as signaling less than benign intent, and have certainly been 
interpreted as provocative from the point of the US.  
 
In recent years, China has taken control of Mischief Reef, a disputed territory that had 
been held by the Philippines. It has also sold nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan, 
as well as missiles to Iran. The PRC has given rhetorical or material support to countries 
which have problematic relations with the US, such as Iran, Sudan, and Nigeria. China 
has been extremely interested accessing the natural resources of African nations – 
resources such as oil and minerals – in order to help feed its rapid economic growth. At 
a recent summit in China, attended by representatives from dozens of African countries, 
Chinese firms signed deals worth almost two billion dollars to develop infrastructure 
and industry in various African nations.92 This is part of a recent trend that has seen 
China signing trade deals with African nations, increasing its foreign aid to the 
continent, and taking a larger role in African peacekeeping missions than ever before – 
                                                
90 Barrell, Eyd, and Pomerantz, "Dollars and Deficits: The US Current Account Deficit and Its Exchange 
Rate Consequences." 
91 Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China. See particularly Chapter 6, "Flashpoint: 
Taiwan", pp.149-165.  
92 Chen Aizhu and Lindsay Beck, "Chinese-African Summit Yields $1.9 Billion in Deals," Washington 
Post, 06 Nov 2006. 
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all of which are seen as improving China's reputation among African nations, and 
strengthening its relations with them.93  
 
China has also warned its regional neighbors that they should pay more heed to its 
wishes than to those of the US or other states geographically outside of Asia. Not least, 
China has indicated that its nuclear arsenal is targeted at the US.94 These public actions 
have been taken against the backdrop of key elements of the Chinese government and 
military viewing the US as China's main adversary, and the greatest threat confronting 
their country.  
 
Continuing Transition Of Russia 
 
Finally, although the Soviet Union's dissolution was completed in the early 1990s, 
Russia continues to be in a state of transition. Even though the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union was of a unique character, Russia remains a great power which must be 
factored into US calculations of national security. As a military power, its aging and 
shrinking nuclear arsenal is still by far the second-largest in the world. As a political 
power, it retains a permanent UNSC seat and important relationships forged during the 
Cold War. Russia has significant influence with the newly independent states of Europe. 
While its domestic economy may be weak, its natural resources (such as its oil and gas 
reserves) are becoming increasingly important to global security concerns. Russia thus 
retains immense strategic importance.95  
 
                                                
93 Colum Lynch, "China Filling Void Left by West in U.N. Peacekeeping: Despite Its Misgivings, Nation 
Is Now 13th-Largest Contributor to Missions as Major Powers Withdraw," Washington Post, 24 Nov 
2006. 
94 Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China  20. 
95 Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala, U.S. National Security  24. 
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In the years since coming to power in 2000, Vladimir Putin has been viewed as 
committed to strengthening Russia's position in international politics. The fact that 
Russia has continued work on implementing economic reforms and stabilizing its 
internal, post-Soviet political situation has not done away with the fear that a Russia 
under Putin's leadership might evolve into a revanchist threat.96 Indeed, some experts on 
the country warn that the US is guilty of naivety in gauging the true objectives and 
intentions of Russia; they see its designs as having been more malevolent than the US 
thought in the past, and believe the same is probably true of its post-Cold War 
incarnation.97 In taking this view, they voice concerns that are similar to those held by 
others about China.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Just as the unique disposition of the US and changes to and within the international 
system have acted together to influence the formation of past policy, so they continue to 
influence the latest great change in national security policy, which was embodied in the 
2002 National Security Strategy of the US. Before turning to that latest – and in some 
ways most contentious – change in policy, it is necessary to first look at the mechanisms 
and processes through which the US synthesizes the variables discussed in this chapter, 
in order to reassess its strategic purposes.  
 
       
                                                
96 Ibid.  24, 28. 
97 Fred Coleman, The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Empire: Forty Years That Shook the World, from 
Stalin to Yeltsin, 1st ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). 
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2.0 The Framing of US National Security – Structures and Processes  
2.1  Structures  
 
The thesis to this point has discussed what national security means in general, and has 
then focused on the US in particular – including the approach the US has taken to 
national security since the end of World War II. The particular US national security 
objectives that were brought about by changes to the international system were 
considered; then the particular national security objectives that were occasioned by 
changes within the international system were touched upon. This thesis will now move 
on to the national security structures and processes that the US has intentionally 
developed or that have grown up around US needs.  
 
For the purposes of this discussion, the terms "structures" and "processes" will be used. 
The word "mechanism" is used as a convenience to describe both structures and 
processes, or to describe what the two together amount to. "Structures" will refer to the 
formalized systems – whether executive, bureaucratic, legal, administrative – which 
facilitate the achievement or maintenance of desired states or outcomes. For example, 
the NSC is a structure whose purpose is to help ensure the safety and security of the US. 
"Processes", however, will refer to the means by which structures function effectively, 
especially with respect to changing or unexpected circumstances. Processes, therefore, 
may be thought of here as the creative, functional means by which structures operate.  
 
There is of course overlap between the structures and processes that frame US national 
security policy.98 Some structures have little practical relevance if viewed in isolation 
                                                
98 Although the phrase "national security policy" often has a quite specific reference to mandated NSS 
reports, the phrase also refers to a large number of federal structures and processes that have a primary or 
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from the conventional processes that imbue them with meaning (e.g., the formal 
structure of the NSC). And to the extent that some processes have been established by 
law, they are less flexible than processes that have arisen out of convention or practical 
necessity. Processes mandated by law are formalized in much the same way that 
structures are. The distinction between structures and processes is a useful one when 
considering the differences between formal systems and their practical implementation. 
However, this distinction is not an absolute one and some facets of US national security 
mechanisms can be understood or interpreted as both structure and process. This is the 
case when considering mandated processes. For example, the US Congress – itself a 
structure integral to the US national security policy system – may pass a law requiring 
that a certain process be followed (by itself or another structure).  
 
Congress  
 
There are fundamental structures that have been established by the US Constitution 
which function, in part, to frame national security interests, objectives, and means. The 
authority of Congress derives from its constitutional role as the legislative branch of the 
US government, and its representation of the American people who elect the body. The 
Congress can express its support of or dissatisfaction with broad strategies, or specific 
ends and means. The Congress may express itself rhetorically; through voting on 
budgetary and other matters; or by exercising its ability to oversee the activities of the 
Executive branch.  
 
There have been periods of greater or lesser inclination on the part of the Congress to 
involve itself in national security strategy. Long before the term "national security" was 
                                                                                                                                          
secondary role in supporting what is generally classed under that heading at any particular time; it is this 
more general meaning that is referred to here. 
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in usage, Congress fluctuated in its desire to involve itself and influence the foreign 
policy of the US, and in curtailing the Executive's use of the military. These may be 
seen as part of an inherent tension between the Executive and the Congress over the 
boundaries of Executive power.99  
 
Congress influences national security policy in ways other than through its voting. This 
may be done by presenting issues in a certain way in the media, or to other audiences; or 
by passing resolutions that rhetorically help frame national security debates or otherwise 
influence policy formation.100 Individual members can also have influence through 
rhetoric and the advocacy of certain views, although they may carry less weight than 
statements resolved and passed by the Congress as a whole.  
 
Over the past four decades Congress has sought to become a more active participant in 
matters of national security policy.101 A significant reason cited for this is US military 
involvement in Vietnam. Because of that divisive war, and augmented by a number of 
scandals and perceived failures on the part of the Presidency – such as the Watergate 
scandal, the Iran hostage crisis, and the Iran-Contra arms trade scandal – the Congress 
became far less willing to cede authority in matters of security to the President. It had 
been more willing to do so in the years immediately after the Second World War. There 
had been a perception then that the Executive, as the entity in possession of the best 
information about risk, potential adversaries, and the best way to defend against them, 
should be given latitude in the policy formation regarding such matters.  
 
                                                
99 Edward Samuel Corwin, The President, Office and Powers, 1787-1957; History and Analysis of 
Practice and Opinion, 4th rev. ed. (New York,: New York University Press, 1957). 
100 Jeremy D. Rosner, The New Tug-of-War: Congress, the Executive Branch, and National Security 
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995) 10. 
101 Richard Haass, "Congressional Power: Implications for American Security Policy," Adelphi Papers, 
no. 153 (1979). 
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The Congress has itself developed many of the resources necessary to evaluate national 
security policy, in terms of research ability and specialized staffing to work on such 
issues. A significant growth in Congressional staff has occurred during the past 40 
years. Particularly, Congressional reforms led to an increase in personal staffs and 
committee staffs in the early 1970s; this enhanced the ability of the Congress to evaluate 
national security ends and means. In addition to increases in Congressional staffing, 
increased staffing at federal institutions provided improved services to Congress in 
terms of researching and evaluating issues. New institutions included the Congressional 
Budget Office and Office of Technology Assessment (now closed), while increased 
staffing occurred at the General Accounting Office and Congressional Research Service 
(part of the Library of Congress).102  
 
The number and length of committee hearings, length of committee reports, and number 
of officials from the Executive required to appear before committees have all expanded; 
this has been made possible by the increased staffing just noted.103 These changes help 
to explain how Congress reviews requests to approve budget requests or particular 
policy approaches in terms of staff expertise and manpower. Related to this ability is the 
historical willingness of the Congress to deal assertively with national security and 
defense budgets, which as mentioned above have generally increased over the last 40 
years.  
 
There is a strong constitutional basis for the Congress involving itself in the formation 
and evaluation of national security policy. It is charged with advising and consenting to 
                                                
102 Ralph G. Carter, "Budgeting for Defense," in The President, the Congress, and the Making of Foreign 
Policy, ed. Paul E. Peterson (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), 173. See Fig.2. 
103 Ibid., 174. 
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treaties, and to financing the proposed activities of the Executive branch. It is to the 
Congress that the Constitution grants the power to raise and fund armies.104  
 
The Congress can greatly impact the formulation of national security policy, not least 
through its budgetary function. The resourcing of the numerous objectives of national 
security policy is of crucial importance. If Congress strongly disagrees with a proposed 
national security goal, or the proposed means of achieving an agreed goal, it may deny 
funding through the annual appropriations process. Even if the Congress agrees with 
proposed goals and the proposed means of achieving them – at least publicly – it may 
deny the resources necessary to implement those means in any sort of practical sense.  
 
In addition to withholding support for specific activities meant to implement specific 
policies, Congress may also impact policy through its ability to allocate or withhold 
funding from the federal government in more general terms. This might be done at the 
level of the total federal budget, or certain departments and agencies might be targeted. 
Just how Congress plays this procedural role will be discussed in Section 2.2 below.  
 
The politics inherent in a two-party democratic system of government also influence the 
disposition and actions taken by the Congress. What was termed "divided government" 
emerged as an issue in the 1970s; that is, the Congress and the Executive were rarely 
controlled by the same party. This problem, exhibited as an ongoing contentiousness 
that inhibits policymaking, was exacerbated by Congressional reforms in the 1970s 
which "decentralized decision making" in the Congress.105  
 
                                                
104 The Constitution of the United States. See Section 8.  
105 William J. Taylor and Don M. Snider, "U.S. National Security Agenda and U.S. National Security 
Policy: Realities and Dilemmas," in U.S. Domestic and National Security Agendas: Into the Twenty-First 
Century, ed. Sam Charles Sarkesian and John Mead Flanagin (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 
110. 
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Partisanship also plays a part in Congress' inclination to involve itself in matters of 
national security policy. Differences of opinion between the Congress and the Executive 
about how national security interests are defined and protected may be quite sincere. 
Nonetheless, Ralph Carter has shown that spending requests from the Executive have a 
markedly better chance of being revised downward when Congress is controlled by the 
party in opposition to the President. Interestingly, when one party has controlled the 
Senate and the other has controlled the House, Executive spending requests have 
experienced even greater cuts, indicating how partisan rifts within the two 
Congressional chambers may pose a greater challenge to Executive planning than 
partisanship between the Executive and legislative branches.106  
 
Further, the prime consideration of most Senators and Representatives is retaining the 
favor of their constituents. During peacetime, the public is not heavily invested in its 
own subjective judgments about foreign policy. The public holds opinions about the 
foreign policy of the US, and opinions on how well that policy is being carried out. 
However, the public's interest in foreign policy is often overshadowed by more pressing 
domestic concerns.  
 
Thus it is far from clear that the Congress is simply out of step with the public's views, 
or dismissive of them, when one attempts to explain why Congress sometimes pursues 
isolationist initiatives despite polls showing that most Americans hold internationalist 
views.107 Rather, some argue that the reason lies in the fact that the public's opinion on 
matters of security and international affairs is not predominant during peacetime. The 
political reality of campaigning means international affairs are used only selectively and 
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opportunistically during campaigns; there is a difference "between public opinion and 
electoral politics".108 
 
Executive  
 
The role of the President, as both Chief of the Executive branch of the government and 
Commander-in-Chief of the military, is central to the formation and execution of US 
policy. If Congressional representatives are sometimes allowed to gloss over 
international affairs and national security issues in favor of domestic issues, the same 
can not quite be said of Presidents. Although domestic issues can have enormous 
impacts on the Executive branch, the President must balance – and the public expects 
him to balance – such issues with essential national security concerns that may not have 
immediate salience on the domestic scene.  
 
In presidential politics, candidates must be seen as strong leaders, fully capable of 
fulfilling the Commander-in-Chief role, and possessing an enunciated foreign policy 
and national security goals. Candidates who visibly lack this will face a much more 
difficult road to election, regardless of their domestic proposals. As one scholar put it, 
"National security in general is a gateway through which all presidential candidates 
must pass before voters will hear them out on their domestic and economic 
proposals."109  
 
In the US, there exist both civilian leadership and military leadership of the armed 
forces; both fall within the Executive branch of the US government. The President of 
course functions as the Commander-in-Chief of the military, a role laid out in the US 
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Constitution. The military is certainly distinct from its civilian counterparts in terms of 
personnel and structure: rules, standards, and culture all differ. Relations between 
military leaders and their civilian counterparts is an important one and deserving of 
study.110 However, the military leadership is ultimately responsible to the President. It is 
a civilian, the Secretary of Defense, who is appointed by the President to oversee all 
branches of the US military. The Joint Chiefs of Staff report to the Defense Secretary.  
 
The magnitude of the Executive's influence on the national security process becomes 
evident when we consider ad hoc reviews and policies implemented by the President or 
in the name of the President; and when one examines the national security structure – 
built around and dependent upon the person of the President – that was first formulated 
in the years immediately following World War II. These two features of Executive 
involvement in national security formulation will now be addressed in turn.  
 
Ad Hoc "Doctrines" Or Reviews  
 
Many of the structures associated with the framing of national security policy in the US 
are meant to function on a routine basis, in terms of the frequency of their activity and 
the fundamental character of their function. In addition, periodic reviews of existing 
policy and the development of novel approaches are undertaken on an ad hoc basis, and 
in response to changes in the international environment. Significant examples would 
include NSC-68, a landmark report dealing with the containment of the Soviet Union 
                                                
110 See, e.g., Peter Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United 
States, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1992). Also Dana 
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which was undertaken at the direction of President Truman;111 the report of the 
Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, which was requested by President 
Reagan's National Security Council and the Department of Defense, which 
recommended that military strategy focus less singularly on the Soviet Union;112 and the 
National Security Review carried out at the direction of President George H.W. Bush at 
the beginning of his presidency, a review which looked forward to a post-Cold War 
world and the new strategies that would be needed to address it.113 Ad hoc reviews such 
as these, and the strategies that often flow from them, occur in response to events and at 
the initiative of the Executive branch rather than as a pre-determined imperative to 
produce a "strategic" report at a certain time.  
 
Ad hoc reviews are most often, although not exclusively, done within the Executive. 
This is because the Congress has historically found itself more active in responding to 
security policies set by the Executive than in attempting to create and define such 
national policies on its own. Within the Executive, the entity charged with carrying out 
such reviews has varied over time. A primary reason for this has been the involvement 
of the President in deciding when and how to carry out such reviews. Thus, such policy 
reviews and the development of new strategies have not been fixed in nature, and have 
depended upon the personalities and needs present at the time.  
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Some of these ad hoc reviews have been spurred by changing international features. For 
example, the Cold War occasioned the creation of a number of strategies centered 
around the idea of containment, as mentioned in Chapter 1. One of the most significant 
of these was NSC-68, as mentioned above. NSC-68 is notable in that it served as the 
basis for much of US national security strategy thinking for dealing with the Soviet 
Union. The document was not simply a military strategy, but included consideration of 
economic, political and psychological matters.114 Despite being published as a classified 
NSC document, NSC-68 was actually not a product of the NSC, "but rather of a joint 
State-Defense Department study group".115 During the years that Henry Kissinger 
served as NSC Advisor and Secretary of State, the US national strategy became less 
broad-based and more focused on purely military matters. The emphasis on military 
strategy has continued in the years since, although some insiders have attempted to 
lessen the reliance of US strategic thinking on military options.116  
 
Likewise, it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that provided much of the emphasis 
for what became known as the "Carter Doctrine" in 1980. In his State of the Union 
Address that year, President Carter announced that any move by a power to take control 
of the Persian Gulf region would be prevented by the US, using any necessary means, 
including military force.117 Such policy announcements may also be regarded as ad hoc 
and irregular in frequency, and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.  
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While never easy, in the years since the end of the Cold War, achieving bipartisan 
consensus on national security policy has proved especially difficult.118 There has not 
been a security strategy developed since the fall of the USSR that has been as widely 
accepted as the containment of the Soviet Union was.  The fall of the Soviet Union 
changed how threats were defined and military force structures were planned in 
response.  
 
While the world is arguably safer from the threat of an inter-state nuclear exchange 
now, it is also less stable. The lack of a need for global containment led to an ability to 
emphasize regional focuses on economic issues and regional stability in the 1990s.119 
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 have proven to be a catalyst for discussion 
about the threats of sub-state terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, but a broadly 
accepted bipartisan national security policy has not yet emerged. Democrats and 
Republicans continue to wrangle over policies meant to address terrorism and WMD, 
with Iraq being an obvious point of contention.120 Indeed, the ongoing US involvement 
in Iraq has exposed differences of opinion within the Republican party over national 
security policy.121 The 2002 NSS formulated by the Bush administration may become a 
lasting strategy, but it possesses contentious aspects that do not bode well for it 
becoming as widely accepted in Washington policymaking circles as containment was 
in years past. 
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The NSC Structure/System  
 
The National Security Act was passed in July 1947, and created a number of new 
agencies such as the National Security Council (NSC) and Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA).122 The Act also established the National Military Establishment (NME). The 
NME included the executive departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as 
other bodies. A new configuration was also created within the US military, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS).  
 
Congress implemented an important statutory change to the National Security Act of 
1947 in the form of the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, which were passed 
in June of that year. Several modifications were brought about by the Amendments. The 
NME was renamed the Department of Defense and "upgraded ... to an executive 
department". The Amendments also bolstered and clarified the authority of the 
Secretary of Defense, and created the position of Chairman of the JCS. Further, the 
standing of the military services were diminished, as they were redefined as 
departments within Department of Defense; a part of this redefinition included the 
removal of the service Secretaries as statutory members of the NSC.123  
 
The primary purpose of the Amendments was to address problems associated with the 
position of the Secretary of Defense. These problems stemmed from the Secretary of 
Defense's lack of ability to manage a decentralized military structure. James Forrestal, 
who had been appointed by President Truman as the first Secretary of Defense, had 
previously (as Secretary of the Navy) championed this decentralization. However, after 
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assuming the office of Secretary of Defense, Forrestal came to see this position as 
unworkable as initially configured.124  
 
The NSC was seen as important in increasing coordination and cooperation "between 
political and military agencies"; that is, integrating the policies of defense agencies and 
foreign relations agencies.125 The NSC was envisioned as being an agency which would 
gather and analyze information for the President and offer expert advice on matters of 
national security. The NSC has always been advisory to the President, unlike some 
other departments such as the Department of State. The NSC was not conceived of as a 
policymaking entity, and has not functioned as one during its history (with perhaps 
some brief exceptions, such as when some NSC staff stepped outside of these bounds 
during the Iran-Contra scandal). Yet, while the NSC was not formally charged with 
policymaking at its creation, contemporary observers detected a threat in the NSC 
potentially assuming much of the State Department's role as the premier formulator and 
conductor of foreign policy on the President's behalf.126   
 
The National Security Act intended that NSC staff be overseen by an Executive 
Secretary. Eisenhower created the position of "Special Assistant" in 1953, and the 
Executive Secretary position has remained vacant ever since. The Special Assistant 
(often referred to as "Advisor") does not need Senate approval. Presidents have often 
forbidden them from testifying before Congress.127 
 
The NSC was originally legislated to include the President, Secretary of State, Secretary 
of Defense, and Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Also, several statutory 
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members were included that no longer exist, such as the Chairman of the National 
Security Resources Board (NSRB), Chairman of the Munitions Board, Chairman of the 
Research and Development Board, and the Director for Mutual Security. Additionally, 
other cabinet members could be included as members if the President so desired. As 
mentioned, the 1949 Amendments dropped the three military service Secretaries from 
the Council; they also added the Vice President.128  
 
Since the creation of the Department of Defense (DoD), there has been a trend to further 
centralize strategic planning and budgeting within the Department. Notably, advocacy 
of increased centralization has continued both in terms of planning and implementation, 
as made apparent in recent discussion of the extent to which defense intelligence 
functions should be combined.129 A similar effort may currently be seen in attempts to 
consolidate government power in the Executive branch, and to consolidate Executive 
branch power in institutions close to the Executive Office of the President.130 As regards 
the Department of Defense, this trend is evidenced most by successive legislative efforts 
to increase the authority and purview of the Secretary of Defense, a position that was 
itself created by the same Act that established the DoD, and the NSC, among other 
provisions. These efforts occurred in tandem with moves to unify the various military 
services, in terms of command, planning, and budgeting.  
 
Even after the DoD was created, the services engaged in bitter disputes about the nature 
of future threats, US security needs, their role in meeting those needs – and thus their 
share of a limited defense budget. Each service saw their own role as the one of most 
use to meeting new and future challenges. Each had its own planning process which 
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created budget requests and conducted its own research to support those requests. As 
one might imagine, these separate planning processes with each emphasizing (perhaps 
over-emphasizing) the role to be played by the service which sponsored it, resulted in a 
regular situation in which the budget requests being made by the military were much too 
high to be feasible. The individual budgets and funding requests, when taken together, 
far exceeded the funding that the Congress could reasonably be expected to provide.  
 
Early efforts to curb this tendency were made by the first Secretary of Defense, James 
Forrestal, who attempted to coax the heads of the military services into agreeing to 
voluntary reductions in their respective budgets. His attempts were not very successful, 
and the continuing issue of incompatible budget requests prompted further efforts to 
centralize planning and curb excessive requests. Successive defense reorganizations 
successfully centralized power, administratively, with the Secretary of Defense. The 
Secretary's powers were "progressively enhanced" by the 1949 Amendments and by 
reorganizations in 1953 and 1958.131  
 
This formation and evolution of the national security structure, in particular the Defense 
Department and the NSC itself, had some influence on other agencies in the US federal 
bureaucracy. It is outside the scope of this investigation to attempt to comprehensively 
identify any agency or departmental development that was catalyzed by the creation of 
the NSC structure. However, it is important to remember that government structures not 
strictly within the NSC were evolving concurrently. One such bureaucratic evolution 
that was bit within the NSC structure, but which was responding to similar 
environmental stimuli, was the Policy Planning group at the US Department of State. 
George Kennan set up and was the first director of the Policy Planning Staff: "the first 
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regular office of the Department of State to be charged in our time with looking at 
problems from the standpoint of the totality of American national interest, as distinct 
from a single portion of it".132  It was another head of the Policy Planning Staff, Paul 
Nitze, who was the main architect of NSC-68, one of the ad hoc policy exercises 
mentioned above.  
 
The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 marked a significant revision to 
national security structures. The Act was itself part of an already ongoing trend that saw 
Congress attempting to shift power away from the Executive branch on matters of 
national security (this is discussed in more detail below in Section 2.2, with special 
attention paid to budgetary aspects). A significant facet of the Goldwater-Nichols Act 
was its emphasis on centralizing the military structure within the Department of 
Defense.133 The role played by the Secretary of Defense – the civilian responsible for 
overseeing all the civilian and military operations of the Department of Defense – had 
been strengthened over the years, as mentioned above. With regard to the structure of 
the military leadership within the Department of Defense, however, efforts to centralize 
power had been less successful. 
 
Congress was dissatisfied with the ability of the military leadership – the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) – to provide comprehensive, national, military advice. The JCS was instead 
seen to be providing "service oriented" advice that precluded more integrated defense 
analysis. Congress viewed the primary reason for this to be a lack of centralized military 
authority. Before 1986 the JCS still operated by consensus. Congress intended 
Goldwater-Nichols to provide the Chairman of the JCS with "independent political 
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clout" that was distinct from the power held by the JCS as a committee.134 The 1986 Act 
called for the Chairman to function as the primary military leader for the formulation of 
strategy. In addition to strengthening the position of the Chairman of the JCS, 
Goldwater-Nichols increased the authority of the CINCs – those professional military 
Commanders-in-Chief who oversee regional commands which integrate the individual 
US military services.135  
 
Colin Powell was the first Chairman of the JCS to assume that office after the 1986 
reorganization. He was the first to try to implement the mandate of the Act and produce 
a JCS National Military Strategy (NMS).136 Powell's planning was based on the concept 
of a "Base Force" - the minimum force with which the US "could continue to function 
as a global superpower". Powell's NMS developed from the Base Force concept, and the 
Base Force concept from the 1989-1990 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The 
increased power of the Chief of the JCS under Powell was what Congress intended 
when passing Goldwater-Nichols.137 
 
Williams has noted several trends that appear pertinent when considering the origins 
and evolution of the NSC, JSC, and DoD. First, the National Security Assistant has 
become increasingly important to the Executive (and one might add that as a 
consequence the position of Secretary of State has been diminished to some degree). 
Second, the authority of the Secretary of Defense as an individual, and the DoD as an 
organization, have generally been increasing since their creation. Third, the authority of 
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the civilian military secretaries (Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force) has 
generally decreased during the same period.138  
 
Finally, for all the effort devoted to developing and refining these bureaucratic 
structures, it is important to understand their limitations. US national security agencies 
do not tend to evolve into forms which provide for optimum efficiency or efficacy. The 
development of these agencies are subject to the perceived needs and pressures of the 
moment. They are designed by political actors who operate in a contentious political 
context that is affected by domestic issues which require compromise.139  
 
The assumption that national security agencies do not, in fact, impede the formation and 
execution of national security policy has been associated with "realist" arguments. 
There is not uniform agreement with this assumption. Some "institutionalist" arguments 
contend that agencies are created by self-interested groups and individuals, and so do 
not necessarily further an objective "national interest". Such arguments stress the role 
played by special interest groups, and the self-interest of politicians themselves, in the 
formulation of national security agencies. However, these institutionalist claims appear 
to underestimate the practical politics of Presidents and bureaucrats – individuals who 
may be more interested in national objectives and protecting agency interests than in 
pleasing the special interests seeking to influence them.140 One may not agree with the 
conclusion that due to special interests and practical politics, agencies in the US "are not 
and cannot be designed to serve any broad-based conception of national interest".141 
However, the warning that the formulation and functioning of bureaucratic structures 
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owes as much to politics as to the objective identification of national security needs is a 
valid one.  
 
National Security Strategy (NSS) Documents 
 
A number of reports focusing on US national security strategy had been produced by 
structures within the Executive branch prior to the passage of Goldwater-Nichols in 
1986. However, these had not been produced consistently and were seen to be deficient. 
For example, 25 years prior to the requirement for a published NSS, the NSC was 
producing a document intended to lay out agreed strategies and priorities in national 
security and defense planning: "National strategies and priorities were supposedly set 
forth in an agreed National Security Council document called the Basic National 
Security Policy. However, the Basic National Security Policy was a vague compromise 
document that provided little real guidance on how defense dollars should be spent."142 
These periodic statements on Basic National Security Policy were policy statements 
"largely based on institutional tradition", but they were of limited use in guiding the 
planning and budgeting of the services.143  
 
Congress mandated an annual NSS report from the Executive as part of the Goldwater-
Nichols Reorganization Act.144 Congress wished to foster strategic thinking in the 
Executive branch, which was a primary reason for the legislated requirement that the 
President "present an annual report on the 'National Security Strategy of the United 
States'".145 In addition to mandating an annual report from the administration, it also 
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mandated that incoming administrations must publish their first NSS within five months 
of entering office.146 None of the incoming administrations in the years since 1986 
(those of George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush) have made the five-
month deadline.  
 
Nevertheless, the mandate that the Executive must produce and publish a National 
Security Strategy annually is a significant development. It will be important to consider 
whether or not the production of the National Security Strategy has also been significant 
in practical terms. National Security Strategy documents will be investigated in more 
depth in Chapter Three.  
 
2.2  Processes 
Process Of Executive – Legislative Relations, Law-Making, and Budget 
Appropriations 
 
The two constitutional structures involved in budget appropriations are the Congress 
and the Executive. The Executive is given the constitutional authority to command, and 
so administer, the military. The Congress is given the authority to raise and fund the 
military. The US Constitution also specifies that Congressional appropriations for the 
support of armies may be no longer than two years; this ensures that the Congress is 
involved in evaluating needed military resources on an ongoing basis.  
 
The Congress then must consider on a regular basis the amount of funding required to 
support the military. The military itself falls under the control of the Executive, and so it 
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is the Executive – either the President himself, or the senior civilian leadership or senior 
military leadership acting on his behalf – that request a certain level of funding. It is 
likewise the Executive which must justify the amount to the Congress.  
 
In the past, the Executive has shown an appreciation for the capacity of the Congress to 
help or hinder its policies in ways less direct than through voting on appropriations bills. 
President Ronald Reagan once stated that national security must be developed and 
implemented by both the President and the Congress; this sentiment was also expressed 
by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1975. It is pointed out that neither man was 
"overly fond of Congressional involvement"; but both accepted that the cooperative 
development of security policy would increase its  legitimacy and be perceived abroad 
as the expression of a unified US government.147  
 
The defense budget is essential; in practical terms, any strategies or operations planned 
can only be implemented if funded.148 Of course, not all possible strategies can be 
funded: "ideal security goals are essentially unlimited".149 Therefore, allocating 
resources to national security involves trade-offs; there is an opportunity cost when 
funds are designated for security, and some level of risk must be identified that is 
acceptable to the government and its citizens.  
 
Constant bargaining attends the particulars of any US federal budget, and the national 
security budget is part of this overall budget. It is often difficult to definitively 
demonstrate which parts of the budget should be thought of as the "national security 
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budget", and how to delineate related activities such as military defense, 
counterterrorism, and intelligence gathering.150 Nevertheless, the defense budget 
unquestionably comprises the most sizeable portion of the national security budget, if 
one considers the national security budget to include funding for defense, homeland 
security, and other activities related to addressing terrorism threats. The awesome size 
of the defense budget is in little threat of drastic reduction in the near future. The total 
federal budget and its allocation among federal departments and agencies is not as 
flexible as one might suppose. Previous decisions, recent events, and current political 
realities all limit the flexibility of budget planning. Additionally, there exists an 
organizational inertia to defense policy and planning, with each constituent player 
possessing its own unique resistance to change.151  
 
Congress sometimes uses the "annual authorization/appropriations process to deny the 
President his preferred options when important policy disputes exist between the 
branches".152 The influence of domestic issues on national security policy is great, since 
such policy formation is a joint activity, or perhaps more accurately a joint struggle, (as 
Corwin puts it) between the Executive and Congress.153 Yet the greatest constraints on 
the budget concern allocations within the same broad scale of spending visible over 
recent decades, rather than a consideration of unintended side-effects. There is no 
significant movement on the part of lawmakers to reevaluate the wisdom of the overall 
size and aim of the defense budget. As has been pointed out, budget planners in 
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Washington have expressed little agreement with worries laid out by Paul Kennedy 
about the applicability of "imperial overstretch" to the US.154  
 
Efforts have taken place over the years to centralize planning and improve budget 
formulation, for example so that the services were not independently requesting the bulk 
of the funding considered feasible. While President Truman sometimes preferred to 
receive advice from the Bureau of the Budget rather than the NSC, under President 
Eisenhower the NSC played an increased role in reviewing proposed defense 
expenditures and effectively replaced the Bureau of the Budget in this function.155 A 
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) was introduced in 1955-1956 which was 
prepared by the JCS and meant to integrate the individual service plans; in practice, it 
did not relate the military requirements it identified to budget ceilings, and so always far 
exceeded the ceiling and had little impact on the process.156 While this approach had 
attempted to explicitly take into account the perceived budget ceiling of the Congress, it 
had in fact led to the Executive balancing its service requests without much strategic 
thinking behind its budgeting. This approach, which emphasized Congressional budget 
ceilings, was viewed as unsuccessful by the incoming Kennedy administration and done 
away with.157 Yet the attempt to operate under such budget ceilings, and the decision to 
discontinue the attempt in search of something better, point to an appreciation within the 
Executive branch that improvements in its own budget formulation process were 
desirable.  
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For its part, Congress has become more willing over the years to impose its will on the 
national security policies of the Executive through explicit terms of the appropriations 
bills it passes. Congress may disagree with the administration's assessment of threats 
confronting the US, or specific responses; at such times it may act to limit the Executive 
from taking action. The legislation that was passed in the form of prohibitions within 
defense appropriations bills during the Vietnam War were unprecedented in scope at 
that time. They limited the use of ground troops in certain areas, and likewise limited 
the use of air power, and restricted funding from being used to support third party 
ground troops in those areas.158  
 
In legislative terms, the visible effects of this Congressional willingness to try to 
constrain the Executive continued in the decade after the US pull-out from Vietnam, or 
even longer. This trend included the War Powers Resolution of 1973.159 This Resolution 
aimed to emphasize the circumstances in which the President could use the armed 
forces under the Constitution, and to set a procedure by which the Congress and the 
Executive should jointly participate in decisions to send US forces into combat. It 
requires that the President inform the Congress whenever US forces are sent into 
hostilities or imminent hostilities. It then requires that the President terminate the use of 
such forces within 60 to 90 days, unless Congress authorizes their continued use. 
However, the Resolution was initially passed over the veto of President Nixon, and 
every President since then has taken the view that the central tenets of the Resolution 
are unconstitutional and so not legitimate.160 Of over 100 reports submitted by the 
Executive to Congress since the passage of the Resolution, only one has explicitly 
addressed the 60 to 90 day time limit. This reticence to abide by the provisions of the 
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Resolution is not exhibited solely by the Executive branch, however. The Congressional 
Research Service has noted that at times the Judiciary, and even the Congress itself, 
have been unwilling to apply the War Powers Resolution more stringently.161  
 
Also in 1973, NATO allies were required to make greater contributions to the cost of 
stationing US troops in their countries, against the wishes of the Executive branch.162 
The Budget Reform Act was passed in 1974, requiring the Executive to spend funds that 
Congress had allocated for specific purposes. Congress also prohibited funds from being 
used in Angola in 1975. This affected CIA combat operations supporting anti-
communist forces. The Boland amendments of 1982 and 1984 outlawing support for the 
Contras in Nicaragua, a nuclear freeze resolution in 1983, and "close Congressional 
oversight" of the 1991 Gulf War and peacekeeping operations in the 1990s continued 
this trend.163  
  
The decisionmaking function in the Executive has become more centralized since 1947; 
during those same years, the Congress has at times assumed a greater role in oversight 
and involvement in national security affairs. At the same time, decisionmaking in 
Congress has become decentralized, with a reduction in the strength of the two parties 
and the role of committee chairmen, and an increase in the role and number of special 
interest groups. These two trends are seen to portend continuing disagreement between 
the two branches over the assessment of threats and the character of the overall security 
environment, and identification of national security objectives.164  
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As can be seen, the relationship between the Executive branch and the Congress is a 
tensioned one, and agreeing on a national security strategy that can be funded in terms 
of the defense and overall federal budgets can indeed be a struggle. An important point 
to keep in mind is that this tension exists constantly, to a greater or lesser degree, 
regardless of changing international circumstances. One point Ralph Carter makes is 
that although fluctuations in overall defense spending seem reflective of broad changes 
in international politics – falling during detente in the 1970s or rising after the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan – Congress has exercised significant influence within the 
parameters that were broadly defined by superpower relations and other international 
politics.165 At the same time, in practice the formulation and justification for the funding 
request has resulted in an annual budgeting process that is at once extremely detailed, 
and tending toward inertia.  
 
At the highest strategic level, the formulation of funding requests is based on the 
pronounced security and defense objectives of the administration in office. While 
changes in those high-level security and defense objectives may challenge the status 
quo, they may also bolster the institutional inertia of the military. Multi-year timescales 
for researching, developing, and producing updated weapons systems may add to this 
inertia; and this may well be augmented by the Congress, whose members often have 
constituents with vested interests in the production of new weapons systems. The 
planning and budgeting system itself may lead to inertia, as the process of reevaluating 
an immense budget on an annual basis does not lend itself to radical changes.  
 
It is also possible for an administration to propose a national strategy that calls for the 
implementation of various specific means. However, the administration may request 
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that only certain facets of its strategy are funded; or it may request funding at a level 
which would make the complete implementation of its policy problematic. The 
proposed means may well have implications for a variety of US departments and 
agencies involved in defense, diplomacy, and other activities.  
 
It is possible that some budget requests are essentially rhetorical, and primarily intended 
to send a political signal. For example, some have wondered whether President 
Reagan's support of funding for his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) might have served 
an immediate, practical political purpose, quite apart from what technological 
achievements might be gained in the future – achievements that many viewed as 
unattainable and unrealistic. Strong presidential backing of SDI is seen as having been 
important in prompting the Soviet Union to re-engage in negotiation with the US.166 
Some Reagan administration officials seem to have considered SDI to function 
primarily as a bargaining ploy, rather than as a feasible strategy.167 It is impossible to 
say with certainty which individuals may have truly believed in the efficacy of SDI, and 
which may have viewed it as useful in terms of rhetoric, regardless of the level of 
funding it received.168 However, the fact that at least some high-level officials viewed 
the initiative in practical negotiating terms seems to suggest that the Executive does not 
expect – and may not really desire – every budget request and policy initiative that is 
produced to receive full funding.  
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All of this is to say that in terms of strategy and funding, the overarching strategy – the 
goals and the means of achieving them – may be funded to a greater or lesser degree. 
This will not necessarily change the stated strategy; the administration is not required to 
reconcile the stated strategy with the level of funding that has been attained through the 
budgeting process. In practical terms of course, all governments must reconcile 
available resources with their preferred strategic objectives.  
 
The reasons an administration's national security strategy may not receive the funding 
required to implement it fully may vary, regardless of its importance in terms of 
providing strategic vision and an identification of broad ends and means. This may be 
due to Congressional opposition to the premises or conclusions of that strategy, or 
opposition to particular means. It may be due to very practical fiscal considerations that 
Congress is mindful of, even if the strategy enjoys general support. If an 
administration's strategy receives less funding than required to fully implement it, this 
may be unfortunate in the view of the administration; or, the administration may have 
never expected to receive the resources necessary to implement all facets of its strategy. 
Just as the identification of strategic goals and objectives involves the ordering of a 
myriad of interests and priorities (as mentioned above in Chapter One), the resourcing 
of strategic goals and objectives involves another ordering of priorities. In democratic 
societies, both the political and security goals set by the leadership, and the level of 
funding approved for their pursuit, are subject to a review in which competing interests 
and demands must be reconciled – in terms of both public acquiescence, and public 
support through the allocation of tax dollars.  
 
There is an additional consideration which is related to the possibility that budget 
requests sometimes appear to be at odds with stated policies. It is possible that an 
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administration indicates, through its stated national security strategy, that the best means 
by which to attain its objectives is through reliance on a particular government 
department. Such a scenario might lead to disproportionate funding of a certain agency 
in support of the nation's security strategy. Or an administration may identify goals 
which would appear to fall within the purview of a certain department, but not request 
additional funding to address these novel objectives. Such inconsistencies may reveal a 
piece of rhetoric which the leadership is unwilling to back up in practical terms. The 
more likely possibility is more complicated: that such inconsistencies are due to 
compromise that is brought about by entities competing for a larger share of the 
available funding – all the more in the case of an events-driven, substantial increase in 
the total sum made available for disbursement (e.g., such as occurred after the attacks of 
11 September 2001). Before examining NSS 2002, the first mandated national security 
document to be produced after 11 September 2001, it is first necessary to consider such 
documents more generally. It is to these mandated NSS documents that we now turn our 
attention.  
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3.0  NSS Documents 
 
The thesis will now move on to NSS reports. The post-1945 tradition of national 
security pronouncements made by US Presidents will be discussed first. Such 
pronouncements both precede, and form the substance of, modern NSS reports that 
Presidents are mandated to produce. The place of the NSS as a tool for forming and 
announcing policy, and its place as a product of compromise and negotiation, will then 
be explored in turn. Finally, the chapter will appraise variables that influence 
presidential pronouncements on national security.  
 
3.1  The Post-1945 Tradition of US Presidential Pronouncements on National 
Security 
 
In the US, the President has historically viewed the articulation of foreign and security 
policy as part of the duties of the Executive. The right to negotiate treaties is given to 
the President in the Constitution, and it seems clear that since articulating a foreign 
policy may often be a necessary precursor for making international agreements, that this 
role is one intended to be within the purview of the Executive.169 The formation of 
foreign policy is meant to be done in consultation with the Congress, to be sure. Yet the 
President performs a singular role in this regard, through explicit pronouncements and 
through direction of federal departments. The direction of federal departments includes 
the making of Cabinet appointments, which are also within the presidential purview.  
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In terms of presidential pronouncements, such pronouncements did not come about in 
the aftermath of World War II; certainly the Monroe Doctrine articulated in 1823 was 
one of the earliest examples of the president seeking to publicly establish a precedent in 
terms of how the US is guided in its foreign policy. One may even consider 
Washington's Farewell Address as such a presidential pronouncement. In even these 
earliest examples, presidents attempted to establish a guiding principle that would aid 
them and future administrations to formulate and implement foreign policies that would 
ensure the safety of the US.  
 
Sempa conceives of there having been eight US national security doctrines in the 
history of the nation – with a national security doctrine defined as a state's geopolitical 
"organizing principle".170 Although I am somewhat at odds with Sempa's 
characterization, these various categories may be better thought of as trends than as 
distinct strategies. For the most part, these trends were not explicitly reaffirmed by each 
successive president through publicly-made statements. The eight categories identified 
are: 1) Washington's Farewell Address; 2) the Monroe Doctrine; 3) Manifest Destiny; 4) 
the Open Door; 5) Off-shore Balancer; 6) Containment; 7) Liberation; and 8) 
Preemption. Washington's Farewell Address, the Monroe Doctrine, and Manifest 
Destiny are seen as existing simultaneously for almost the first hundred years of the 
nation's history. The Open Door policy is most closely associated with Theodore 
Roosevelt, and represented the expansion of US influence in the Far East, in both 
political and commercial terms. The policy was intended to ensure an Asian balance of 
power that favored US interests.  
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The category "Off-Shore Balancer" is meant to describe the growing US role, joining 
Britain, as a protagonist in the European continental balance of power; this role grew 
from the time the US entered World War I to the conclusion of World War II. 
Liberation is viewed as particular to the policies of Ronald Reagan, and Preemption is 
identified with the policies of George W. Bush. In choosing these categories, Sempa 
distinguished between those doctrines he identified as part of an overarching and 
enduring strategy, and lesser doctrines that amount to subordinate policies, in his 
view.171  
 
This examination will focus on the pronouncements made by presidents in the years 
after the Second World War. Since 1945, such pronouncements have increased in 
frequency, even if a number of them may fall under the same designation of varieties of 
containment.172 While their immediate impact and staying power have varied, these 
modern presidential pronouncements on national security have helped to frame the Cold 
War and post-Cold War environments, and the preferred US response to those 
environments.  
 
These pronouncements were formulated to address immediate concerns, but addressed 
fundamental concerns in some way that was lasting and of use to successive 
policymakers. The pronouncements did not amount to the sole policy of the US, or the 
sum of all US policies. Nevertheless they have been important in terms of their source – 
the very top of the US political hierarchy – and their timing as responses to the 
contemporary international environment facing the US. Also noteworthy is their fairly 
gradual development; even when policies were reversed, it was not done in a jarring 
way and still kept within the broad concept of limiting Soviet expansion during the Cold 
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War. Each built on the ones before it, leading to continuity of national security policy. 
One example would be when the US announced in 1969 that it would oppose 
communist expansion through support of indigenous fighters.173 While this was a 
change from the more direct military assistance associated with the Truman Doctrine, 
such direct assistance was not ruled out but rather muted somewhat to allow the US to 
not engage militarily if it so chose.  
 
In order to be inclusive and avoid the potential misstep of viewing individual policies as 
indistinct from one another due to their similar objectives, an attempt has been made 
here to include the major presidential pronouncements made in the post-World War II 
years. Although there are no objective criteria by which one may discern what is 
presidential "doctrine" and what is presidential "policy", each elected President in the 
years from 1945 has made a significant policy pronouncement enunciating the 
orientation of US foreign and national security policy.  
 
This lack of objective criteria also illuminates the subjective nature of presidential 
"doctrines". While arguably every elected President since 1945 has pronounced a policy 
which became known as his "doctrine", these can not be said to function as the 
definitive encapsulation of that President's national security policy. Such 
pronouncements might be viewed as a single facet, although sometimes a very 
important facet, of an administration's articulated policy. All of the other facets of 
policy may not contradict the pronouncement, but can not be said to derive directly 
from a single Executive pronouncement. That such a policy pronouncement became 
known in policymaking circles, or the media, or the general public, as a "doctrine" may 
have as much to do with the receptiveness audiences exhibit toward that policy than its 
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inherent substance. In the same vein, it should be remembered that US presidential 
policies remembered as "doctrine" tend to emphasize security and other military aspects 
of national policy; all other factors being equal, a certain policy has a better chance of 
being elevated to the level of a "doctrine" if it has explicit consequences for the 
potential use of force by the US.  
 
Pre- 20th Century 
 
Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine, while outside of the time 
period under consideration, will be briefly touched upon. There are two reasons for this. 
First, each was a presidential formulation of policy very similar in form to the 
presidential pronouncements made by modern presidents, and sometimes referred to as 
presidential "doctrines". Second, each gained wide currency and have been repeatedly 
evoked by US presidents since they appeared, although having been made in the early 
years of the nation's existence.  
 
Washington's Farewell Address encapsulated an idea formulated jointly by Washington 
and Alexander Hamilton. The Address advocated US neutrality when dealing with other 
powers, such as France and Britain in Europe.174 The US, as a young nation still 
growing geographically, did not possess military or economic power on a par with the 
traditional great powers of Europe. In such circumstances, Washington felt it most 
prudent for the US to avoid taking sides in the machinations of European politics. This 
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was not a call for strict isolationism; Washington's Address advocated extending 
commerce to all nations, but limiting political connections to them.175  
 
The Monroe Doctrine was announced at a time when Russia was interested in 
expanding its holdings in North America; and it was feared that Spain with the help of 
other European powers might move to regain its colonies which had secured 
independence during the Napoleonic Wars.176  The Doctrine warned against further 
European interference in the political affairs of the Western Hemisphere.177 One source 
of the Monroe doctrine actually took the form of a proposal by the British that a joint 
statement be issued from Britain and the US forbidding further European colonization 
of the failed or failing Spanish colonies. John Quincy Adams, US Secretary of State at 
the time, re-fashioned this idea into a unilateral pronouncement. The US was not 
capable at the time of enforcing the Monroe Doctrine, but Britain in effect enforced it 
out of self interest.178 The Monroe Doctrine continued to be cited by presidents into the 
modern post-1945 era:  during Cuban missile crisis; with regard to conflicts in El 
Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1980s; and on numerous other occasions.179  
 
Early in the 20th century, Theodore Roosevelt amended the Monroe Doctrine with what 
became known as the Roosevelt Corollary. In order to address what was perceived as a 
pressing economic security concern in Latin American, it was announced that the US 
had the right to not only oppose European intervention in the Western Hemisphere but 
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itself to intervene in the domestic affairs of its neighbors if they proved unable to 
protect US investments in the region on their own.180  
 
Early 20th Century 
 
Two presidents in the early 20th century made significant contributions to the US 
conception of national security. An historical tendency had existed for most American 
statesman, such as John Quincy Adams, to assume a degree of US exceptionalism. In 
this view, the other nations of the world would never attain the quality of democratic 
progress that the US had. Woodrow Wilson enunciated an alternative vision, and the 
repercussions of the ideals he gave voice to can still be discerned in US policymaking. 
Wilson believed that the spread of democracy and capitalism throughout the world 
would bring peace and security in a natural, almost organic way. The failure of the 
League of Nations after World War I prevented Wilson's vision from materializing to a 
greater degree in his lifetime, and some have directly laid the blame for this failure with 
Wilson himself: "[Wilson] allowed this interest to exceed the limits of what the United 
States could accomplish abroad and what Americans would accept at home".181  
 
This Wilsonian idea was to have an immense and continuing impact on the US notion 
of national security, especially when revived and institutionalized in a more enduring 
way by Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Harking back to Wilson's ideals and worldview, 
FDR chose to follow a course of action that stressed multilateralism during World War 
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II. This preference for multilateralism and international institutions heavily influenced 
US policies during the Cold War.182 FDR is viewed as achieving greater success than 
Wilson had because of his mindfulness of considerations of power and a pragmatic 
political calculus. While championing the institutionalization of multilateral processes, 
FDR "... never neglected, as Wilson did, the need to keep proclaimed interests from 
extending beyond actual capabilities."183 Far from favoring peace and security over US 
interests and relative power, Roosevelt sought increased levels of both: "American 
hegemony ... was now to be global ... [and] it was to arise by consent."184  
 
The emphasis placed on democracy and other liberal values, and the effect that their absence 
could have on the US – even if that absence occurred in other nations around the globe – was 
continued by successive administrations, although with somewhat varying interpretations. 
Wilson and FDR held that US security "was affected by internal conditions in all nations". 
Truman linked security with conditions in democratic nations. Nixon and Carter viewed 
security as "benefit[ing] from certain existing conditions" in the USSR and China.185  
 
Truman 
 
George Kennan's 1947 article The Sources of Soviet Conduct is the first early public 
articulation of postwar national security policy.186 Kennan argued that the Soviet Union 
posed a threat to the US that could be contained, but not ignored. It was this 
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"containment" that Kennan first spoke of that served as the substance of the Truman 
Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine was Truman's decision to "resist aggressive 
communism", and relied on Kennan's reasoning to conclude that the expansion of 
communism to new states and regions would be a threat to the security of the US. In 
immediate, practical terms, the Doctrine provided the logic for providing aid to Turkey 
as well as Greece, even though Turkey was not in need of relief or reconstruction, nor 
was it suffering financial distress or internal unrest.187  
 
After Truman made his speech to a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947, the 
news media immediately compared it in significance to the Monroe Doctrine.188 To a 
greater or lesser degree, the elevation of a particular Executive stance or public policy to 
the level of "doctrine" comes down to the discernment of commentators as well as the 
importance attached to it by the issuing administration. It matters whether the media and 
political pundits view something as  a "doctrine", as their discourse influences the 
perception of the broader American public. "Doctrine" is an epithet that is usually 
awarded outside policymaking circles, though such a designation may have been hoped 
for by the formulators of the policy.  
 
The principles laid out in Kennan's article and Truman's speech were codified in 1948 
in NSC-20, which was a secret document produced by the National Security Council 
and laid out US military and political goals for the Cold War. These were reaffirmed in 
the more well-known NSC-68, which was drafted in February – April 1950. NSC-68 
cited NSC-20 as having identified the Soviet threat well, but asserted that that threat 
was more imminent than originally thought.189 Although he himself had conceived the 
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policy of containment in Europe, Kennan immediately questioned the sweeping nature 
of the Truman Doctrine.190 Kennan disapproved of the propensity of the US to use 
universal doctrines to "justify particular actions".191  
 
Eisenhower 
 
Containment was attacked as immoral – an abandonment of the subjugated citizens of 
communist countries – by the opposition Republican party during the 1952 campaign. 
James Burnham argued that the policy of containment did not go far enough, and wrote 
several books in the years 1947-1951 arguing for "liberation". This theme was picked 
up by Eisenhower who talked of the "roll-back" of communism. Interestingly, in the 
previous administration the official Truman policy was for the "liberation" of North 
Korea – until the massive Chinese intervention there in October 1950.192  
 
For practical reasons, containment was soon supported by the Eisenhower 
administration after election.193 It was Eisenhower's application of containment to a 
specific region that became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. This doctrine asserted 
that upon request, the US would use force in response to imminent or actual communist 
aggression in the Middle East. 
Eisenhower announced this policy on 05 January 1957.194  
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Kennedy 
 
John F. Kennedy likewise felt the need to add an explicit regional focus to the broad 
policy of containment. Kennedy's announcement was clearly in immediate response to 
issues raised because of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In what became known as the 
Kennedy Doctrine, the president announced that the US would oppose the formation of 
any communist governments in Latin America.195 Kennedy also laid out in the 22 
October speech that regional blocs could take forceful action against a state in their 
bloc, without UN approval, if they found it to be violating the norms of the bloc – 
basically an assertion that the OAS was allowed by the UN Charter to act militarily 
within its own region, for example against Cuba. The pronouncement was viewed as a 
revival of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine: that the US would intervene 
to prevent a "second Cuba" in its hemisphere.196  
 
While the Kennedy "doctrine" may not have enjoyed the kind of place in the public's 
memory as the Truman "doctrine", it still points up a problem of defining presidential 
"doctrines". Scholars have attributed different characteristics to the Kennedy "doctrine". 
For example, the policy is viewed alternatively as encompassing the "help any friend, 
bear any burden" segment of Kennedy's inaugural address. This is a different source 
than the 22 Oct 1962 speech, and seems to differ from other understandings of what the 
Kennedy Doctrine signaled.197 Similarly, another scholar has identified the Kennedy 
"doctrine" with a policy that US would act against any state in the Middle East who 
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attacked its neighbors, and viewed it as a commitment to the US protecting Israel.198 
While this sentiment is not dissimilar from the more traditional view of the meaning of 
the Kennedy "doctrine", it bears a closer resemblance to the Eisenhower "doctrine".  
 
Johnson 
 
Lyndon Johnson's pronouncement that the US would intervene militarily to fight a 
communist threat to any government in the Western Hemisphere became known as the 
Johnson Doctrine.199 The Johnson "doctrine" was used as justification for the US 
invading the Dominican Republic in 1965, although that invasion was initially justified 
on the grounds of protecting US citizens abroad, and then on the grounds of 
humanitarian intervention. Importantly, this invasion was the first unilateral military 
invasion of a sovereign state by the US since the formation of the UN.200  
 
In 1963, a military coup overthrew the government that had been democratically elected 
in the Dominican Republic in 1962. Subsequently, a revolution against this military 
dictatorship – and in support of restoring the rule of a social democratic regime – 
occurred in 1965. Although perception of the threat posed by the revolution varied 
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widely both in the US and in the rest of Latin America, Johnson and his Undersecretary 
of State Thomas Mann viewed the prospect of what they saw as the establishment of a 
communist government unacceptable.201  Mann himself was convinced, and felt most 
others were too, that a rebel victory would result in the establishment of a communist 
government in the Dominican Republic like that of Cuba.202   
 
This assessment has been strongly contested by scholars citing evidence supplied by a 
later fact-finding mission.203 The Johnson "doctrine" is a good example of broad US 
policies being adopted by other states for their own use in similar situations 
elsewhere.204 For example, a strong argument can be made that the Johnson "doctrine" 
was a strategic mistake that allowed the USSR to easily justify the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia with the subsequent announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine.205  
 
Nixon 
 
The issuance of reports that laid out national goals and strategies in light of the 
contemporary international environment became routine during the administration of 
Richard Nixon, when that administration released an annual "State of the World 
Report".206 Yet these relatively regular reports did not rise to the same level of 
significance as did the presidential pronouncements under investigation here. What 
became known as the Nixon Doctrine was outlined by President Nixon while meeting 
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with reporters in Guam on 25 July 1969. The event was not a public press conference as 
such, as the president's remarks were provided to the reporters on a background basis.207 
The policy was also defined in an Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam that 
Nixon gave on November 3, 1969.208 The Nixon "doctrine" was applied to justify the 
evolving US approach to the Vietnam War: when the US determined that direct military 
assistance was not possible, it would train and assist native fighters in the country 
concerned. The Nixon "doctrine" is seen as part of a trend that modified the concept of 
security so that US troops would not automatically be deployed in case of conventional 
aggression or communist encroachment. The policy has been viewed as evidence of 
what has been recognized as a broader trend in the US approach to the use of force: 
beginning in the 1960s, importance was placed on limiting "armed conflicts within 
narrow bounds".209  
 
Carter 
 
What became known as the Carter Doctrine was announced on 23 January 1980 in the 
President's State of the Union Address. The policy asserted that any attempt to gain 
control of the Persian Gulf by states outside the region would be regarded as an assault 
on the US, and repelled by force if necessary.210 This policy was an explicit response to 
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the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The pronouncement was viewed as warning 
the Soviets away from Iraq, as well as Iran, which had just undergone the 1979 
revolution that resulted in the hostage crisis which began in the US Embassy in Tehran. 
While novel in terms of its focus on the Persian Gulf, the policy displayed continuity 
with earlier expressions of commitment to containing and mitigating the Soviet threat.  
  
Reagan 
 
In terms of national security policy, the Reagan administration focused almost 
exclusively on military questions surrounding its relations with the Soviet Union, and 
also what it perceived as other communist threats, such as certain political movements 
in Latin America. Analysts point to documents such as National Security Decision 
Memorandum 32 (NSDM 32) as an example of this focus.211  Another significant 
document with a military focus was produced by the Commission on Integrated Long-
Term Strategy, which was co-chaired by Fred Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter. This 
Commission was appointed by President Reagan. In January 1988 it produced a report 
entitled "Discriminate Deterrence".212  
 
In terms of orientation, some have argued that the Reagan administration's policies are 
more accurately described as in accordance with the ideals of "liberation" than of 
containment.213 It is this orientation, perhaps, that distinguishes what is known as the 
Reagan Doctrine from similar presidential "doctrines" announced in earlier 
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administrations. An expression of the Reagan "doctrine" is found as part of the 
President's State of the Union Address on 06 February 1985, and spelled out US support 
anti-communist movements, as well as justifying US support for the contras in 
Nicaragua and mujahadeen in Afghanistan.214  
 
However, the extent to which the policies of Reagan differed substantially from earlier 
expressions of the containment policy are not clear. To assume that Reagan's relative 
bellicosity is indicative of an entirely different strategic conception puts too much 
weight on aspects of Reagan's policy that were hoped would significantly weaken the 
USSR, and underemphasizes the decades-long role that containment played in that 
eventual demise. It appears more realistic to view Reagan's policies as containment in a 
different form.  
 
Another point that has been noted is that while President Reagan seems to have advocated a 
return to a conception of "liberation" favored at times by earlier presidents such as Eisenhower 
– or even Truman – that his intentions are hard to judge. This is because for all his 
outspokenness, Reagan is viewed as relying much more than other presidents on the services of 
subordinates who would prepare entire addresses for him. Even his State of the Union 
messages are seen as the creations of others, be they speechwriters or other officials.215  
 
What is certain is that Reagan took a more aggressive, moralistic stance against the 
Soviet Union than his immediate predecessors. This, coupled with the emphasis on 
military aspects of security, led to the most massive – and expensive – peacetime 
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military buildup in US history.216 It was in Ronald Reagan's second term that the 
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act was passed, in 1986. Reagan then 
became the first Executive subject to its provisions, which called for an annual NSS 
document to be issued by the President. The first two NSS reports were subsequently 
issued by the Reagan administration. The overarching themes and particular significant 
tenets of policy had already been established, and so these NSS reports were in large 
part restatements of already declared policy.217   
 
George H.W. Bush  
 
The incoming George H.W. Bush administration undertook a review of US national 
strategy almost immediately upon Bush assuming office in January 1989.218 In general, 
US planning continued to be primarily focused on the military aspects of national 
security. This focus is reflected in the national strategy review.219  
 
However, if the focus on military matters argues for continuity with previous planning, 
the conclusions drawn by the George H.W. Bush administration were novel. The results 
of the strategic review were significant and formed the substance of the NSS reports 
that followed it. The first NSS document produced by the George H.W. Bush 
administration was released in March 1990; this was before the national strategy review 
had been completed and announced, and so this NSS document did not incorporate the 
                                                
216 Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, American National Security  84. 
217 United States. President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), National Security Strategy of the United States, 
1st ed. (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1988). 
218 Kaufman, Clark, and Sheehan, eds., U.S. National Security Strategy for the 1990s  1. This early focus 
on national security strategy can not be completely explained by the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the 
clearest signs of its disintegration occurred after this strategic review had begun. 
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results of the review.220 The results of the national strategy review were announced in 
an 02 August 1990 speech Bush delivered at the Aspen Institute, laying out the need for 
significant restructuring of the US military for the post-Cold War world.221 The changes 
envisioned included an overall reduction in force size, and a shift from planning that 
foresaw a full-scale land war in Europe to planning for smaller potential conflicts of a 
regional nature.  
 
This shift in strategic thinking drew scholarly attention in the form of investigations not 
only into the content of the pronouncement, but also the method by which it was 
announced, the kind of planning that had preceded it, and clarifications and 
consequences that occurred during its implementation.222 In a way the strategy spurred 
some of the initial thinking about the implications of a "post-Cold War" world. 
Implications of the strategy in particular, and this new international environment in 
general, received attention. Examples of these new considerations included implications 
for "alliance relations" as well as for the US military.223  
 
Of interest when considering how a major policy becomes popularly known, be it as a 
"doctrine" or in some other way, is the fact that the change in strategic outlook 
announced by George H.W. Bush in 1990 was known by several different names. This 
was particularly true in the time between the initial speech announcing the policy in 
August 1990, and the publication of the first NSS report spelling out the strategy in 
August 1991. The August 1991 NSS was the second NSS issued by the George H.W. 
Bush administration, but the first that incorporated the results of the national strategy 
                                                
220 United States. President George H.W. Bush (1989-1993), National Security Strategy of the United 
States: 1990-1991, 1st ed. (Washington, DC: Brassey's (US), Inc., 1990). 
221 James John Tritten, Our New National Security Strategy: America Promises to Come Back (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 1992) xi. The speech was made coincidentally on the day that Iraq invaded Kuwait, and so 
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review mentioned above. Even then, however, audiences strove to dub it with a moniker 
that captured its content more thoroughly than simply the 1991 National Security 
Strategy. The various names by which the strategy was known included: "new strategy"; 
"new defense strategy"; "President's strategy"; "Aspen strategy"; "reconstitution 
strategy"; "strategy for the new world order"; and others.224 These constitute an 
interesting example of how some government policies, such as broad doctrines and NSS 
reports, are sometimes named as much by the public and press as by the Executive 
branch.  
 
Clinton 
 
A frequent criticism of the Clinton administration was that it had no consistent foreign 
policy, and a national security strategy that did little to protect US interests in concrete 
ways.225 Clinton himself has been quoted as saying a US grand strategy was not needed; 
that Truman and FDR had not had one, and he did not intend to manufacture one either. 
Such a sentiment may display an understanding of early Cold War history at odds with 
many scholars. However, it is unclear that this justifies the comparison by one scholar 
of Clinton's administration to that of Harding and Coolidge, due to its loose, "laissez-
faire" approach to national security policy.226  
 
In addition to being accused of exhibiting a controversial understanding of the history 
of US national strategy,  Clinton has also been charged with formulating policies around 
processes – like democratization – rather than around vital interests and defined 
objectives. Gaddis argues explicitly that the Clinton administration was influenced 
                                                
224 Tritten, Our New National Security Strategy: America Promises to Come Back  7-8. 
225 John Dumbrell and David M. Barrett, The Making of US Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1997) 82. 
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greatly by Francis Fukuyama's "End of History" argument. In Gaddis' view, Clinton 
believed that if democracy and capitalism had indeed triumphed, then the appropriate 
role for the US was to "engage" and "enlarge" their development rather than develop a 
grand strategy for the post-cold war, 21st century era.227   
 
Difficulty in isolating a consistent national security policy does not necessarily prove its 
complete non-existence. Some analysts have attempted to discern an overarching 
Clinton Doctrine from the selective US involvement in international trouble spots. After 
Rwanda, Clinton is viewed as coming to the conclusion that the US should assume a 
leadership role in halting genocide and ethnic cleansing: "This perceived newfound 
willingness to intervene on moral and humanitarian grounds led some commentators to 
discern a 'Clinton Doctrine'".228  
The decision to use force in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Serbia certainly appeared to be 
due to a change in the traditional thinking enshrined in the Weinberger-Powell doctrine: 
in these cases, force was used for goals not necessarily in the US vital interest, and 
broad public and Congressional support was somewhat lacking.229  
 
Due to the character of the Clinton presidency, the fact that little time has passed and so 
the historical perspective is limited, or a combination of both, it is difficult to reduce 
                                                
227 Ibid. NSA Advisor Anthony Lake is quoted as speaking of "engagement and enlargement", and the 
term became the title of the first few NSS reports issued by Clinton.  
228 Korb and Council on Foreign Relations, A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, 
Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Three Options Presented as Presidential Speeches  14. 
229 The Weinberger-Powell doctrine, as it became known, is not a national strategy that was made explicit 
policy at a presidential level. As such, it does not rise to the level of "doctrine" that is generally discussed 
here. Weinberger-Powell was formulated by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and General Colin 
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combat operations, postulated that troops should be sent into combat only when vital US national security 
interests were at stake, and that overwhelming force should be used when they were sent into combat. 
This doctrine, therefore, is not a national strategy; it does not lay out perceived US interests and threats, 
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formulation of US policy, as well as decision-making by US leaders about the use of force. See Stephen 
D. Wrage, "Civil-Military Relations and the War on Terror," White House Studies 4, no. 2 (2004). See 
also Record, Making War, Thinking History  31. 
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Clinton's national security policy to a single "doctrine" or "grand strategy". Critics have 
pointed to the NSS reports issued under the Clinton administration as providing 
evidence supporting the charge of the lack of consistency and focus described above. 
Others have attached more weight to the ideas expressed in the reports. While scholars 
may differ when judging the extent to which an articulated foreign policy existed during 
the Clinton years, the issuance of NSS documents occurred more regularly than during 
the tenure of the other four presidencies subject to the Goldwater-Nichols reporting 
requirements.230 If the Clinton administration's national security policy lacked focus, it 
did not hinder the production of public NSS reports.  
 
The NSS reports from these years reflect continuity with past national security policies, 
the identification of some new priorities, and an effort to position both old and new 
facets within the novel, post-Cold War environment. For example, the 1999 NSS 
asserted that when US vital national interests are involved, "our use of force will be 
decisive and, if necessary, unilateral".231 This consideration of the unilateral use of force 
was both in line with statements of previous US administrations, and foreshadowed the 
stance taken by the George W. Bush administration that followed the Clinton 
administration.  
 
Yet the same NSS report divided US concerns into "vital" interests, "important" 
interests, and interests defined as "humanitarian" in nature. As mentioned above, the 
Clinton administration did not agree with the Weinberger-Powell doctrine in terms of 
never using force for reasons other than defending vital interests. However, even in its 
more expansive view of interests worthy of forceful action, the NSS reports of the 
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New Century,"  (The White House, 1999), 19. 
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Clinton era included most of the features of Weinberger-Powell in its own list of 
questions to be asked when considering using military force.232 One notable change was 
an emphasis placed on economic concerns during the Clinton years. Clinton established 
the National Economic Council, which was configured along the same lines as the NSC, 
albeit with 18 members. This move was made because the NSC – staff and principals 
alike – had traditionally neglected to emphasize economic issues in its operations and 
deliberations. Clinton's aim was that the work of the NSC and NEC would be 
integrated.233 The advent of the NEC is in line with a trend toward emphasizing the role 
that economic stability and economic growth play in the concept of national security.234  
 
3.2  The Place of the NSS in the Framing of US National Security Strategy 
 
A published NSS report is an implement used for multiple purposes. It functions as an 
expression by the Executive to the Congress to explain strategy and facilitate 
budgeting.235 The report is intended to explain US objectives, perceived threats, and 
how the government intends to prepare for or eliminate them. If successful in carrying 
out this function, the NSS will facilitate the approval – political and budgetary – of the 
means required implement the strategy. This is a vital use of the NSS discussed in some 
depth above in Chapter Two.  
 
The NSS report serves as a similar expression to the US public. It is meant to explain 
the Executive's view of possible threats, and the President's intended course of action. 
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The Executive hopes the NSS will engender broad public support for US national 
security policy. To an extent, constituencies who supported the President's election look 
for some indication that their particular concerns have been included in strategic 
thinking.236 The acquiescence of the broader public is also sought, as it is their taxes 
that will support an implemented strategy. This function was discussed in terms of the 
domestic purpose of a state's national security disposition in Chapter One.  
 
Another purpose is to communicate the US perspective, and the intended posture and 
strategy that proceed from it, to an international audience. Just as the NSS is not the sole 
mode of communication to the Congress, it is likewise but one way of interfacing with 
the international community. Other high-profile pronouncements of US strategy and 
outlook such as the annual State of the Union address, as well as regular diplomatic 
relations, also function to announce and explain US behavior. While not the sole means 
of such communication, the NSS is important in facilitating international 
communication. Indeed, the NSS is thought of as an especially effective means of 
transmitting US intent to nations who have limited contact with the highest levels of the 
US government.237  
 
As discussed, national security strategies have been formulated since the earliest days of 
the nation. Yet the regularity with which the Executive branch began "publicly 
articulating" its national security strategy/policies [increased] at the beginning of the 
Cold War just after World War II.238 One may disagree with the contention that over the 
years, certain bureaucratic changes have meant that national security strategies have 
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become increasingly focused on the military facet of security.239 However, bureaucratic 
changes did take place. Indeed, they may have helped to perpetuate an emphasis on 
military strategy, if not expand it.  
 
For example, it is useful to consider the changing bureaucratic organizing structure that 
lay behind various formulations of policy in the years after 1945. The landmark NSC-68 
was formulated by Paul Nitze as head of the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of 
State. The Department of State also played a leading role in the formulation of national 
security policy during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.240 During the 
Nixon administration however, the NSC assumed the lead role, under National Security 
Adviser Henry Kissinger. National security strategy reviews since then have been 
headed up by the NSC, sometimes in conjunction with the Department of Defense.241  
 
This development may well have helped the Department of Defense – itself naturally 
focused on military threats and strategy – in influencing the formulation of national 
strategy favorable to its own institutional goals.  The prominence of the military in the 
overall federal bureaucracy, as well as better assurance of the continuity of its 
perennially vast budget with its large allocation of tax dollars, surely benefited. 
However, care must be taken not to oversimplify the decisionmaking apparatus when 
considering the designation of a "lead agency" for drafting – if not fully and 
independently formulating – strategy.  
                                                
239 For example, Huntington argues that NSC-68 showed a significant emphasis on non-military aspects 
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PRINCE  108/315  
 
The Secretaries of State and Defense, along with the President and Vice President, are 
both principal members of the NSC. Given certain factors, the input of the State 
Department – naturally focused more on foreign policy and diplomatic strategy than 
military strategy – may be marginalized in an environment in which it is not the 
prevalent policy voice. For example, the disposition of a certain President or National 
Security Advisor might make those two individuals more receptive to the Defense 
Department's views than to the State Department's.  
 
But given such a disposition on the part of the President, or the NSC Adviser (who, 
after all, is appointed and works extremely closely with the President), would policy 
formulation not favor the Department of Defense anyway? The answer is not 
immediately clear, and would likely depend on numerous factors. One consideration is 
that there is much to be said for the ability to frame the agenda and formulate questions 
in a certain way. This, in fact, is one of the acknowledged sources of power of the 
NSC.242 Even if the President was more sympathetic to a rival agency, the ability to 
coordinate the exploration of security issues and draft policy responses affords a 
tremendous opportunity for swaying an administration's policy, or at least being 
included rather than excluded from the policy-making process.  
 
Therefore, one may expect a significant amount of political and bureaucratic jockeying 
to occur during any Presidency, regardless of the perceived preexisting preferences and 
allegiances that are attached to an incoming administration. This maneuvering occurs 
between the senior leadership of the federal agencies. Individuals with access to the 
President but without a particular government department to support also participate in 
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such maneuvering. Some have conceived of senior cabinet officials like Secretaries of 
State and Defense as "barons" in the hierarchical federal government, whereas people 
tied more directly to the individual president, like the NSC Advisor and ad hoc policy 
aides, are more like "courtiers".243 While the former may have more bureaucratic 
resources to draw support from, they also have more "territory" to defend; the latter may 
have little institutional baggage influencing their advocacy of policy, but also lack the 
weight that accompanies established institutions.  
 
While some would argue that the NSC Adviser, and perhaps the NSC staff too, are 
"courtiers", one should remain aware that the NSC structure may play different roles at 
different times. At times, the NSC Adviser can operate as an individual advocating a 
certain policy, or as the representative of the NSC as an organization (that is influential 
though of a relatively small size), or as an impartial arbiter of policies advocated by 
others. The exact role played by the NSC Adviser and staff has changed from 
administration to administration, and can conceivably change from issue to issue during 
a single presidency.244  
 
3.3 The NSS as a Product of Negotiation and Compromise  
 
While the NSS report is a tool for forging consensus, it is also a product of negotiation. 
It is interesting to consider where NSS documents actually fit into presidential 
pronouncements in general. As a single document, it can not perfectly fulfill its multiple 
uses with regard to multiple audiences. Part of the negotiation involved in its creation – 
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for example within and between the many agencies with competing ideas and varying 
levels of influence in terms of identifying goals and threats – results in a document 
produced through political maneuvering and compromise.245 As such, it is subject to the 
possible inconsistencies that attend products of compromise. It is also subject to 
potentially becoming outdated due to fast-moving events and changing goals and 
priorities.  
 
An NSS report is produced through discussion and compromise at least to some extent, 
although of course powerful agencies or a willful Chief Executive can significantly 
limit such discussion and compromise. Such a compromise document is more likely to 
embody concessions and modifications of a pragmatic nature than to represent a single 
unadulterated ideology, perception of threat, or unanimously-supported strategy or 
response. Added to this, one must consider that the document is also meant to serve 
multiple purposes. It is subject to modification not only in terms of the preferences of 
the agencies and individuals involved in its creation, but also in terms of the various 
uses which it is meant to have.  
 
In light of this, it is fair to question how succinctly and accurately a NSS document 
expresses an administration's national security strategy. As a compromise political 
document, the NSS is not an altogether "pure" expression of strategy. However, while 
the NSS may be a product of concessions and negotiation – and perhaps even represent 
a somewhat watered-down and inconsistent expression of strategy – other articulations 
of an administration's national security strategy often possess the same drawbacks.  
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soliciting input from a variety of federal agencies. Bouchard noted, "… there were cases where there were 
policy disputes, where there really wasn't a major budget issue. The resolution of it wasn't going to effect 
anyone's budget really, but the particular agencies had a stake in the outcome, because they had very 
different views on how the US should handle a particular issue. So the gaming was not just budget, it was 
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When considering how accurately an NSS report reflects strategic orientation, of 
primary concern is how closely the NSS accords with other expressions of an 
administration's national security strategy. Other products of that strategy may also 
serve as useful indicators. If a strategy is producing various actions or policies at 
variance with one another, they may be inaccurate expressions of the strategy, or may 
reveal inconsistencies inherent in that strategy.  
 
Any NSS document is bound to be one of compromise to a greater or lesser degree. One 
consideration that must be taken into account by a President is the likely reception an 
articulated strategy will receive from the legislative branch. Such consideration does not 
always involve overt bargaining, although it often does entail some degree of 
negotiation. Even so, the Executive may at times decide that great Congressional rancor 
is an acceptable price to pay for announcing a dearly-held policy.  
 
Furthermore, in many instances it has been accepted by the Congress that the Executive 
branch possesses the primary responsibility for the formulation of national security 
policy. Indeed it has been noted that even when Congress has asserted a right to limit 
the Executive's authority in formulating – or even implementing – such policy, that its 
follow-through in exercising such a right has often been lacking.246 For example, the 
historical tendency of Congress has been to rhetorically support limitations on 
presidential power without following through. Congress has vocally supported the 
creation and observance of legislation limiting Executive power such as the War Powers 
Act. Yet the reluctance of the legislative branch to insist on the accountability of 
                                                
246 One former senior Department of Defense official, Larry Korb, made this point with regard to how 
Congress typically receives NSS documents: "[NSS documents can be effective i]f congress would be 
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presidents when the law is breached is apparent. A tension exists between the desire of 
the Congress to bridle Executive power on the one hand, and its wish to limit the risks it 
would assume when taking a more leading role in national security policy.This has 
resulted in what some have termed "fake activism" aimed at "avoiding 
responsibility".247  
 
It should be acknowledged that NSS reports, as interagency documents, are intended to 
include an array of inputs and meant to be statements of common outlook and purpose 
made available to the public. As such, there is a real risk that they often may take the 
form of "least common denominator" documents.248 In the effort to arrive at a 
consensual understanding of threats and appropriate responses, the various agencies 
consulted may tend to avoid contentious issues to such a degree that the document may 
have little practical relevance for guiding an administration's future courses of action. 
Likewise, it may offer precious little information to both international and domestic 
audiences about how the US is likely to respond to particular crises. There is always the 
possibility that such a document may simply tout traditionally-held values that enjoy 
broad support (such as a general support for the spread of democracy), or focus more on 
detailing past successes than future objectives.  
 
On the flip-side of these risks, however, are benefits. The search for consensus may 
enable actors coming from relatively narrow policy perspectives to develop a broader 
understanding of issues that transcend the purview of a single department. This in turn 
may foster increased cooperation and lead to new, shared understandings on matters of 
national security. And in situations where a President has a new and clearly-defined 
policy that he intends to enact, the inter-departmental process of incorporating that new 
                                                
247 Destler, Gelb, and Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy  275. 
248 Clark A. Murdock, Improving the Practice of National Security Strategy: A New Approach for the 
Post-Cold War World, Significant Issues Series; V. 26, No. 1 (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2004) 11. 
PRINCE  113/315  
policy across agencies in the form of an updated NSS can force the development of a 
consensus where little incentive existed before to come to one.249  
 
Whether considering the drawbacks or benefits of the interagency process that produces 
them, there are limits to what NSS reports can express. If it were possible to formulate a 
"grand strategy" of national security, it seems unlikely that it would be produced 
through such a process. National strategy amounts to a "compendium" of individual 
security policies. In the opinion of one military professional, even if a grand strategy 
could actually be drafted that combined existing, lesser policies with projected future 
directions, it would have to be kept so secret as to limit its utility.250 It is easy to think 
that such a statement may exhibit an over-emphasis on concerns of secrecy; yet part of 
the statement rests on logic that is more difficult to dismiss: "Current policies are 
delicately balanced between opposing sets of pressures."251  
 
Logistically, it is usually the NSC structure that has served as the focal point for the 
compromise and ordering of priorities that accompanies the interagency production of 
draft NSS documents. It is important to keep in mind that the NSC can straddle the 
bureaucratic boundaries discussed above. As an organizational structure within the 
federal government, the NSC has interests and a bureaucratic domain as do other 
departments and agencies. Yet, it also functions in a very direct way on behalf of the 
White House. While all departments of the federal government technically fall within 
the Executive branch, the NSC is headed by the Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs. It is acknowledged that this individual meets with the President more 
regularly than any other government official, usually daily.  
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The NSC has a unique mission to support and advise the President as an individual. 
Also, to a greater or lesser degree in its history, it has been meant to be an impartial 
adjudicator of other agencies and their competing interests. The NSC, then, may be 
simultaneously asked to assert the views of the President and act as referee among the 
other federal agencies and departments, while also acting to advance its own 
bureaucratic interests. And as mentioned, even administrative functions carried out by 
an unobtrusive NSC structure focused on the support of other agencies can run to the 
controversial. Notetaking and drafting summaries of meetings can themselves come 
close to being policy formulation.252 The National Security Adviser prepares the agenda 
for NSC meetings, and this is a powerful function. The influence that flows from 
administrative functions has limits of course. Yet, to a significant extent the setting of 
agendas "determines which issues will actually reach the president and the formal NSC 
for deliberation and decision".253 Certain issues may be kept off the calendar entirely, or 
the content of meeting agendas may be withheld until the last moment.254  
 
3.4  Variables Affecting Such Pronouncements  
 
All of the compromise and consultation – between the Executive and Congress, 
between the departments within the Executive branch, and often managed by the NSC 
structure – takes place against the backdrop of the international circumstances of the 
day. These international circumstances greatly effect national security pronouncements. 
The international environment, as an inherent part of the politics between states, always 
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has an impact on their expressions of intent to one another. Drastic changes in that 
environment can create crises or the impression of crises, that themselves greatly effect 
the formulation of national security pronouncements.  
 
The international circumstances and security issues which effect presidential 
pronouncements were explored in Chapter One. Both changes to and changes within the 
international order were considered, and both help to frame US thinking about its 
national security. Domestic purposes also play into the formation of national security 
goals. Similarly, the consideration of domestic concerns is a factor in the ad hoc 
doctrines that presidents formulate. The tensioned interplay that takes place in 
executive-legislative negotiation over the identification and funding of national security 
objectives and means is an example of the serious impact domestic concerns can have 
on the development of a national security policy. These issues were discussed in 
Chapter Two.  
 
Presidential pronouncements and NSS reports are not developed independently from 
international circumstances, the political and ideological orientation of each 
administration, and considerations of the intended audience. There may exist purposes 
that the announcement itself might serve, as distinct from outcomes that particular 
policies are hoped to have. That is, the effect of a public pronouncement may be of 
more interest to a President than the effect of the policies enumerated in that 
pronouncement.255  
                                                
255 The Vandenberg Resolution comes to mind here. This Resolution made by the US Senate helped pave 
the way for NATO by evidencing domestic support for a regional security organization that was in line 
with provisions of the UN Charter. The effect of this Resolution – facilitating the creation of NATO – 
was doubtless of more interest to the Truman administration than the ideas espoused in its content. The 
Vandenberg Resolution "…marked a striking evolution in American foreign and defence policies in time 
of peace, and it made it possible for the United States to enter an Atlantic Alliance." See Lord Ismay, 
"NATO: The First Five Years 1949-1954" 06 Mar 2001 [cited 05 Feb 2009]); available from 
http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/1.htm. The Resolution is reproduced in Appendix III of 
this work. See also Yergin, Shattered Peace  362. 
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Of crucial importance are the variables that find their origin in the individual person of 
the President. These variables include the personality of the President, his personal and 
professional experience, and his moral and political ideology. The trusted advisors 
which Presidents initially choose to surround themselves with can have a tremendous 
impact on the manner in which unexpected crises are managed. Presidential 
pronouncements may be heavily influenced by all these factors, which themselves 
figure prominently in the immense literature that surrounds presidential 
decisionmaking.256 The focus here is confined primarily to pronounced security 
policies, which are but one facet of a President's decisionmaking.  
 
It may seem obvious to state it explicitly, but the single most important variable in the 
national security formulation of a US administration is the individual with the 
prerogative of making the final decision about its articulation: the President. While 
historical precedent might lead one to believe a course of action in response to a crisis is 
more likely than another, a number of presidents have not been reticent to break with 
traditional wisdom in times of national emergency (or in times perceived to be such).257   
 
There are a number of purposes or audiences that presidential pronouncements may 
hope to address. Such a pronouncement may be simply the public unveiling of 
established policy; it may hope to assure the public that a policy has been implemented 
to deal with a particular issue. Or a pronouncement on national security may serve 
primarily as a message to the domestic public or international actors. Even if meant to 
                                                
256 James P. Pfiffner, "Presidential Decision Making: Rationality, Advisory Systems, and Personality," 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (2005). Pfiffner provides a concise overview of the field in this 
journal issue dedicated to decisionmaking.  
257 Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience. Part of Gaddis' argument is that FDR and 
George W. Bush both broke with the tradition that immediately preceded their tenure, with FDR moving 
away from a long-standing US preference for freedom of unilateral action, and Bush moving away from a 
decades-long preference for multilateralism institutionalized by FDR.  
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serve as such a message, its purpose may or may not be primarily rhetorical. For 
example, although the Truman "doctrine" partly served as a communication to the 
American public of policy that had already been decided on, it also served to bring an 
end to much of the US isolationism apparent at the time.  
 
Franck and Weisband have conceived of the rhetoric of presidents and other national 
leaders as falling into three broad levels of "intentionality". The first of these levels an 
upper level in which the aim of rhetoric is to bring about "system-transformation". The 
Truman Doctrine would fall into this category, signaling as it did the US intention to 
remain active in Europe and opposing communism throughout the world. A lower, 
crisis management level exists in which rhetoric has been devised to address specific 
events. Such rhetoric may, if accompanied by other consistent signals over time, also 
result in desired system transformation or reinforcement. Conversely, statements crafted 
to address a distinct situation may be the basis for unintended longer-term 
consequences.258  
 
At the lowest level, statements are not intended to affect the international system in any 
meaningful way, but rather are "informational" in nature. Statements of this ilk have the 
potential of being misconstrued by the audience as a higher form of rhetoric. This is 
especially true if they are delivered by national leaders. Examples of such statements 
would include apologetics attempting to put a past action or future action in positive 
light, but without intending systemic consequences.259  
 
The risk of unintended consequences are increased by the fact that statements 
formulated as apologetics can not be admitted to be of low importance, or they would 
                                                
258 Franck and Weisband, Word Politics  125. 
259 Ibid.  125-126. 
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lose much of their rhetorical value. A very real danger exists of the exercise (or 
pronouncement) of an excuse for immediate, short term reasons which is later cited by 
an adversary as precedent for undesirable acts. When attempting to justify the behavior 
of their state, prudence would dictate that leaders "listen to themselves as if they were 
the enemy speaking."260 Likewise, when making pronouncements for the sake of 
convenience, it is wise to remember the possibility "that other states may treat what we 
say more seriously than we do ourselves."261  
 
Therefore, Presidents should act very purposefully and carefully when announcing new 
outlooks or philosophies that justify novel behavior. A new national policy which is 
hoped to moderately increase the security of the nation may in fact have far-reaching 
repercussions, with consequences that are difficult to foresee. Conduct explained by 
novel principles – principles never used previously when similar conditions applied – 
helps to engender system transformation just as highly intentional rhetoric does. Such 
conduct also has the real potential of costing prestige, since it amounts to inconsistency. 
All states have a stake in system stability that overarches their stake in whatever issue 
of the day is being explained.262 Consistency in state behavior, and in the logic 
justifying that behavior, is a key to stability.  
 
The NSS of George W. Bush, like other NSSs, should be seen as a product influenced 
by international circumstances, the internal disposition of the administration, and the 
intended audiences and purposes of the policy. In order to consider the exceptionality of 
its formulation and implications, it is necessary to now look closely at the various facets 
of the NSS issued in 2002.      
                                                
260 Ibid.  vii. 
261 Ibid.  126. 
262 Ibid.  6-7. 
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4.0  The 2002 NSS as Presented      
 
The chapter will begin with a consideration of the character of the incoming Bush 
administration in 2001. Pertinent events that took place from September 2001 to 
September 2002 are then reviewed, as are related policy statements made during the 
same time period. Finally, the National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the 
administration in September 2002 is presented.  
 
4.1  Features of the Bush Presidency in its First Nine Months     
Contested Election 
 
The election that took place in November 2000 was noteworthy in that it was the most 
contested election in the history of the nation. As votes were tallied in the extremely 
close election, it became clear that the candidate that won the state of Florida would win 
the decisive number of electoral votes and become the next President.  
 
Complaints of irregularities in the vote counting surfaced, with constituent groups 
complaining their votes had been discounted: pensioners who had been confused by the 
ballot layout, African-Americans who were inappropriately listed as ineligible to vote, 
servicemen in the military whose ballots were excluded, and average voters whose 
ballots were discarded if the perforated punch-holes were not completely separated from 
their ballot. With these groups arguing that they had been disenfranchised, some 
election officials disagreeing with the Florida state government's handling of the 
situation, and the public nationwide split in opinion as to whether the decisions taken by 
the state government were legitimate, the candidates went to court. The case quickly 
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found itself propelled upward to the Florida State Supreme Court, and then to the US 
Supreme Court. In a telling vote that split along ideological lines, the US Supreme 
Court ruled 5-4 against the Florida State Supreme Court, and ordered the manual 
recount then taking place to be halted.263 The decision in effect decided the 43rd 
President of the US to be George W. Bush.  
 
Bush's Agenda 
 
Bush had run on an agenda with key domestic components. Foremost was his call for a 
massive tax cut that would exceed $1 trillion. Energy policy formed another significant 
portion of his platform, with Bush advocating the opening of national parks for oil 
exploration (notably the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve). Bush's lack of professional 
international diplomatic experience may have contributed to his domestic agenda 
receiving more emphasis than his foreign policy agenda, although it must be 
remembered that presidential candidates ignore domestic issues at their own peril. Even 
so, he lacked a deftness in foreign policy matters that was illustrated by his 
unfamiliarity with some important details about the makeup of the current international 
community. Famously, on the campaign trail he was unable to name the leaders of 
Chechnya, Pakistan and India when queried by a reporter.264  
 
Yet despite a relative lack of emphasis on foreign policy matters, and a degree of 
unfamiliarity with such matters, the candidate did have well developed foreign and 
                                                
263 U.S. Supreme Court, Per Curiam Opinion in Bush V. Gore; Rehnquist, C. J., Concurring; Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Jj., Dissenting 2000 [cited 12 Oct 2006]); available from 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/florida.html. 
264 Glen Johnson, "Bush Fails Quiz on Foreign Affairs," Washington Post, 04 Nov 1999. See also Ivo H. 
Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution, 2003). The incident may have been over-emphasized. Bush certainly would 
not be the first US president to enter office with more interest in domestic issues than foreign policy and 
determined to keep that focus; in this respect, Bill Clinton might be viewed quite similarly. However, the 
gaff was indicative of the candidate's degree of familiarity with current international affairs. 
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defense policy proposals. In terms of defense, he was vocal about his opposition to the 
use of US troops in "nation building" missions, and supported a renewed commitment 
to national missile defense (NMD). The emphasis on NMD was based on a professed 
belief that the greatest threats to the US would come from "rogue" states such as North 
Korea who might develop nuclear weapons and missiles capable of delivering them to 
the continental US, rather than from non-traditional threats such as sub-state terrorist 
groups.265  
 
While continuing to voice strong support for NMD, and to an increase of the overall 
defense budget to counter what Bush saw as an erosion of US military equipment and 
capability, the administration took immediate action on neither. The administration 
chose early on to stick with the 2002 budget requested by the outgoing Clinton 
administration, and make due with the defense appropriation already passed for 2001.266 
Further, the decision was taken to maintain the number of US troops serving as 
peacekeepers in the Balkans at their preexisting level.  
 
High-Profile Policy Decisions 
 
Soon after the Bush administration assumed office, a significant amount of scrutiny and 
criticism were elicited from members of the international community when the US 
announced its intention to not participate in several international agreements. These 
high-profile policy decisions were interpreted as a having a strong unilateralist bent. 
Criticism from the international community was if anything augmented by the style in 
which the US announced its decisions.  
                                                
265 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), A Distinctly American Internationalism: 
Speech Delivered at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California on 19 Nov 1999 
[cited 12 Oct 2006]); available from http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm. 
266 Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. 
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Upon taking office the administration did not immediately withdraw from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) – an agreement which prohibited the US from 
developing and implementing a NMD system – but had signaled that it was a priority 
throughout the summer of 2001. The US withdrew formally from the treaty in 
December of that year.267  
 
The Kyoto Protocol was another of the high-profile agreements that the US stepped 
back from after President Bush declared his opposition to it.268 It is notable that the US 
had been heavily involved in the negotiations of the treaty, and as is usually the case, 
had exerted a defining influence on the terms and structure of the agreement.269 The 
Bush administration's decision to abandon the Protocol was seen by some as an act of 
bad faith on the part of the US after having been so intimately involved in the 
negotiations. Had the US entirely refrained from participation in negotiating the 
agreement, the Protocol might have been drafted in a more robust fashion – although 
the prospects for its effective implementation probably would not have been increased.  
 
The decision to refrain from becoming a party to the statute creating an International 
Criminal Court (ICC) was also high-profile. This decision, as well as subsequent US 
legislation and policy that limits assistance to the ICC, was likewise negatively 
critiqued by many other states.270 Yet in a way the act was less at odds with past US 
                                                
267 United States. White House, Statement by the Press Secretary: Announcement of Withdrawal from the 
ABM Treaty on 13 Dec 2001 2001 [cited 12 Oct 2006]); available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-2.html. See also Paul Rogers, Losing 
Control: Global Security in the Twenty-First Century, 2nd ed. (London; Sterling, Va.: Pluto, 2002).  
268 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), Text of a Letter from the President to Senators 
Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts on 13 Mar 2001 2001 [cited 13 Oct 2006]); available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html. 
269 See "Global Warming: Throwing Precaution to the Wind" in Philippe Sands, Lawless World: America 
and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules (London: Allen Lane, 2005) 69-94.  
270 Jennifer Elsea, "U.S. Policy Regarding the International Criminal Court,"  (Congressional Research 
Service; The Library of Congress, 2002). 
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rhetoric and practice than the withdrawal from Kyoto had been. The previous Clinton 
administration had also voiced serious concerns over the creation of the ICC.271 
 
In terms of international agreements, the Bush administration's overriding concern was 
with extricating the US from agreements which had already been negotiated or were in 
the process of being created. This was an imperative that precluded the possible creation 
of new initiatives. Although certain of the administration's goals might have been 
furthered by multilateral means, Bush seemed primarily concerned with ending or 
limiting existing relationships with their attendant responsibilities, rather than initiating 
new ones.  
 
4.2  Brief Overview of 11 September 2001 to September 2002      
 
Nine months into the presidency of George W. Bush, the attacks of 11 September 2001 
occurred. The attacks were a defining event in American history, and also of Bush's 
presidency. While the NSS was not released until a year later, the events and thinking 
that helped to form it found expression and development during this period.  
 
The Attacks  
 
On the morning of 11 September 2001, four domestic flights were hijacked in the 
United States. The hijackers piloted two of the planes into the twin World Trade Center 
                                                
271 John Dumbrell, Evaluating the Foreign Policy of President Clinton - or, Bill Clinton: Between the 
Bushes (London: British Library, 2005). It was only towards the end of his second term as President that 
Clinton signed the treaty, and the act may have been more indicative of his personal and professional 
commitment to multilateralism than of the resolution of all misgivings he held about the ICC. He was 
able to sign the agreement as a symbol of his commitment to certain diplomatic and democratic values 
even though indications were that the ICC statute would not be ratified by the Senate anytime in the near 
future. 
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towers in New York, and a third into a side of the Pentagon building in Arlington. The 
fourth flight crashed in the countryside of Pennsylvania while flying towards 
Washington, after passengers decided to resist the hijackers after learning of the attacks 
in New York.  
 
It was ascertained over time that altogether around 3,000 individuals lost their lives in 
the attacks – an unparalleled event in US history. However, in the immediate aftermath 
of the attacks the number of casualties was feared to be much higher.272 The morning 
after, Washington residents were confronted by the somewhat surreal image of military 
vehicles standing sentry over deserted intersections in the upscale and normally bustling 
Georgetown area. The functioning of the infrastructure of the US, notably its financial 
and transportation sectors, was affected in unprecedented ways. Trading on Wall Street, 
which had been suspended on Tuesday morning, was subsequently suspended through 
Friday. All civilian air traffic remained grounded for three days.273  
 
A partial accounting of the direct financial impact of the 11 September attacks has been 
figured at over $285 billion. This figure includes the physical damage and lost wages of 
those killed in the attacks, as well as the initial effect on the US GDP. It does not 
include the ongoing effects of other jobs lost across the US and world economy, which 
are more indirect consequences. Effects on the municipality of New York, tourism 
generally, the ensuing federal bail-out of US airlines, and public uncertainty which was 
reflected in significantly reduced consumer spending all continued to fuel economic 
concerns long past the date of the actual attacks.274  
                                                
272 Eric Lipton, "A Nation Challenged: The Tally; Officials Say Number of Those Still Missing May Be 
Overstated," New York Times, 22 Sep 2001. 
273 Robert D. McFadden, "After the Attacks: The Overview; a Shaken Nation Struggles to Regain Its 
Equilibrium, but Remains on Edge," New York Times, 14 Sep 2001. 
274 Burton M. Leiser, "The Catastrophe of September 11 and Its Aftermath.," in Terrorism: The 
Philosophical Issues., ed. Igor Primoratz (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). Leiser compiled this data 
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Rally of the US Public To Bush, and of the International Community to the US 
 
Predictably, the American public and Congress rallied behind the President, as normally 
happens in time of crisis. During President Bush's speech to the joint session of 
Congress on 20 September 2001, he received standing ovations from both parties at 
numerous times. Virtually no prominent politician, nor a significant number of the 
public, opposed the administration's initial response, which included a tough stance 
against the Taliban regime.275 This support continued when US forces were deployed in 
Afghanistan, the Congress having previously passed a very broadly-worded Resolution 
authorizing the President to use force against the "nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the 11 September 2001 attacks.276  
 
Initially, the international community also rallied behind the US. Support and sympathy 
for the US was strong. The televised images of the attacks were seen live around the 
world.  The attacks evoked an almost universal reaction of sympathy from governments 
                                                                                                                                          
from the Wall Street Journal, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Congressional legislation, and a 
study carried out by the Milken Institute. He points out that $285 billion is in excess of the GNP of many 
nations in the world. 
275 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 
American People on 20 September 2001 [cited 02 Feb 2006]); available from 
http://whitehouse.fed.us/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html. Although Osama bin Laden was 
mentioned by name in this speech, the ultimatum to the Taliban was to hand over leaders of al Qaeda. 
However, administration officials emphasized the need to bring the individual Osama bin Laden to 
justice; to locate and apprehend him, "dead or alive" in the words of the President. This may help to 
account for the general public's strong support of military action in Afghanistan. If the government was 
sure this individual planned/ordered the acts that resulted in mass civilian casualties on US soil, was 
certain he was somewhere in Afghanistan, and the de facto government of Afghanistan refused to locate 
and extradite him, then certainly the US should act to do so. This kind of straightforward logic, which 
was in line with traditional notions of law and order in the US, both in terms of national self-defense and 
criminal justice, appealed to a distraught public eager to 'do something'. 
276 Emphasis added. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, 1st Session, S. J. RES. 23. The 
Resolution was passed unanimously in the Senate and with only one "Nay" vote in the House.  
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around the world.277 A great deal of sympathy from the international public was in 
evidence as well.278  
 
In the aftermath of the attacks, it quickly became clear that the makeup of the various 
companies and individual employees of the World Trade Center was decidedly 
international in character. Due to companies which operated internationally, and non-
US citizens employed at various levels high and low, it was quickly acknowledged by 
the US government that the tragedy had affected friends and families in many countries 
around the world, and not just the US.279  
 
Preliminary International Initiatives in Response to the Attacks 
 
Preliminary international initiatives aimed at responding to the attacks in the US 
targeted terrorism generally. The day after the attack the UNSC passed a Resolution 
condemning the attacks in the US, and recognizing the right of individual or collective 
self-defense under the UN Charter. UNSCR 1368 of 12 September 2001 declared that 
the attacks were acts of international terrorism, and a threat to international peace and 
security. The Resolution also called on all states to increase cooperation in 
implementing international conventions and previous Resolutions regarding acts of 
terrorism.280  
 
                                                
277 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), Statement by the President in His Address to 
the Nation on 11 Sep 2001 [cited 02 Feb 2006]); available from 
http://whitehouse.fed.us/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010911-16.html. Bush mentions the speed with 
which other world leaders had called to offer diplomatic support and condolences.  
278 Jean-Marie Colombani, "We Are All Americans," Le Monde, 12 Sep 2001. 
279 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 
American People on 20 September [cited date as above].   
280 UNSC, Resolution 1368 Adopted on 12 Sep 2001 [cited 13 Oct 2006]); available from 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm.  
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International efforts soon went on to implement controls on the financial support of 
terrorist organizations. The Security Council subsequently passed UNSCR 1373 on 28 
September 2001. This Resolution reaffirmed the inherent right of self-defense, 
emphasizing again an important recognition in legal terms that formally accepted the 
right of the US to act militarily in defending itself. UNSCR 1373 also acted under 
Chapter VII authority, and mandated that states cooperate in curtailing the funding of 
terrorist organizations, and deny refuge to those involved with planning and funding 
terrorist acts. The UNSC also established a Security Council committee to monitor 
implementation of the Resolution.281  
 
Moving quickly, NATO invoked Article V of its Charter. This recognized that an armed 
attack had occurred against one of its members, and declared the alliance's intention of 
fulfilling its obligation to render aid and military support to the US. This was the first 
time that the mutual assistance clause had been invoked by NATO.282  
 
Invasion Of Afghanistan 
 
The days immediately after the attacks were spent by the administration in deep 
discussions and briefings, including a retreat at Camp David. During the President's 20 
September 2001 address to a joint session of Congress, he confirmed that the US 
government believed that the attack had been planned and carried out by al Qaeda.283 
Osama bin Laden, already wanted in the US for his involvement in the bombings of the 
US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, was again identified as the leader of al Qaeda – 
                                                
281 UNSC, Resolution 1373 Adopted on 28 Sep 2001 [cited 13 Oct 2006]); available from 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm   
282 Lord Robertson, The Future of the Transatlantic Link 2001 [cited 13 Oct 2006]); available from 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011024a.htm. 
283 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 
American People on 20 September [cited date as above].   
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an entity more identified with its linking of shared beliefs and goals of smaller groups 
across the globe than by any organizational structure.284 As the group's leader, bin 
Laden was singled out by the US as the individual with primary responsibility for the 
attacks. Bin Laden was known to be in Afghanistan with the acquiescence of the 
Taliban regime. In his address to Congress, the President demanded that the Taliban 
hand over all al Qaeda leaders to the US. An ultimatum was given: immediately comply 
by surrendering such leaders and their supporters, or "share in their fate".285 
 
The Taliban regime did not turn over bin Laden, although it was probably a mixture of 
reluctance and inability that produced this outcome. Although Special Forces troops 
used for reconnaissance had been operating in Afghanistan for some time before, the 
US initiated military action against the regime on 07 October 2001.286 In what might be 
considered an example of the type of combat favored by the administration's Pentagon 
officials, the US opted to use a combination of air power with small and mobile special 
forces units on the ground. In addition, Afghan military elements collectively known as 
the Northern Alliance who were opposed to the Taliban were given arms, intelligence 
and other logistical support. The opposition began advancing southward from the small 
enclave it controlled in the north of the country. Within weeks of the US initiating 
military action, the Taliban quit the capital city of Kabul overnight, leaving it for the 
opposition forces to occupy without resistance.287  
 
                                                
284 Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (London: Free Press, 2004). 
285 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 
American People on 20 September [cited date as above].   
286 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), Presidential Address to the Nation on 07 Oct 
2001 2001 [cited 13 Oct 2006]); available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html. 
287 One consequence of this strategy was to leave the new government of Afghanistan, led by Hamid 
Karzai, struggling to exercise any kind of central control over the entire country. Factions of the Northern 
Alliance jockeyed for power and controlled parts of the country, contributing to a tenuous security 
situation. This, along with a continuing Taliban presence, put the central government at a disadvantage. 
See Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy,"  (Congressional Research Service; 
The Library of Congress, 2003). 
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Such caution as was expressed in the US took the form of worries that the US might 
find itself bogged down for years in the vast expanses of Afghanistan, as the Soviet 
Union had two decades before. As it was, the US seems to have avoided such a situation 
through its limited goals – it never sought to occupy the country – and crucially through 
its reliance on the Afghan opposition to execute much of the ground fighting.  
 
At the time of this writing, evidence of the US military being "bogged down" is more 
apparent in Iraq than Afghanistan, but Afghanistan remains unstable, and a new NATO 
command is working to counter a resurgent Taliban. Yet attainment of the objective that 
had originally prompted the US intervention in Afghanistan remained elusive.  
 
After the fall of the Taliban, it was thought that bin Laden and those in the country loyal 
to him were hiding in caves in the eastern Tora Bora region of the country. The US 
military carried out an extensive bombing campaign directed at the cave systems in this 
mountainous region. The difficulty of bombing such protected positions was explained 
to the public, as was the dangerous and time-consuming task of sending ground troops – 
whether US special forces or Afghan forces – to search cave entrances and tunnels for 
combatants and intelligence. This helped to explain the slow progress made in eastern 
Afghanistan, and for the failure to find bin Laden. Thus, the initial success of military 
action against the Taliban regime was tempered by the fact that as the weeks and then 
months wore on, there was no capture – or even sighting – of bin Laden. 288  
 
                                                
288 Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy,"  (Congressional Research Service; 
The Library of Congress, 2002). 
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4.3  Statements and Speeches Preceding Doctrine      
 
The major ideas embodied in the administration's NSS were introduced in a number of 
speeches and statements made by President Bush prior to the release of the NSS in 
September 2002. Some of these ideas were reaffirmations of familiar US positions. 
These include continuing US support for human rights, economic development, and the 
need for strengthening multilateral relationships. Other less familiar themes were also 
introduced, and flowed from the contention that it was imperative for the US to adopt a 
new security paradigm to meet the challenge of a changed security environment. The 
ideas, both those familiar and novel, were all publicly pronounced by Bush before being 
enshrined in the NSS.  
 
For example, the President's 17 July 2001 speech to the World Bank asserted the need 
to support worldwide economic development, as both a moral imperative and to 
improve international security, with the continuing spread of free trade and open 
markets seen as the best means to accomplish such growth. Support for efforts to 
eradicate HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, and to eliminate high levels of debt 
carried by developing countries, is also cited in the World Bank speech.289 The intention 
to champion the spread of human rights and economic development around the world 
was also included in the 2002 State of the Union address.290 Poverty reduction, the 
promotion of human rights, and the spread of free markets and private investment were 
all reiterated as prime US goals in speeches made by Bush to the Inter-American 
                                                
289 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), Remarks by the President to the World Bank 
on 17 Jul 2001 [cited 02 Feb 2006]); available from 
http://whitehouse.fed.us/news/releases/2001/07/print/20010717-1.html.  
290 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), The President's State of the Union Address on 
29 Jan 2002 2002 [cited 02 Feb 2006]); available from 
http://whitehouse.fed.us/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129-11.html.  
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Development Bank, and at the UN Financing for Development Conference in 
Monterrey, Mexico.291  
 
The President also asserted a belief in the importance of multilateralism at various 
times. Bush spoke to his audience at the World Bank about the US support of 
multilateral relationships, and endorsed NATO and EU expansion as an expression of 
this.292 Bush's speech to a joint session of Congress just after the September 11 attacks 
contained some elements reflective of multilateralism; for example, he stated that the 
US required the support of other nations' police and intelligence services.293 NATO's 
invocation of mutual defense was also referred to positively by the President in the 
same address. The need for cooperation with other nations in order to prevent WMD 
being used by terrorists or state sponsors of terrorism was included in Bush's 2002 State 
of the Union address.294 Similarly, the continuing usefulness of multilateralism in 
general, and the NATO alliance in particular, was asserted during the President's 23 
May 2002 speech to the German Bundestag.295  
 
The need for new strategies to deal with new security threats was also stated by the 
President at various times. The notion of pursuing "a balance of world power that favors 
human freedom" was introduced prior to the attacks of 11 September. Bush stated that 
                                                
291 See United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), Remarks by the President on Global 
Development on 14 Mar 2002 2002 [cited 08 Feb 2006]); available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/print/20020314-7.html. and United States. President 
George W. Bush (2001-2009), Remarks by the President at United Nations Financing for Development 
Conference on 22 Mar 2002 2002 [cited 08 Feb 2006]); available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/print/20020322-1.html., respectively.  
292 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), Remarks by the President to the World Bank 
on 17 Jul [cited date as above].   
293 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 
American People on 20 September [cited date as above].   
294 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), The President's State of the Union Address on 
29 Jan 2002 [cited date as above]. 
295 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), President Bush Thanks Germany for Support 
against Terror: Remarks by the President to a Special Session of the German Bundestag on 23 May 2002 
2002 [cited 02 Feb 2006]); available from 
http://whitehouse.fed.us/news/releases/2002/05/print/20020523-2.html.  
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this pursuit should begin with a new conception of security that emphasized threats such 
as terrorism, cyber-warfare, WMD and ballistic missiles. What are termed "Cold War 
doctrines" – presumably strategic ideas such as deterrence and containment – are 
asserted to have reduced relevance to the current international environment.296 After 11 
September, the potential danger posed by WMD, if acquired by terrorist organizations 
or delivered by the missiles of hostile states, was later reiterated in the speech made in 
Germany.297 While speaking of threats posed by WMD and dangerous regimes, the 
President also stated – while not using the term "preemption" – that he would "not wait 
on events, while dangers gather".298  
 
The need to utilize preventive military action under some circumstances was stated 
most clearly in two speeches made to military audiences in the late spring and summer 
of 2002. In his speech to the graduating class of the US Military Academy in West 
Point, NY, Bush reiterated the potential dangers posed when the "radicalism" of 
terrorist organizations and the "technology" of WMD come together. While not 
discounting their usefulness entirely, the President went on to argue that the past US 
strategies of containment and deterrence were of limited value when applied to this new 
potential threat. Rather, this particular threat is so great, its potential consequences so 
destructive, that the US must be prepared to take preemptive military action before the 
"threats … fully materialize".299 The need for preventive military action in some 
                                                
296 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), Remarks by the President to the World Bank 
on 17 Jul [cited date as above].   
297 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), President Bush Thanks Germany for Support 
against Terror: Remarks by the President to a Special Session of the German Bundestag on 23 May 2002 
[cited date as above].   
298 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), The President's State of the Union Address on 
29 Jan 2002 [cited date as above]. 
299 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at 
West Point United States Military Academy on 01 Jun 2002 2002 [cited 02 Feb 2006]); available from 
http://whitehouse.fed.us/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3.html.  
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circumstances was stated again when the President addressed US troops at Fort Drum, 
NY.300  
 
4.4  Brief Presentation of the 2002 NSS      
 
The first NSS to be issued by the Bush administration was that of 17 September 2002. 
The majority of the Strategy exhibits consistency with previous American thinking, 
values, and strategy.301 The structure of the document will now be reviewed, followed 
by the identification of some common threads that run through the Strategy. Finally, the 
most contentious aspects of the NSS will be described.  
 
The Structure of the 2002 NSS 
 
There is an introduction (I), and eight sections (II-IX) detailing different facets of the 
Strategy. In the Overview (Section I), the 2002 NSS states that the aim of the US is not 
only to make the world safer, but also to make it better. With this in mind, the goals that 
the US has identified are set out: "... political and economic freedom, peaceful relations 
with other states, and respect for human dignity." The document identifies eight ways in 
                                                
300 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), President Salutes Troops of the 10th Mountain 
Division: Remarks by the President to Troops and Families of the 10th Mountain Division on 19 Jul 2002 
2002 [cited 02 Feb 2006]); available from 
http://whitehouse.fed.us/news/releases/2002/07/print/20020719.html. The speech also mentioned an 
administration stance seen as indicative of a unilateralist impulse: the determination to never to allow the 
ICC jurisdiction over American troops.  
301 It is notable that most sections enunciate goals that the US has held for some time. The fact that the US 
– and many other nations – regard these goals as reputable would initially seem to argue against the 
novelty of the NSS. On the other hand, even if broad goals exhibit some ethical resonance and historical 
basis, they may also be used to obfuscate more radical and contentious aspects of US policy. 
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which the US believes these goals can be achieved. These eight means form the 
remainder of the document (Section II to Section IX).302  
 
Section II encompasses the first way in which the US will seek to achieve its broad 
goals: it aims to "champion aspirations for human dignity". The next means is laid out 
in Section III, "strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent 
attacks against us and our friends". Section IV addresses how the US will "work with 
others to defuse regional conflicts". Section V explains how the US intends to "prevent 
our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass 
destruction".  
 
The next means by which the US seeks to achieve its goals is to "ignite a new era of 
global economic growth through free markets and free trade", and is set out in Section 
VI. The intention of the US to "expand the circle of development by opening societies 
and building the infrastructure of democracy" is addressed in Section VII. The aim to 
"develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power" is 
discussed in Section VIII. Finally, Section IX turns to the final intention stated in the 
Strategy: to "transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges 
and opportunities of the twenty-first century".303  
 
These sections may be usefully divided into three groupings: those emphasizing support 
for human rights and economic development; those which stress the importance of 
multilateral action and relationships; and those arguing that a changed security 
environment has necessitated a policy of military preemption and changes to the 
structure of intelligence and military force structures.  
                                                
302 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), "The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America."  
303 Ibid.  
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Sections II, VI, and VII are primarily concerned with human rights and development. 
Section II sets out the US support for human rights and individual freedoms. These are 
viewed as expressions of universal values held by the US, that are applicable across the 
world. Moreover, these universal values form the stated basis of the Strategy; the NSS 
will be formulated to further these values, rather than simply providing the stability 
necessary to secure them in the US. The focus in Section VI is on free markets: both on 
why they are seen as essential to the security and quality of the world, and on how the 
US will seek to support and expand these economic values. Section VII lays out the 
case for reducing the spread and negative impacts of infectious disease – HIV/AIDS in 
particular – as being an integral part of the overarching need for more effective 
development efforts around the world.304 
 
Sections IV and VIII turn to multilateral issues. Section IV asserts the need for work 
towards the resolution of regional conflicts around the world, and emphasizes the need 
for US support of "international relationships and institutions that can help manage local 
crises". Section VIII also focuses on multilateralism. The US asserts that it continues its 
long-standing commitment to multilateralism, and seeks to improve and expand 
cooperation with other nations. This cooperation includes the US existing participation 
in alliances such as NATO, and also its security agreements with other states or actors 
such as South Korea and Taiwan. The US relations with regional groups with which it is 
not a member, such as ASEAN, are also included. A significant portion of the Section is 
devoted to the importance of great power cooperation, with particular emphasis placed 
on the relationship between the US and Russia, India, and China.305  
                                                
304 Ibid., 21-23. In terms of HIV/AIDS, the positive view taken of development aid and efforts to 
eradicate and control the global spread of the disease might have taken some by surprise, given the 
conservative voter base loyal to Bush.  
305 Ibid., 25-28.  
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Sections III, V, and IX deal with the need for new strategies to meet the challenge of a 
new security environment. Terrorism, and the administration's "war on terror" that 
followed the attacks in September 2001, had largely consumed the Bush administration 
for the year preceding the publication of the NSS. It is therefore not surprising that 
terrorism figures prominently in the Strategy. In Section III, emphasis is placed on the 
need to combat international terrorism itself, which is defined by the NSS as 
"premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents". What must 
be targeted by the US and the rest of the international community is broader than a 
particular state, individual, or ideology.306 Section III briefly announces two aims that 
prefigure later sections. These strategies foreshadow concepts that are expanded upon 
later in the document.307  
 
There exists overlap between the Sections, with various issues being discussed in more 
than a single context. However, it is telling that the section dealing especially with 
terrorism is distinctly interrelated with two other sections that lay out proposed military 
aims most prominently. The first is the statement that the US is prepared to act 
unilaterally and preemptively against perceived terrorist threats, a feature with 
significant military implications that is laid out in Section V. The second is the 
reorganization of national security institutions, which is seen as encompassing the 
creation of a new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security, a restructured FBI, 
and – another proposition with notable military implications – the formation of a unified 
                                                
306 This is in accordance with administration policy which began to focus on terrorism generally 
immediately following the 11 September attacks, but is also reflective of a shift in official rhetoric away 
from Osama bin Laden, apparent even in September 2002. This rhetorical shift is seen by many as 
primarily caused by the inability of the US to capture, or even locate, the nominal head of al Qaeda after 
nearly a year of military action in Afghanistan. 
307 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), "The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America," 5-7.  
PRINCE  137/315  
command structure in the US military. These organizational matters are the focus of 
Section IX.308  
 
Common Threads That Run Through the NSS 
 
The NSS issued by the Bush administration in 2002 laid out a number of issues seen as 
affecting security, and the intended US means of dealing with each of them. These 
issues were for the most part reflective of modern liberal democratic values, which large 
segments of the population of most Western nations would support. Values such as 
basic human rights, economic and political rights, freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion, democracy, opportunities for education, equality for women, and capitalism 
(expressed in terms of free markets and the right to individual property rights) feature 
prominently in the document.  
 
The NSS, by virtue of the values it stresses as the basis for its strategy, is a highly 
moralistic document. This is unsurprising, as values are often invoked in politics in 
order to provide a moral basis for whatever course of action a government is taking or 
wishing to take. Values were certainly also invoked in the formal NSSs produced by US 
administrations since the mid-1980s. In his administration's NSS, Ronald Reagan 
insisted that "National Security Strategy must start with the values that we as a nation 
prize", and set "the growth of human freedom" as a key goal. George H.W. Bush's NSS 
spoke of a "common moral vision" that united the US and its strategic allies, and of the 
commitment of the US to make "liberal trade" the basis of the world economy. The 
                                                
308 Ibid., 29-31.  
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Clinton administration's NSS of 1998 spoke of "the universal values of democracy and 
freedom".309 
  
A simple logic is set out in the 2002 document. Long-held values and rights, rather than 
functioning as simply window dressing for controversial policies, are explicitly linked 
by the Strategy to the proposed policies and strategic goals in the document. The 
transmittal letter is also straightforward. The US is supportive of the same democratic 
values and rights that it has always endorsed, and that served as a basis for American 
society when the nation was established. The 20th century, with its two World Wars and 
the Cold War, is presented as a period in which these values were challenged. The 
victory of the US and its allies in the world wars of the early and middle of the century, 
and the demise of the Soviet Union near its conclusion, are viewed as proof that non-
democratic systems of governance with values contrary to the US are at least inferior to 
liberal democratic values, and are even not viable as forms of political organization.310  
 
The document even goes so far as saying that the values that are cherished by the US – 
held by its citizenry and so reflected in the policies and relations of its government – are 
more than a unique expression of democratic liberalism. Rather, the values held by the 
US are universal. They are applicable to all people, regardless of culture; they have 
been applicable in all times or historical moments.311  
 
                                                
309 See United States. President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), "National Security Strategy of the United 
States,"  (Washington, DC: The White House, 1988), 3. United States. President George H.W. Bush 
(1989-1993), "National Security Strategy of the United States,"  (Washington, DC: The White House, 
1990), 1. United States. President William Jefferson Clinton (1993-2001), "A National Security Strategy 
for a New Century,"  (The White House, 1998), iii.  
310 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), "The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America." See the transmittal letter that precedes the table of contents.  
311 Ibid. For a brief discussion of how the US views its values in absolutist terms, see also Rogers, Losing 
Control: Global Security in the Twenty-First Century.  
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These values are reflective of the will and aspirations of the American people. They 
have served the US well, in that they have endured as expressions of the will of the 
American public, and engendered the loyalty of the citizenry of the US to the 
government. In addition, these rights, freedoms, and values have also been held by other 
powerful states, who although may have expressed them somewhat differently, are 
nonetheless liberal democracies who outlasted the challenges of the 20th century. These 
values are equated with the finest, yet most basic, of human aspirations throughout time. 
The freedoms and rights laid out in the Strategy are held to be the proper expression of 
aspirations held by all peoples, everywhere.  
 
Yet, these values also have a function; they possess a concurrent, beneficial side-effect. 
Although they are moral expressions – they are the right goals and objectives of 
humanity – they also are structural. The administration sees these values as serving as 
the very foundation of international order. Democracy and economic liberalism, in 
particular, are mentioned as providing a stable order internationally, and a stable 
domestic order for the polities within states. When these values are threatened by the 
actions or orientation of governments around the world, the stability of the international 
order is also threatened. Long-held American values must be defended globally, not just 
as universal moral certitudes, but as necessary prerequisites for a lasting and stable 
international order.  
 
Thus the discussion of freedom also links values and rights to the international order 
itself. When such values are supported, and allowed expression, international order 
itself is strengthened. When they are challenged, or denied whole populations by 
authoritarian regimes, the challenge is not only immoral, but destabilizing in practical 
terms – and international order is made less secure.  
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While making this point, the Strategy explicitly states that national security strategy of 
the US is now about more than just security.  It is also about supporting universal 
American values as a moral necessity. The US must actively support the spread of these 
values. The NSS argues that the US can not be true to its beliefs and values by simply 
securing them within its borders; it must champion them when and where it can. Given 
the preeminence of the US at present, it must champion them continuously and 
globally.312  
 
Less Contentious Aspects of the NSS 
 
While few would argue against the desirability of peace and stability in international 
affairs, many might disagree with the goals the US views as supportive of that peace 
and stability. Likewise, the manner in which the US pursues these goals rarely has 
unanimous international support. However before turning to the more contentious 
elements of the Strategy that are set out as supportive of peace and stability, some of the 
less contentious will first be considered: those concerned with the promotion of human 
rights and economic development, and those supportive of multilateral relationships and 
goals.  
 
At times the 2002 NSS is almost liberal in tone, which some may find surprising, given 
the orientation of the administration. However, even the most conservative "Realist" 
strands of American politics retain a significant degree of liberal ideology, particularly 
in their approach to foreign policy. Disagreements about foreign policy in the US is 
often about the short-term direction of that policy, and how to bound the debate, than 
                                                
312 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), "The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America," 3-4.  
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they are concerned with replacing the liberal democratic (and moral) assumptions that 
underpin it.313  
 
One example is the stated need to enhance the development assistance given to the 
poorest nations. A moral argument for working to eliminate poverty is made. People in 
poverty are deprived of some of the basic freedoms mentioned at the beginning of the 
President's transmittal letter. These include the right to work and profit from that work, 
the opportunity to provide for the education of offspring (an ability usually severely 
curtailed in instances of widespread poverty), and the right to own property.314  
 
The document sets out poverty as both a values-laden issue, and as a pressing and very 
practical security issue. While arguing that poverty is not the cause of militant 
terrorism, it asserts that poverty creates an environment that is conducive to militant 
philosophies. Therefore, to shrink from taking steps to reduce poverty would be a 
failure to address one of the most important conditions that foster the popularity of 
terrorist organizations.  
 
Poverty is not only viewed as a security issue at the individual level. In addition to 
creating an environment that easily fosters militant ideologies that appeal to those 
individuals affected most in their day-to-day lives by it, poverty also has consequences 
at the state level. States who suffer from endemic poverty are inherently less stable than 
more prosperous countries. They are less able to counter the attraction that terrorist 
organizations or causes hold for their own citizens – both in terms of providing viable 
economic options for their disaffected, and more negatively, in terms of possessing the 
wherewithal to control their populations through strong central control and 
                                                
313 Dumbrell and Barrett, The Making of US Foreign Policy  6-7. 
314 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), "The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America." See the transmittal letter.  
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enforcement. Further, due to severe budgetary constraints, such states are often unable 
to effectively patrol their own borders and remoter regions effectively. The Strategy 
also explicitly mentions the drug trade, which thrives in weak states which lack the 
ability for effective law enforcement. The drug trade is seen as regionally destabilizing, 
and as providing a source of critical funding to terrorist organizations.  
 
The US proposed solution to global poverty is multi-faceted. It is asserted that the 
continuing spread of free trade is an inherently positive development that is the proven 
way to increase individual well-being and the prosperity of states. Therefore, the US 
will remain committed to free markets and supportive of efforts to bolster their vitality 
and growth. The US sees it as the responsibility of governments to recognize the 
positive influence of free trade, and to seek their nations' inclusion in a global free 
trading system. Governments who make this decision will receive the support of the 
US.315  
 
The US also proposes a more direct means of providing financial support to poverty-
stricken nations. The Strategy expresses an intention to increase the funding provided 
by the US for development through a "New Millennium Challenge Account". The 
dispersal of funds to poorer nations will be on the basis that their governments have met 
certain conditions. These include just governance, accountability, and commitment to 
free markets. The US sees its commitment to help stop the spread of AIDS – its 
financial support of AIDS initiatives – as part of its broad development goals.316  
 
Likewise, multilateralism is presented as having both a values-based logic underpinning 
it, as well as positive outcomes for US security. Supporting like-minded states is a 
                                                
315 Ibid., 17-20.  
316 Ibid., 21-23.  
PRINCE  143/315  
moral good that has a long historical precedent. Further, when considering the various 
conflicts and security challenges in regions around the world, the NSS recognizes that 
the US alone can not resolve them. Rather, it is recognized that the cooperation of other 
states is necessary to address such challenges. The US coalition relationships and 
participation in regional institutions  "advances security, prosperity, opportunity, and 
hope."317 
 
It is also acknowledged that fostering multilateral relationships has other practical 
implications. Cooperation in addressing security issues is seen as a way of bringing 
additional resources to bear – resources and expertise that are needed to augment the US 
"finite political, economic, and military resources". Such cooperation will help to secure 
stability while sharing costs and risks.318 Cooperation in security matters may lead to 
cooperation in other matters, such as diplomatic and economic ones. In other cases, it is 
hoped that economic cooperation will lead to a closer alignment of values and common 
security interests.319 
 
A Highly Contentious Aspect of the NSS: Preventive Self-Defense 
 
By far the most controversial aspect of the 2002 NSS is its emphasis on the US 
intention of using preemptive or preventive military force when necessary. There exist 
different facets of the preemption aspect of the Strategy, all contentious. The intention 
of acting preemptively when necessary is one. Another is the US assertion that 
preemption/prevention is legitimate, and even compliant with international law. The US 
intention of independently determining when preemptive military force is necessary, 
                                                
317 Ibid., 10.  
318 Ibid., 9. The Strategy argues in favor of NATO enlargement to nations "able to share the burden" of 
defense.  
319 The NSS talks of China in this context; see Ibid., 27-28.  
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rather than through a multilateral mechanism such as the UNSC, is yet another facet of 
this part of the Strategy. Finally, and relatedly, the US asserts that once it has 
determined unilaterally that preventive military action is called for, it is prepared to take 
unilateral military action. Each of these aspects, all of which are interrelated, are 
nonetheless distinctly controversial.  
 
The NSS argues that while the traditional method for ascertaining an imminent threat 
was originally understood as very material – the physical movement of military forces – 
that the international environment has changed to such a degree that preemptive action 
is necessary before a threat is blatantly or indisputably imminent. The document also 
recognizes an age of advanced technology – of ballistic missiles, chemical, biological, 
and nuclear devices, and the ease of global travel – has resulted in new vulnerabilities. 
Threats are seen as posing severe risks before any belligerent action is taken, while they 
are still in the formative or planning stages.320  
 
In this view, the US must take forceful action before such threats are fully formed. It is 
this necessity that makes taking action justifiable before an imminent threat exists. 
Indeed, the document even explicitly argues for a definitional change, arguing that 
"imminent" is no longer useful in the traditional understanding of the word. The 
Strategy notes that in times past, the movement and massing of troops were the 
indicator of imminent threat. In an age where an individual could potentially import or 
construct a WMD, and use it to effect mass civilian casualties, the instant of imminent 
threat is much more difficult to detect and define.321  
 
                                                
320 Ibid., 14.  
321 Ibid., 15.  
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This nature of this changed environment is also formed by the threats posed by sub-state 
groups that are difficult to target and fight. The covert support of such groups by states 
antagonistic to the US – which increases the seriousness of the threat, but does not 
necessarily make the identification of the threat any less difficult – exacerbates the non-
state aspect. Finally, there is the potential that a chemical, biological, or nuclear WMD 
might be supplied to a sub-state group by a "rogue state". Therefore the US perceives 
itself as facing the continuous possibility that a group that is not a state (but perhaps 
receiving some degree of assistance from one) may act to inflict unprecedented civilian 
casualties in a way that is extremely difficult to defend against.  
 
Yet despite the strident assertion that these contemporary security challenges are so 
novel that the US must be allowed to meet them as it sees fit, its proposed actions 
remain highly controversial. The wisdom of setting aside existing procedures and 
institutions in order to increase its freedom of action is far from apparent. Further, 
whether the US can legitimately implement such a sweeping change in accepted 
behavior, on its own authority alone, is also a controversial issue.  
 
In legal terms, the NSS argues for a new interpretation of the traditional concept of 
preemptive self-defense. The US claims a legal basis for anticipatory action, pointing to 
a norm allowing preemptive military action that is found in customary international law. 
Since this traditional concept was accepted by the international community as legitimate 
in times past, it is viewed as a legitimate basis which should be adapted to the 
"capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries".322 There is much disagreement 
among international lawyers that a customary right of preemptive self-defense still 
exists; and even if it does, the leap to "adapting" the concept of preemption so as to 
                                                
322 Ibid. The document does not address the issue of the UN Charter superceding the legitimacy of 
customary international law in matters concerning the use of force – a crucial argument made against the 
legitimacy of preemptive or preventive military action. 
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facilitate the unilateral use of force is problematic at best. Even if some sort of right of 
preemptive action is sometimes legitimate, the assertion that a lone state can unilaterally 
determine future threats – and then unilaterally use force to forestall them – is 
questionable, though not insupportable. This fact is borne out by the reaction that the 
release of NSS 2002 engendered, which is examined next.  
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II.  The 2002 NSS of the US and External - Affective Exceptionality  
5.0  The Reaction to the 2002 NSS           
 
This chapter will concentrate on the relatively short-term reactions to the release of the 
2002 NSS – that is, those enunciated before the publications made in response to the US 
invasion of Iraq. In part, this is because the earlier reactions concentrate on legal and 
political implications of the document itself and its logic. After Spring 2003, the scale 
and importance of the war in Iraq meant that discussion of preemptive self-defense took 
on a more general, less document-specific character.  
 
When considering the reaction to the release of the 2002 NSS, it is important to focus 
on the reaction to the Strategy, as distinct from reaction to the decision to invade Iraq. 
Even before the invasion, the NSS was seen by some as providing a rationale and 
justification for military action against Iraq that had already been decided upon by the 
president, or that the administration thought was possible or probable.323 After the 
invasion, the prudence, and practicality, of establishing a policy orientation based on the 
use of military force to preempt emerging threats was seen through the lens of the 
experience in Iraq. Of course the preemptive policy enunciated by George W. Bush 
(first in his West Point speech and given prominence in the NSS), and the subsequent 
decision to invade Iraq (in the professed belief that Iraq was concealing chemical and 
biological weapons programs and stockpiles), can not be viewed in complete isolation 
from each other.  
 
                                                
323 Kirshner states the Strategy was formulated "with one eye (at least) towards a military confrontation 
between the United States and Iraq", and that it has implications above and beyond providing "the 
strategic and philosophical justification for a U.S. invasion of Iraq". See Jonathan Kirshner, "Prevent 
Defense: Why the Bush Doctrine Will Hurt U.S. Interests," in Iraq and Beyond: The New U.S. National 
Security Strategy, Occasional Paper #27 (Peace Studies Program, Cornell University 2003), 8,1.  
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The degree to which the existence of WMD in Iraq was seen by some as a confected 
rationale also might have some bearing on perceptions of the 2002 NSS. There is little 
hard evidence that the US administration set out to mislead the public by fabricating 
evidence of a WMD threat in Iraq. However, it is undeniable that unusual intelligence 
analysis procedures and personnel were put in place, and these almost certainly led to 
biased conclusions in US intelligence estimates.324 Also the fact that WMD was 
identified as a serious concern and a growing threat, and that preemption was identified 
as an appropriate response, in the same NSS document, means that the issues are 
difficult to untangle. These two issues are not easily isolated from one another, nor are 
they easily isolated from the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This difficulty is felt by analysts 
outside the US as well: for if one is debating whether a certain threat justifies 
preemptive self-defense, must not one also consider evidence that such a threat never 
existed?325  
 
Yet, all the evidence garnered in interviews with officials involved in the drafting and 
revision of the 2002 NSS before its release supports the assertion that the Strategy was 
written solely as an updated statement of the nation's national security policy. It was not 
devised around specific US intentions toward Iraq. Philip Zelikow, the University of 
Virginia professor who was the main drafter of the working document that became the 
2002 NSS, has stated that neither he nor National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice 
(who tapped him to draft the document) had Iraq in mind when writing the document.  
                                                
324 Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers, The Political Road to War with Iraq: Bush, 9/11, and the Drive to 
Overthrow Saddam, Contemporary Security Studies (London; New York: Routledge, 2006). See 
especially "Chapter 9: Finding the Evidence".  
325 Sven Biscop and David Mendeloff, "Power to the System: The UN High-Level Panel and the 
Reinvigoration of Collective Security Conference Proceedings," Studia Diplomatica LVIII, no. 2 (2005). 
See the statement by Dr. Martin Ortega, Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies, in "Part 
1: A New Consensus on the Use of Force?".  
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As Professor Zelikow put it 
 
But the document was not giving policy guidance for what to do about Iraq 
in 2002; nor was it reflecting judgments that had already been made about 
action against Iraq. Contrary to much public speculation, the present-day 
Iraq issues played no part whatever in my work on the document. I did not 
even have especially strong views on the Iraq question. Nor did plans or 
thoughts about Iraq have any influence on Rice's direction and input into the 
NSS. Some of this misunderstanding understandably arises from the fact 
that, although the document was mainly formulated in the winter of 2001-
2002, it did not emerge into public view until September 2002, seemingly 
coincident with the Bush administration's moves to use military power to 
force the issue of Iraqi WMD. Although Rice tried to rebut any inference 
from this coincidence in her October 2002 Wriston lecture, the unfortunate 
association remains.326   
 
Franklin Miller, as the NSC Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, 
oversaw the NSC Directorate that has been charged with the production of the 
mandated NSS document. His views differ somewhat from those of Zelikow in terms of 
the practical utility of the document; Miller viewed the production of the document 
largely as "ticking a box". However he likewise detected no attempt to justify a US 
stance against Iraq through the production of the Strategy, and indeed views military 
action against Iraq as justifiable without the concepts developed in the 2002 NSS. Mr. 
Miller asserts  
 
Nor do I believe … that the enunciation of the policy foreshadowed what 
we did in Iraq, or that it was designed to foreshadow or justify that. I don't 
believe that for a second. … Was it retrospectively designed to provide 
some cover for invading Iraq? I don't know. I mean I think that people didn't 
need that particular public justification to do so.327  
 
One of the top Pentagon officials charged with reviewing the 2002 NSS before its 
publication was Andy Hoehn. Mr. Hoehn worked with Doug Feith in the Defense 
Department, and became involved with the document after Secretary Rumsfeld tasked 
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Feith with reviewing the draft Strategy that had been circulated to him. Hoehn states 
that one of the main concerns of the group of top Defense personnel who reviewed the 
2002 NSS was with limiting the stated parameters for when preemptive action was to be 
considered: namely, limiting it to situations involving states outside the international 
fold who were pursuing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. This concern 
was not meant to tailor the document for use against Iraq, but to limit the application of 
preemption in general. Mr. Hoehn judges one of the primary strengths of the document 
to be its long-term strategic outlook and application, and finds it regrettable that some 
view the document as mainly a justification for taking action against Iraq: 
 
Then, people that even initially looked at this [the 2002 NSS] and viewed it 
rather favorably, then began to distance themselves because they perceived 
it to be the justification for a specific action as opposed to a longer term 
strategy statement for the country.328  
 
That these three individuals – the external drafter of the document, an official with 
oversight responsibilities at the White House, and a top official at the Pentagon – all 
concur that the document was not designed to justify a US war against Iraq is really 
quite striking.  
 
However the intention of the present chapter is to focus on the perception of the NSS, 
and of the policy of preemption included in it, before the military invasion of Iraq. Had 
caches of hidden WMD been found, had the oppressed Iraqi people hastily unified in 
the endeavor to create a new democratic state, had US forces left the country quickly 
and thus not been viewed as an occupying force by other countries and the Iraqis 
themselves, then the strategy of preemption might now enjoy greater support. Certainly 
preemption, as described by the Bush administration in the NSS, would have been 
viewed differently.  
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It is useful, then, to attempt to look for reactions to the NSS that are, as much as 
possible, distinct from the issue of Iraq. This is not an easy task, as the confrontation 
between the US and Iraq was continuing, and the possibility of US military action 
against Iraq was beginning to loom large at the time the NSS was released. Indeed, part 
of the reason the NSS received such attention was that it was released at the same time 
the international community was grappling with whether war against Iraq was 
justified.329 Yet to the extent possible, the reaction to the NSS and the reaction to the 
invasion of Iraq should be isolated – at least temporarily – in order to gauge the novelty 
of the document.  
 
This approach is not meant to invalidate or diminish the importance of these initial 
critiques in terms of their ongoing usefulness and relevance. This is especially true since 
they form at least part of the intellectual substance of subsequent, larger debates on 
preemptive and preventive self-defense. However, the attempt to keep the responses 
generated by the war in Iraq separate from responses generated by the publication of the 
2002 NSS itself does help to contextualize these initial critiques.  
 
Similarly, just as it is difficult – but desirable – to differentiate between reaction to the 
2002 NSS and reaction to the US invasion of Iraq that followed close upon its heels, it 
is difficult but desirable to distinguish between reaction to the 2002 NSS and reaction to 
the person and policy disposition of George W. Bush. Many politicians, academics, and 
members of the public had of course already formed opinions of the man and judgments 
of the first policy stances and directions taken by his new administration. The intention 
in trying to separate reaction to the NSS from reaction to the administration that 
                                                
329 This issue of timing was mentioned by Philip Zelikow; see note 4 above. See also Jolyon Howorth, 
"The US National Security Strategy: European Reactions," in Security Strategy and Transatlantic 
Relations, ed. Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 30.  
PRINCE  152/315  
preceded its publication, and from reaction to the invasion of Iraq that came to dominate 
the time just after its publication, is to ascertain as much as is possible the reaction 
generated by the NSS, in order to assess the import of the document.  
 
 The previous policies of the administration helped to define the way it perceived US 
national interests and goals. It has been noted that George W. Bush and Dick Cheney 
entered office with a desire to expand presidential power. Cheney in particular 
perceived presidential power as having been curtailed too much after the Nixon 
presidency and the Watergate scandal.330 This preexisting disposition no doubt 
influenced, if not formed, the administration's approach to policy; it was an approach 
that was often seen as confrontational and insensitive to groups which held alternative 
views. The disposition of the Bush administration and the qualities embodied in the 
person of the president preexisted the public presentation of the NSS. The orientation of 
the Bush administration was not immutable, but it did not undergo radical revision in 
the NSS. Rather, previous statements and speeches, as discussed above in Chapter Four, 
foreshadowed and directly provided the content for the 2002 NSS.  
 
5.1  Support for Elements of the 2002 NSS 
 
The release of the NSS document elicited a substantial response. Yet as mentioned in 
the previous chapter the policies contained in it had, for the most part, been introduced 
to the public earlier. The President had spoken of the need for a "new strategic 
framework" to address threats such as cyberterrorism and weapons of mass destruction 
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over a year before.331 He had also asserted that the US was threatened by terrorist 
groups who intended to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction, and by states who 
were attempting to develop such weapons through clandestine programs.332 The need to 
act preemptively before threats "fully materialize" was a significant component of the 
President's West Point speech.333 One might have expected that the initial policy 
choices and announcements made by the administration would have received a more 
considerable reaction than when bundled and reiterated for the mandated NSS 
document. This is telling in regard to how much importance has begun to be assigned to 
the NSS in its form as a Congressionally mandated document, which only came about 
in 1986. Part of the reason may also be the timing in this particular case, coming as it 
did just after the events of 11 Sep 2001 and the announced disposition that preceded it 
(e.g., a unilateral bent, and disdain for certain treaty regimes and multilateral 
institutions), and just before the policies that followed it (e.g., the invasion and 
administration of Iraq).  
 
Especially in the US, the dividing lines between policy, academic, and press critiques 
are in practice not always distinct. Advocacy of one sort or another is often discernible. 
Because of this, this chapter will not attempt to rigidly segregate these groups from one 
another. Rather, a more holistic and thematic approach will be taken. Some of the 
reactions that were generally supportive of the 2002 NSS will now be considered. These 
relatively supportive reactions, as well as more critical ones that will be discussed later 
in this chapter, can be thought of as responding to the Strategy's unilateral disposition, 
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reliance on preemption, legality, and other elements that were seen as central to the 
document.  
 
Unilateral Disposition 
 
Supporters pointed out that it was not unusual for states to take unilateral actions, and 
contended that the tone of the Strategy was not really as unilateral as some thought. 
Some responses noted that even countries seen as having a strong commitment to the 
use of multilateral decisionmaking regarding the use of force have sometimes seen fit to 
make their own, unilateral decisions. For example, states sometimes take action without 
multilateral consultation, and at other times simply refuse to support multilateral 
decisions and actions – such as when Germany reserves the right to not support 
multilateral uses of force that it may have come out in favor of.334 A related issue 
surfaces when individual states do not contribute to enacting decisions they took 
collectively as members of the international community.335  
 
Of course the freedom to use military force against their own populations is viewed as a 
sovereign prerogative by states that possess a relatively nascent democratic tradition. 
These states view their actions as an internal matter, such as when Russia decided to 
intensify its military campaign in the civilian areas of Chechnya in 1999.336 Yet states 
                                                
334 Walter B. Slocombe, "Force, Pre-Emption and Legitimacy," Survival 45, no. 1 (2003): 120. 
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with a much more established liberal democratic tradition, such as the United Kingdom 
and France, also exhibit a propensity to take unilateral action.337  
 
Regardless of how prevalent unilateral action is in contemporary affairs, defenders of 
NSS 2002 further argued that it is harder for a state to be "unilateral" in practice than in 
theory. The more challenging the circumstances of the situation, it was reasoned, the 
more difficult to take "truly unilateral action".338 The fact that the 2002 NSS makes note 
of the need for international cooperation, especially with regard to NATO and European 
Union member states, was cited by these supporters. Indeed, a prominent US historian 
asserted that the Strategy was more multilateral in tone than the last such document 
issued by the Clinton administration.339 
 
Preemption 
 
Those supporting the Strategy endorsed the use of preemption to deal with perceived 
threats, including states as well as non-state actors. There is a distinction to be drawn 
between a preemptive attack that targets a specific facility in a state – such as a nuclear 
reactor or chemical plant – and one which targets the regime which rules that state. 
Interestingly, in their response to the Strategy, some argued that targeting regimes 
                                                
337 Britain intervened in Sierra Leone in May 2000 when RUF forces were advancing on the capital. 
France intervened in Cote d'Ivoire in September 2002 after an attempted coup against the government, 
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support of "conflict mitigation" or other humanitarian objectives, that a major drawback of this pattern is 
the possibility of alienating formal multilateral organizations that might otherwise play a more substantial 
and constructive role in post-conflict reconstruction. See Dan Smith, Alternatives to War (Friends 
Committee on National Legislation, 2004 [cited 19 Mar 2008]); available from 
http://www.fcnl.org/smith/peace_org_212-04.htm.  
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would sometimes be the more practical course of action.340 For example, if no physical 
targets are known, or if a regime is perceived as likely to quickly reconstitute 
unconventional weapons programs that might be destroyed in a preemptive military 
attack, then it is argued that the regime itself is a more practical target in terms of 
achieving the goal of eliminating the development of such unconventional weapons.341  
 
In defending the Strategy against early criticism, these supporters rejoined that the 
policy of preemption was not too expansive, arguing that it was focused only on 
terrorist groups and "rogue states" seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. It 
was contended that the states that could be so classified were very few in number: 
principally those the administration dubbed an "Axis of Evil", Iraq, Iran, and North 
Korea. In responding to worries that other states might also adopt the policy of 
preemption, but as a cloak for their own ambitions or aggression, supporters 
acknowledged the possibility. However, it was argued that such bad behavior was 
already apparent, since international law could not prevent it in practical terms of 
enforcement.342 
 
Interestingly, even some supporters of the Strategy noted that a double standard was 
being applied where preemptive military action was concerned. For them, though, the 
issue centered around US criticism of Israel. If the US had announced and was 
following such a policy itself, they argued, it should not simultaneously criticize the 
Israeli government for taking the same kind of action in the occupied territories. The 
administration's support of regimes in the Middle East who possessed undemocratic 
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features and tendencies was likewise seen at odds with the Strategy's stated support for 
democratic freedom and individual rights.343  
 
Legality 
 
An issue interconnected with the policy of preemption is the legality of such action.344 
On this score, it was contended that the distinction between use of force for defense, 
and use of force for aggression, has always been a grey area. Supporters pointed out that 
self-defense is recognized as legitimate in the UN Charter, and as an "inherent" right, 
not one brought about by the creation of the Charter.345 It remained an unresolved 
question at what point self-defense is justified, "on the spectrum of prevention, pre-
emption, and response".346 At any rate, the idea of preemptive self-defense (as 
traditionally understood) already enjoyed a significant degree of acceptance both in the 
US and around the world.347 The US had also stressed the right of using force 
unilaterally. This right was asserted in regard to supporting democracy movements, as 
in the so-called "Reagan Doctrine".348 It was asserted in regard to the protection of US 
interests as well, as in the Clinton administration's 1998 National Security Strategy. 
Such "vital interests" were broadly defined as  
 
"… the physical security of our territory and that of our allies, the safety of 
our citizens, our economic well-being and the protection of our critical 
infrastructures.  We will do what we must to defend these interests, 
                                                
343 N. Podhoretz, "In Praise of the Bush Doctrine," Commentary 114, no. 2 (2002). 
344 While some of the legal questions surrounding the 2002 NSS are discussed here in terms of the initial 
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345 Slocombe, "Force, Pre-Emption and Legitimacy," 123. 
346 Ibid. 
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including—when necessary—using our military might unilaterally and 
decisively."349  
 
After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the rights to act preemptively and unilaterally 
were obviously claimed more prominently and frequently, especially with regard to 
terrorist organizations and states sponsoring them or offering them sanctuary.350  
 
To the extent that preemption had been defined in the past, some argued that the 
Strategy's assertion of a right to act preemptively was consistent with the formulation 
made by US Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the 1837 Caroline case. They pointed 
out that even in Webster's restrictive formulation, it is the "necessity" of self-defense 
that must be "instant" and "overwhelming", rather than the armed attack itself. This 
point is used to refute the proposition that only an imminent armed attack can provide 
the "instant" and "overwhelming" need for preemptive military action.351  
 
Supporters of the Strategy asserted that the document was actually supportive of 
international law, pointing to the fact that the document made an explicit argument for 
the legal justification of a new policy of preemption.352 However, even some of these 
supporters of the Strategy viewed the possibility that the policy of preemption would 
weaken international law as worrying. It was recognized that the US needs the 
legitimacy that international law affords. Yet while worrying, it was argued that the 
policy of preemption outlined in the Strategy was legal, and so would not weaken 
international law; and the Strategy explicitly pointed to a grounding for preemption in 
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international law. It was further argued that the distinction between what is traditionally 
understood as "preemptive" and what has been understood as "preventive" is not a clear 
one.353 
 
Other Elements 
 
The overall significance of the Strategy was also stressed by those supporting it. 
Assertions were made that the Strategy was not only more significant than past 
strategies because of its content, but also because of its context; this was the first 
national strategy document issued by the Bush administration since the attacks of 11 
Sep 2001, and Bush had already announced his "war on terror". Some viewed the 2002 
NSS as putting forth a strategy as a landmark equivalent to containment, and viewed 
both as developing from practical experience rather than theory; while the expansion of 
communism in the late 1940s stimulated the development of the containment strategy, 
the attacks of 11 Sep 2001 stimulated the strategy presented in the 2002 document.354 
Supporters also argued that the Strategy was an improvement over those of the Clinton 
years, because they perceived the 2002 document to be more focused on providing an 
overarching rationale, or new American "grand strategy".355   
 
Some even went to far as to assert that opposition to the Strategy – both domestically 
and internationally – was based on "envy and fear" of US power and the attendant will 
to use it unilaterally.356 Those supportive of the Strategy viewed the document in its 
totality, lauding not only the goal of deterring and preempting threats posed by 
terrorism and rogue regimes, but also the objectives of fostering harmony among the 
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world's great powers and the spread of democracy.357 In the view of some scholars, it 
was the portion dealing with actively supporting the spread of democracy around the 
world that was the most far-reaching yet overlooked aspect of the Strategy. This aspect 
was viewed as a return to a Wilsonian understanding of, and approach to, foreign 
policy.358  
 
Rather than seeing the Strategy as unrealistic, or failing to match ends and means, some 
viewed it as informed by an "incandescent moral clarity".359 Indeed, the Strategy was 
seen as articulating a more idealistic disposition, one that was more activist in its efforts 
to force the development of democratic progress. George W. Bush's orientation, made 
apparent in the Strategy, was compared favorably with that of Ronald Reagan. Reagan 
had also couched foreign policy issues in terms of "good" and "evil"; while Reagan 
sought to bring an end to the Soviet Union, Bush was now pursuing the goal of ridding 
terrorism from the world. This was seen by some as a "new fusion of power and 
principle", a courageous moral and ethical stance that put moral imperatives before the 
goal of stability central to more "realist" approaches (such as that of the president's 
father, George H. W. Bush).360  
 
There had been an ongoing disagreement in US policymaking and intelligence circles in 
the 1990s on whether terrorism was best thought of, and responded to, as criminal 
activity or as acts of war. Some of those who favored the conception of terrorist attacks 
as acts of war insisted on the utility of military force to counter them. They applauded 
                                                
357 Muravchik, "The Bush Manifesto." 
358 Ibid. 
359 Podhoretz, "In Praise of the Bush Doctrine." 
360 Philip Zelikow, "The Transformation of National Security," The National Interest 71, no. Spring 2003 
(2003): 20. Zelikow was involved in the drafting of the text of the 2002 NSS, and so his article functions 
as both an authoritative explanation of the thinking behind the Strategy, and a scholarly defense of it.  
PRINCE  161/315  
the new Strategy for asserting – as the president had done before – that the US was in 
fact engaged in a war with "global terrorism".361  
 
Related to this is the fact that at the time of the Strategy's release, some individuals were 
certain of Iraqi involvement in the attacks of 11 Sep 2001. Because the evidence of such 
involvement was slim, they welcomed the justification made for taking preemptive 
action against "rogue states" pursuing the development or acquisition of unconventional 
weapons.362 Defenders of the document also contended that the declared strategy was 
important rhetorically, even if policies in practice did not fully conform to it, or live up 
to its potential. Historical comparison was made with the rhetoric of Reagan, which was 
said to have provided hope and support to communist dissidents even when Reagan's 
own policies were at odds with his stated positions.363  
 
5.2  Negative Criticism of Elements of the 2002 NSS 
 
When considering the reaction of those who were not supportive of the 2002 NSS, one 
finds negative criticism concerning each of the elements discussed above. This more 
deprecating criticism centered at times around the goals identified in the Strategy. At 
other times, it was the means to be used in the pursuit of those goals that was the focus. 
Detractors also detected a lack of consideration given in the document for unintended 
negative consequences that might result from its implementation.  
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Unilateral Disposition 
 
While allowing that it is not unusual for states to sometimes act unilaterally, some 
critics noted that the Bush administration's Strategy seemed to flout the opinion – and 
wisdom – of the American public. It was noted that the US public has consistently 
expressed in opinion polls that it values the support of other nations with regard to use 
of force. Public support for the use of force is higher when the US is acting with allies. 
These facts are seen as indicative of not just a prudent public wishing to share risk and 
cost, but also one that is more confident in the actions of its government when other 
governments agree and support it.364 For these reasons, multilateral support for US 
actions is seen as usually desirable. Also, it is usually possible for the US to garner such 
support, due to the many means of leverage at the disposal of the US.365 Further, the 
Strategy's emphasis on unilateral action seemed to ignore the fact that multilateral 
institutions have relevance beyond particular military missions; over time, participation 
in such institutions can actually lead to shared interests and approaches that enhance 
peace and stability.366  
 
Preemption 
 
President Bush had previously announced the need for relying more on preemptive 
military action than in the past. However the inclusion of this point in the Strategy was 
seen by some as elevating the policy to, and codifying it as, "official US doctrine".367 
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Further, preemption was made even more controversial than traditionally debated, when 
interpreted in the new, expansive way of the Bush administration.368  
 
Many critics of the Strategy perceived a distinct lack of clarity in the document, 
incandescent or not. One example cited is the conflation and confusion of the terms 
"preemption" and "prevention". In terms of states and unconventional weapons, some 
viewed these terms as respectively referring to action that might be taken against a state 
about to use such weapons, and action taken against a state seeking to acquire them.369 
More than one critic asserted that what the administration was really proposing was not 
a doctrine of preemptive military action, but a doctrine of preventive war.370 Others 
pointed out that taking preemptive action was illustrative of a failure of policy and 
prevention strategies, that would otherwise have obviated the need to act against 
whatever compelling situation is at hand.371 
 
Some critiques of the Strategy grappled with how to highlight risks inherent in the 
expansive interpretation of preemptive self-defense promoted in the document, without 
categorically ruling out preemptive action. Some perceived preemptive action as 
plausibly necessary in some situations, but viewed such hypothetical situations as only 
rare occurrences. As one expert put it, even if preemption were legitimate in some 
circumstances, it was a right that should be "rarely invoked"; and even in such extreme 
circumstances, it should be remembered that preemptive military action "is as 
problematic as non-military alternatives".372 
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Detractors warned that acting alone in preemptive military operations would engender 
hostility towards the US in the international system. Such hostility would actually 
increase the obstacles to achieving overall US goals.373 Another question raised about 
the possible effects of the policy of preemption is whether other states – believing the 
US to now be more prone to taking preemptive action – might not launch attacks at the 
US earlier than planned, or perhaps even launch attacks that otherwise would not take 
place.374 Another sobering observation was the possibility that by lowering the 
threshold for resort to force, the policy of preemption might lead to increase in 
traditional, interstate war.375   
 
Others noted that in focusing on preemption, the Bush administration was fixated on 
only the easiest part of a larger equation. It is relatively less difficult to attack a state, 
even to prevail militarily, than it is to ensure what takes the place of the regime that has 
been defeated.376 The preemptive use of force against terrorist groups, as opposed to 
sovereign states, may enjoy a somewhat greater acceptance. However, such acts as these 
are also highly contentious, in that they raise issues such as proper legal process, 
individual rights, and extrajudicial execution.377 
 
Legality 
 
Some critics of the Strategy viewed one of its major pillars, the preemptive use of 
military force, as downright illegal. Others allowed for some form of preemption in 
                                                
373 G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5 (2002): 56. 
374 Jeffrey Record, "The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq," Parameters 33, no. 1 (2003): 18. 
375 Michael E. O'Hanlon, Susan E. Rice, and James B. Steinberg, "The New National Security Strategy 
and Preemption," The Brookings Institution Policy Brief #113 (2002): 7. 
376 Record, "The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq," 15. 
377 Steinbruner, "Confusing Ends and Means." 
PRINCE  165/315  
general, but balked at the Strategy's definition of it. At the root of the disagreement 
about the permissibility of preemption is a disagreement among lawyers as to whether 
the UN Charter supercedes the customary international law recognizing preemption. A 
closely related issue is whether the "inherent right of … self-defence" mentioned in 
Article 51 of the Charter includes preemptive self-defense, or not.378 
 
Leaving aside the debate around preemption as it is traditionally understood, the 
Strategy leads to a new level of controversy by expanding the meaning of "imminence", 
and relaxing the meaning of "necessity".379 Some – who consider the UN Charter's 
prohibition on the use of force to be so at variance with state practice as to call into 
question the standing of the Charter as law – have, even so, argued that a restrictive 
interpretation of preemptive self-defense be adopted, and UNSC authorization sought, if 
threats are not "imminent" in the traditionally understood sense. This is because doing 
so would be less destabilizing than unilaterally enacting a new, expanded, policy of 
preemption. Further, multilateral support could be better ensured, and thus a wave of 
unilateral acts of preemption taken by other states more surely prevented.380 
 
Other Elements 
 
Early on, critics asserted a mismatch between goals and the methods used to achieve 
them in the Strategy's conception of preemption.381 In the eyes of these critics, the 
connection between ends and means appeared unclear. In addition, the goal of 
                                                
378 Arend, "International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force," 92. 
379 Ibid.: 96. 
380 Ibid.: 102. The increased reliance on force which could lead to greater instability in the international 
system was mirrored by a decreased reliance on treaty regimes which could lead to more numerous arms 
proliferation activities. See Daryl G. Kimball, "National Insecurity Strategy," Arms Control Today  
(2002). 
381 Steinbruner, "Confusing Ends and Means." 
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completely eradicating terrorism appeared too ambitious to achieve or even effectively 
measure.382  
 
In analyzing the Strategy, some scholars drew a distinction between preemption against 
terrorists, and preemption against states. Some viewed "preemptive" action taken 
against terrorist groups involved in the attacks of 11 Sep 2001 as not really preemptive 
at all. Rather, since terrorist groups worked in a coordinated fashion to attack the US, 
any action taken against them is viewed as responsive rather than preemptive.383 To 
those who draw this distinction, the use of preemptive force enunciated in the Strategy 
has greater implications when applied to the "looming threat" of "rogue states" pursuing 
the acquisition of unconventional weapons.384  
 
An additional critique of the policy of preemption is that it is impractical, even if 
legitimate and lawful. This is because to be effective, a preemptive attack – especially 
against stockpiles of unconventional weapons or the facilities that produce them – 
requires high-quality intelligence. Such intelligence, that is "comprehensive as well as 
precise", is viewed as far from easy to obtain.385 
 
Another practical limitation on preemptive action is the response that such action will 
elicit from the states it is targeted against. For example, preemptive action taken against 
a state with formidable conventional forces entails a high degree of risk. This is one 
constraint on US thinking about using force against North Korea; even if nuclear 
facilities could be attacked quickly and successfully, there is no practical way of 
                                                
382 Martha Crenshaw, "Terrorism, Strategies, and Grand Strategies," in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of 
a Grand Strategy, ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2004). 
383 Slocombe, "Force, Pre-Emption and Legitimacy," 123-124. 
384 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), "The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America," 14. 
385 Slocombe, "Force, Pre-Emption and Legitimacy," 126. 
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negating the immense conventional forces that the regime could use to attack South 
Korea.386 
 
Some evaluations observed what they perceived as inconsistencies in the document. As 
some noted, the fact that the Strategy – containing "a general doctrine of pre-emption" – 
was released while the specific consideration of attacking Iraq was taking place created 
some confusion over the intent of the document.387 Also, preemption seemed to be 
presented both as a new US policy, and as a long-standing one. The security to be 
gained from undertaking preemptive action was not balanced against the instability such 
action could foster, in the form of other states taking similar preemptive actions of their 
own. The Strategy asserts that deterrence was of limited use against terrorists and 
"rogue states"; yet commentators noted that while it might be difficult to deter suicidal 
sub-state actors, states – "rogue" or otherwise – were in fact influenced by deterrence.388 
 
A related contention was that the document mistakenly or sloppily conflated two 
distinct threats, and that a wiser course of action would be to formulate distinct policy 
agendas to address each threat. These two threats were sub-state terrorism and the 
proliferation of unconventional weapons, both of which the Strategy argued could be 
addressed by the same response – preemptive action.389 Some argued that the objective 
of preempting threats is a valid one, but the means identified in the Strategy by which to 
                                                
386 Ibid.: 127. 
387 Litwak, "New Calculus of Preemption," 60. 
388 Ibid.: 59-60. Others noted that while the document argued that deterrence was not as useful as in the 
past, that it was not rejected altogether; in fact, the goal of maintaining preeminent military capabilities 
beyond equal may be understood as expanding the role, and understanding, of deterrence. See Daalder, 
Lindsay, and Steinberg, "The Bush National Security Strategy: An Evaluation," 5. Interestingly, as time 
has passed, the US administration has somewhat reversed itself on this point by conceding that even sub-
state terrorist groups may be deterred. Some Pentagon officials even oversee planning designed to have 
an "overall deterrent effect" on terrorist groups. See Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, "U.S. Adapts Cold-
War Idea to Fight Terrorists," New York Times, 18 Mar 2008. 
389 Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," 25. See also Litwak, "New Calculus of Preemption," 53-
54. 
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do so – the coercive, unilateral use of force – are inappropriate to the task.390 These 
critics pointed to the fact that coercion was an ineffective way of establishing peace and 
security, which had led to the collective security approach that is enshrined in the UN 
Charter.  
 
While allowing for the possibility that preemption is lawful in certain circumstances – 
in the traditional, customary understanding of "preemption" – opponents contended that 
the scale of the threat posed by sub-state actors employing unconventional weapons 
made preemptive military action an unsuitable response.391 Preemption might plausibly 
play a legitimate role in countering threats such as the conventional invasion of a state 
or even aerial bombing. However, it was of a scale that ill-suited the prevention of 
small, sub-state groups from using easily concealable weapons. Still others questioned 
the strategic effectiveness of relying on a policy of preemption – even for threats posed 
by states – pointing to the minimal number of successful preemptive actions taken in the 
past.392  
 
The Strategy was also criticized for over-simplifying the prospect of using force against 
other states. It was pointed out that while an initial military conquest might be 
successful, that the subsequent tasks of peacekeeping, state building, and reconstruction 
are critical and take much longer to accomplish. Such tasks increase the cost of military 
operations in the best of circumstances; if the international community has been ignored 
or spurned in the decision to use force in the first place, they may refuse to aid critical 
reconstruction tasks that are more realistically undertaken multilaterally by international 
                                                
390 Steinbruner, "Confusing Ends and Means." 
391 Ibid. 
392 Richard K. Betts, "Striking First: A History of Thankfully Lost Opportunities," Ethics and 
International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003). 
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organizations than by a single state.393 Critics charged that in emphasizing a willingness 
to act unilaterally, and preemptively – even against states who are seeking to acquire 
unconventional weapons, absent a specific intent or threat to use them – the US was 
focusing on but one facet of its security, and neglecting numerous other national 
interests.394 
 
It was further pointed out that once the US engages in unilateral, preemptive military 
action – what may be, or have the appearance of, preventive war – it will be difficult to 
prevent other states from taking such action of their own. The result of this would be a 
degradation of international stability. Preemptive action might even provide incentive 
for some countries to accelerate rather than stop their efforts to acquire unconventional 
weapons.395 
 
For some, the principles and policies contained in the Strategy amounted to an 
extraordinary revision of the very post-1945 international order that the US was key to 
establishing.396 Further, not everyone accepted the Strategy's assertion that the US was 
simultaneously committed to multilateral institutions and embarking on a new course 
emphasizing preemptive military action – and a novel form of preemption at that, that 
"adapt[s] the concept of imminent threat".397 Rather, some saw the elevation of 
preemption to the level of doctrine as an explicit disengagement from the system of 
multilateral institutions that the US had helped to create with the goal of increasing its 
security and reassuring other states about its intentions and capabilities.398  
 
                                                
393 Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," 57. 
394 Steinbruner, "Confusing Ends and Means." 
395 Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," 56-57. 
396 Ibid.: 44. 
397 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), "The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America," 15. 
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Finally, it was also contended that the Strategy largely ignored negative consequences 
that might result from even a successful use of preemptive military force. While the US 
might successfully attack a weaker state and destroy its capacity to produce 
unconventional weapons, by using force preemptively and unilaterally, such action 
would be inherently discriminatory and uncertain of gaining widespread international 
acceptance. It was argued that the enaction of a policy that is wide-ranging yet lacking 
in legitimacy would most probably result in acts of retribution.399 Presumably such acts 
could be both political in the case of the international community, and operational in the 
case of sub-state actors. Some saw the Strategy as indicative that the US was falling into 
the pitfall of "imperial overstretch", taking on expansive and costly obligations in order 
to impose its own agenda and conception of order on the international community.400 
 
Perhaps one of the most considered examinations of the elements contained in the 
Strategy was actually published just prior to the Strategy because enough information 
was available from speeches and other public sources to discern the direction of the new 
policy stances taken by the administration. The reliance on unilateral, preemptive use of 
military force was seen by G. John Ikenberry as threatening  
 
… to rend the fabric of the international community and political 
partnerships precisely at a time when that community and those partnerships 
are urgently needed. It is an approach fraught with peril and likely to fail. It 
is not only politically unsustainable but diplomatically harmful. And if 
history is a guide, it will trigger antagonism and resistance that will leave 
America in a more hostile and divided world.401 
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5.3  International Reception  
 
While a contentious document, a significant portion of the US response to the Strategy 
was generally impressed with the 2002 NSS, with some scholars believing that George 
W. Bush had been underestimated by the liberal wing of the academic community.402 
Internationally, there was a definite political reaction to the 2002 NSS itself, as distinct 
from previous US statements and policy positions that emphasized US power and 
unilateral freedom of action.  Due to diplomatic and security ties, it is understandable 
that a great deal of feedback originated in Europe. Still, some have noted that the NSS 
aroused a more muted reaction from the academic community outside the US than 
domestically.403  
 
The timing of the release of the 2002 NSS may have helped to cushion initial 
international reaction. Its dissemination came just after the first anniversary of the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks and a speech by President Bush to the United Nations 
General Assembly that urged international unity in dealing with Iraq.404 This may help 
to explain why some saw the document as providing useful direction for Western 
democracies in general, as well as for the US. One European pointed out that while 
preemptive action might or might not be justified against Iraq, that the reasoning behind 
the Strategy itself was sound. The threat posed by terrorist groups obtaining and using 
some sort of weapon of mass destruction was judged to be quite real, and a serious 
concern for Western democracies in general.405  
 
                                                
402 Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience. 
403 Howorth, "The US National Security Strategy: European Reactions," 30. Interestingly, Howorth notes 
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404 Ibid., 35. 
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More than one commentator pointed out that scholars and policymakers outside the US 
recognized the importance of dealing the issues identified in the Strategy as well.406 One 
scholar based in China – a country viewed by the US as a competitor rather than an ally 
– found many faults with the Strategy, but nonetheless broadly agreed that non-state 
actors employing "asymmetric warfare" were a legitimate and pressing concern for the 
US.407 It would have to be conceded that agreement ended there, and was much more 
limited than other reactions originating from countries possessing closer relations with 
the US. 
 
For example, one European review of the strategy noted the interchangeable way the 
Strategy used the words "preemption" and "prevention". It noted that much 
misunderstanding – and even heightened security risks – could result from this 
imprecision. Yet, it was allowed that the 2002 NSS should be viewed as a "work in 
progress", one that needed clarification but was not necessarily incompatible with the 
interests of US allies.408  
 
It was also suggested that while the rhetoric of the document was somewhat charged, 
even radical, that subsequent US policies specific to various situations might be more 
moderate. Preemptive self-defense was not met with vociferous opposition in every 
quarter outside the US. The Strategy was faulted for its linguistic ambiguity around this 
issue, rather than the reliance on preemptive self-defense and the possible expansion of 
the meaning of the term.409 Such critiques were not blind to the contentiousness of the 
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document, but argued that much common ground could potentially be found among US 
allies.  
 
Another commentator chided fellow European critics for not evaluating the 2002 NSS 
as a whole. While the section on preemption received the bulk of attention, little time 
was spent on other parts of the Strategy having to do with democracy promotion, 
economic growth, and development. It was further argued that it was European critics, 
rather than the American Strategy, that were failing to differentiate between proposed 
"preemptive" actions and "preventive" actions.410  
 
Others agreed that the preemption component of the 2002 NSS had received much 
consideration at the expense of other elements of the Strategy. However, the attention 
given to preemption by critics was seen as warranted, due to the novelty and 
contentiousness of preemptive self-defense. Interestingly, the decrease in reliance on 
deterrence as a strategy was viewed as significant as the increase in reliance on 
preemption.411  
 
The UK-based International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded that much of the 
concern over talk of preemption in the 2002 NSS was "misplaced". It noted that the 
document asserted that the US would consider utilizing preemption against only a 
limited number of terrorist groups and "rogue states", only two of which were 
mentioned (Iraq and North Korea). When identifying shortcomings with the Strategy, 
                                                
410 Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Prevention in US Security Strategy," Internationale Politik Global Edition 4, no. 1 
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the difficulties inherent in taking successful preemptive action were pointed out, rather 
than the logic or legitimacy of a preemptive strategy itself.412  
 
Others viewed the reliance on preemptive military force as shortsighted and dangerous, 
both for the international system and the US itself. It was argued that enacting a policy 
of preemption would carry its own inherent security dilemma. Conceivably, the US 
would take preemptive military action against a state seeking to acquire WMD, which 
would in turn lead other states to intensify their attempts to obtain such weapons, which 
would then lead to further preemptive acts by the US, and so on.413  
 
Yet on balance, the initial reaction of "informed" Europeans – academics and 
practitioners – was "actually quite restrained".414 Even scholars who were skeptical of 
the US premise that deterrence was of limited utility in countering the proliferation of 
unconventional weapons accepted that the changed environment might well call for 
changed strategies.415 A primary feature of European responses, at least initially, was 
that they accepted that the Strategy had raised legitimate, pertinent issues. Many 
advocated further US-European discussion around those issues.416  
 
5.4  Political Response 
 
There are clear diplomatic and political reasons for heads of state to refrain from a 
public critique of another nation's security strategy, particularly if it is an ally and/or if 
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the strategy is not threatening.417 The differentiation between responses from political 
sources, the academic community, and the general public is somewhat artificial. While 
these constituencies are often considered distinct, they are also interrelated. Often 
politicians reflect public sentiment, and many current and former policymakers publish 
in scholarly journals. And of course, it is highly unusual for any one of these 
constituencies to be unified in their response to a certain issue, and completely at odds 
with another group. For example, the academic community never is of a single mind 
when presented with any given issue; even if they were, it is unlikely that the general 
public – however that is defined – would be in complete agreement or disagreement 
with "academics" as a group, or "politicians" as a group. 
 
That said, politicians do enjoy a unique stature, and some of their reactions will be 
touched on briefly. In his early response to the Strategy, the Democrat George W. Bush 
had defeated, Al Gore, stated that in his view existing UNSC Resolutions were enough 
to legally justify the invasion of Iraq, if necessary. This being the case, the Strategy was 
not needed as additional justification for such action. What it did do, in Gore's opinion, 
was pose a serious threat to the international order established after 1945.418 John Kerry, 
who would eventually face George W. Bush in the 2006 presidential election, made the 
same point at the time of the Strategy's release: if the US could engage in such a policy, 
other nations could adopt it as well and apply it to a wide variety of situations.419  
 
                                                
417 The lead-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is an exception in this sense.  
418 Muravchik, "The Bush Manifesto." 
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Conclusion 
 
It is not yet clear how enduring the 2002 NSS will be in guiding US policy, nor how 
long its effects will echo. However, in searching for an accommodation of the new 
threats and new responses identified in the Strategy, the ideas of some critics highlight 
the possibility of cardinal changes being wrought on the international order. An 
interesting response that was partly aimed at the release of the 2002 NSS, although with 
the issue of Iraqi WMD in mind – and framed by the 11 September 2001 attacks – took 
the form of a number of articles seeking to address the issue of legitimizing the use of 
force outside the UN Charter framework. Inherent in these arguments is an acceptance 
that the US must indeed sometimes act alone, as asserted in the 2002 NSS. As 
discussed, the Bush administration argued that unilateral, preventive military action is 
justified as a form of legitimate customary self-defense, albeit somewhat expanded and 
evolved due to developments in technology and the international environment.  
 
These particular articles, however, are intensely critical of the idea of a right to 
preventive self-defense, and generally reject the legitimacy of using force outside of the 
UN Charter paradigm. Yet this group seems to have sought a middle ground. While 
allowing for the possibility that using force without UN authorization may sometimes 
be necessary, they view it as apparently illegal, and so have proposed alternative 
mechanisms by which such use of force can be legitimized.420 Some of these proposals 
include the creation of an entirely new membership organization open only to liberal 
democracies – an "International Organization of Democracies" or an "Association of 
Democratic Nations" – that could lead or authorize a use of force if the UN Security 
                                                
420 See for example Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, "The Preventive Use of Force: A 
Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal," Ethics and International Affairs 18, no. 1 (2004).  
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Council would not.421 Others suggest the possibility of institutionalizing the ability of 
both in- and out-of-area regional security organizations to authorize the use of force 
absent Security Council approval.422 What is envisaged is a kind of multi-tiered 
approach to the international regulation of the use of force, with overlapping but distinct 
institutions – crucially, distinct institutions with distinct memberships – diffusing the 
authority to sanction the use of force.  
 
To some, the 2002 NSS reflects the continuation of a national security mentality that 
had been discerned beginning in the immediate post-World War II years. As such it 
illustrates the "pursuit of the inherently unattainable goal of absolute security, and as 
such it is a prescription for endless conflict".423 Decisive, forceful action may give the 
impression that threats are being confronted, and so minimized. However, as one 
scholar observed, "The idea of using decisive force against implacable evil may be 
emotionally satisfying, but it is hardly the basis for responsible policy against today's 
most likely threats."424  
 
In short, much contention surrounded the release of the 2002 NSS. Much of that 
contention remains today, six years after its publication. Disagreement existed even 
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among those broadly critical of the Strategy: some viewed the NSS as historically 
understandable (though probably detrimental); others validated the new concerns and 
threats identified in the document but attempted to conceptualize the response to those 
threats with novel frameworks and mechanisms; still others viewed it as embodying 
nothing less than a threat to the entire international system.425  
 
Immediate reaction to the 2002 NSS would in any event have diminished in topicality, 
although this was almost certainly speeded by the scale and unfolding drama of the war 
in Iraq. But to the extent that the more substantial of those reactions and analyses 
provide substance for the wider debates about preemption, we must now turn to the fora 
where these are conducted in a necessarily slower, more wide-ranging and detailed way. 
Contention surrounding the Strategy was fueled by the judgment that the 2002 NSS 
represented a recognition of revolutionary threats, and offered an unprecedented 
response – a response which might well have far-reaching consequences in terms of the 
threat of force in international affairs, the changed security environment, and 
international law. It is these changed and changing areas that will next be explored 
below.  
 
         
                                                
425 Robert Jervis concluded that the 2002 NSS was "both a normal reaction to an abnormal situation and a 
policy that is likely to bring grief to the world and the United States". See Robert Jervis, "Understanding 
the Bush Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly 118, no. 3 (2003): 366. Those who proposed novel 
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2002 NSS as amounting to a repudiation of the entire UN Charter system. See Franck, "What Happens 
Now? The United Nations after Iraq," 620.  
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6.0  NSS 2002 as Exceptional In Terms of the Threat of Force       
6.1  Introduction: Definitions and Key Terms   
 
This introductory section begins with a brief discussion regarding the threat of force as 
an expression of power. The ways in which the threat of force is used will be considered 
first in general terms, and then with specific reference to NSS 2002. This section will 
define and standardize the terms to be employed for the remainder of the chapter.  
 
A vast literature exists on the nature of power, and its accrual and exercise.426 An 
investigation of power lies outside the scope of this thesis; however, the relation of the 
use of force to power must be clarified. For present purposes, power may be defined as 
the ability of an actor state to get a target state to do (or refrain from doing) what the 
actor state prefers. Whatever might be the objective conditions for power – such as the 
resources available to a state, including the size and effectiveness of its military – its 
quality is essentially relational. 
 
Nations make use of many tools of power when interacting with one another. Military 
force is one of these tools. However, force is not the only tool states possess to wield 
power. Nations also express their power through other means that do not rely on the use 
                                                
426 See for example the following: Felix Berenskoetter and Michael J. Williams, eds., Power in World 
Politics (New York: Routledge, 2007). Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in 
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Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London; New York: Macmillan, 1974). Steven Lukes, ed., Power (New 
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of military force. Means of expressing or projecting power that do not involve the 
physical use of force include the use of economic strength and diplomatic influence.427   
 
Some tools are wielded through inducements and threats: military force is one example; 
economic strength is another.428 Other tools of power mainly rely on attraction rather 
than coercion for their utilization. If a state possesses values and institutions that are 
admired by others who wish to emulate it, a degree of power accrues to that state. 
Coercive power, and forms of "soft power" that rely more on an ability to attract than to 
compel, do not exist separately; they are linked, and often reinforcing.429 Whether the 
former or the latter, the credibility of the state affects its ability to wield power, and the 
respect of others for that power.430 The use of military force is often the most violent 
expression of power, and may be the bluntest. However military force it is not the 
preeminent form of power in all circumstances; it is only one of many means that are 
available to states as they confront myriad situations.431  
 
Broadly, the tools of power fall into three categories: inducements, persuasion, and 
coercion. Inducements are also referred to as rewards.432 Persuasion may be 
accomplished through the use of propaganda or diplomacy. Coercion primarily takes the 
form of threatened or actual use of economic or military force.433 However, this is not 
always the case; for example, a state might compel another to take certain actions 
                                                
427 However it should be noted that some expressions of a state's power that do not involve military force, 
such as economic measures, may have severe humanitarian effects. For example, the imposition of 
unilateral restrictions on trade, or multilateral economic sanctions, may lead to the loss of life under 
certain circumstances.  
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(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) 95. 
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without using military force. In such a scenario, the one state has coerced the other, 
though the use of force was not present.  
 
Inducements tend to be effective only for temporary periods; as time passes and 
situations change, actor or target or both often begin to feel as if they are giving more 
than receiving in the exchange. Other limitations of inducements include the possibility 
that actor and target will develop a misunderstanding of what was agreed in terms of 
exchanging a behavior for a benefit.434 Benefits of such an exchange include the fact 
that inducements cause less damage to relations between actor and target than coercion 
tends to, and may actually improve relations between the two. Actor states retain the 
ability to influence another state without engendering the level of resentment that often 
accompanies the use of force, and relatedly, enjoy a better possibility that behavior will 
be more willingly modified – and modified to a greater degree towards the desired ideal 
– than when force is used. At other times, the offer of an inducement can mask an 
attempt to make later use of force seem more justified, and can exacerbate tensions in 
an existing atmosphere of distrust.435   
 
Persuasion is distinct from inducements. In political or economic arenas, persuasion 
aims to establish shared values or interests, and is usually targeted at elites. Propaganda, 
in contrast, is the biased and sometimes inaccurate dissemination of information, and is 
usually aimed at the masses; it focuses on the psychology of the public of the target 
state.436 Persuasion concentrates on the possibility of convincing the target nation – the 
leadership, general population, or both – that the acting nation has legitimate goals 
and/or it is in the target's interest to comply with the acting nation's ends. An acting 
state is most likely to successfully influence target states when it uses multiple tools 
                                                
434 Ibid.  117. 
435 Ibid. 
436 Ibid.  118-119. 
PRINCE  182/315  
simultaneously, for example combining inducements with coercion or logic with 
inducements.437 Yet whether a combination of tools is employed or only a single one, it 
is important to recognize that the absence of force does not mean that no violence is 
present, as "[v]iolence is most purposive and most successful when it is threatened and 
not used."438  
 
Inducements are most effective when distrust and animosity have been minimized, and 
persuasion is most effective when distrust and animosity have been almost entirely 
eliminated; coercion may be most effective when a significant degree of distrust and 
animosity are present.439 Coercion primarily takes two forms: the use of military force 
and use of economic resources.440  
 
All of this is to say that force is but one type of coercion, and coercion is but one tool of 
power. The prospect of force – willful physical violence – is frightening, and in 
actuality may have devastating consequences. It has therefore garnered much attention 
from scholars of international politics; but it is crucial to be mindful of the fact that 
other types of coercion and other tools of power can be of equal or greater utility than 
the use of force. They, like force, can also entail violence and carry a high human cost, 
albeit less directly than the use of force.441  
 
                                                
437 Ibid.  95-96. 
438 Thomas C. Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence," in International Politics: Anarchy, Force, 
Political Economy, and Decision-Making, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Co., 1985), 175. 
439 Rothgeb, Defining Power  131. 
440 Ibid.  138. Each of these forms can be subdivided into the categories of defense, deterrence, and 
compellence.  
441 For example, the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq in the years between the 1991 Gulf War and the 
2003 Iraq War led to significantly increased child mortality in the country. See Mohamed M Ali and 
Iqbal H Shah, "Sanctions and Childhood Mortality in Iraq," The Lancet 355, no. 9218 (2000). It is 
difficult to untangle the consequences of the 1991 war from the consequences of the sanctions, but 
estimates of the number of child deaths that resulted from both lie in the hundreds of thousands. See 
Mohamed M. Ali, John Blacker, and Gareth Jones, Excess Mortality in Iraq (Centre for Population 
Studies, 2003 [cited 11 May 2008]); available from 
http://www.lshtm.ac.uk/cps/public/excess%20mortality%20in%20Iraq.pdf. 
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Somewhere between outright coercion (be it the threat of economic or military force), 
and peaceable negotiation, lies "coercive diplomacy". Coercive diplomacy involves the 
use or threat of force to convince actors to consider negotiation or accept a certain 
negotiated solution.442 The utility of coercive diplomacy is not universally accepted. 
Some policymakers believe that coercive diplomacy should not be used. Some have 
held that coercive diplomacy, which often initially involves air strikes or naval 
deployments and the like, leaves the ball in the adversary's court; this is because the 
adversary can then decide to escalate or deescalate the situation as it chooses.443  
 
Craig and George draw a distinction between coercive diplomacy and "pure coercion", 
or sole reliance on the use of force to compel a target. Pure coercion would include the 
invasion without warning of another state, or the defensive reaction to invasion aimed at 
regaining lost territory. Coercive diplomacy, in contrast, focuses on using only the 
amount of force that is necessary in order to demonstrate commitment to, and credibility 
in, furthering or protecting interests. Coercive diplomacy gives the opponent 
opportunity to change behavior before force is used and hence before force is 
escalated.444 While pure coercion only requires force, coercive diplomacy usually 
requires a judicious use or threat of force, along with "negotiation, bargaining, and 
compromise".445 As such, coercive diplomacy or bargaining is "not concerned with the 
                                                
442 For example pressuring Iraq to accept UNSC Resolutions and vacate Kuwait, while threatening the use 
of force against Iraq if it did not vacate Kuwait, is an example of coercive diplomacy. The actual eviction 
of Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 would be an example of compelling Iraq to do so through the actual use of 
military force. See Paul Gordon Lauren, "Coercive Diplomacy and Ultimata: Theory and Practice in 
History," in The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 26. Indisputably, forceful coercion does find application in 
international politics, sometimes to great effect.  
443 Record, Making War, Thinking History  29. This was the position taken by Caspar Weinberger, the 
US Secretary of Defense from 1981-1987. Record disagrees with Weinberger on these points, arguing 
that Weinberger's line of thinking ignores the ability of the US to change its mind or exercise its "free 
will", and the fact that potential adversaries are each unique and different. Weinberger's thinking, and the 
public debate that took place between him and Secretary of State George Shultz, will be discussed later in 
this chapter in the context of limits on the use of force.  
444 Gordon Alexander Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our 
Time, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) 196. 
445 Ibid.  199. 
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efficient application of force but with the exploitation of potential force".446  
 
Coercive diplomacy attempts to influence the motives of others, as opposed to 
attempting to defeat the strength of others.447 Sometimes the difference between "pure 
coercion" (with the aim being victory on the battlefield), and more limited coercion 
(with the aim being pressuring a target to accept a certain settlement), is also dependent 
on intent. If mass killing of troops on the battlefield is intended to eliminate an obstacle 
to achieving military objectives on the road to winning a war, brute force is applied. If 
the same mass killing is intended to create anguish in the opposing nation and make 
surrender look like a good option, the same level of violence is being directed toward a 
different coercive end.448 The bombing of civilian centers in World War II is a case in 
point. Indeed, much the same logic applies to militarily-enforced, comprehensive 
sanctions. 
 
Therefore, the difference between the two – all-out war fighting and more limited uses 
of force to achieve certain objectives – can be very slight, or the emphasis can change 
from one to the other quickly and with little notice. It is even possible that the two 
might be in play simultaneously; with mass killing occurring on the battlefield, an actor 
state may be willing to accept either outcome (the elimination of obstacles in the form 
of enemy troops, or the compellance of the enemy state to accept negotiation or 
surrender).  
 
It is desirable to distill from the preceding discussion those terms and definitions which 
will be used throughout the remainder of the chapter. What follows are generic 
                                                
446 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge,: Harvard University Press, 1960) 5. 
Emphasis in the original.  
447 Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence," 172-173. 
448 Ibid., 173. 
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definitions and applicable terms that will be used in discussing state-level threats of 
force made for political purposes. These terms are meaningful and useful abstractions 
which nonetheless do not entirely capture the complex realities of state dispositions and 
behaviors. For ease of reference, these terms are presented below in Table 6.1.  
coercion  compelling a target state to take certain actions, or deterring 
a target state from taking certain actions  
 
coercive diplomacy a blend of incentives, persuasion, and coercion – sometimes 
including the use of force; stresses using only the amount of 
force that is necessary in order to demonstrate commitment 
to and credibility in protecting interests; affords the target 
state the opportunity to change behavior before force is used 
and before force is escalated; usually requires a judicious 
use or threat of force while negotiation continues  
 
compel  
 
pressure a target state into a desired change in behavior, 
often through the use or threat of force  
 
deterrence  preventing a target state from taking certain actions through 
denial or punishment; that is, by communicating to the 
target state that a potential action will be unsuccessful, or 
that the potential action will result in a costly punishment  
 
force  the kinetic utilization of military resources, often involving 
physical violence  
 
(threat of) force  the threat of such utilization  
 
inducements rewards given by an actor state, or bargains struck by an 
actor state, in order to secure the acquiescence of a target 
state  
 
persuasion  through the use of reasoning or propaganda, convincing the 
leadership or general population of a target state that an 
actor state has legitimate goals, or that it is in the target 
state's interest to comply with the actor state's wishes  
 
power  the ability of an actor state to direct or influence a target 
state  
 
 
Preemption  employing force proactively to forestall an imminent attack  
 
prevention  employing force proactively to forestall the means of a 
future attack from being fully developed  
 
Table 6.1    
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6.2  The Threat of Force – Purposes  
Introduction 
 
Force and the threat of force have been employed throughout human history. They have 
been used to secure certain objectives that were viewed as desirable, and to remove 
threats that were viewed as undesirable. Whether a case of the former or the latter, force 
has generally been viewed as a means by which the security and prestige of a nation or 
other political entity can be increased.  
 
In the traditional Realist conception of international society as an anarchical arena, the 
use of force or the threat of force is seen as a quality that is inherent in the environment; 
indeed, the use and threat of force has uses in times of peace and in times of conflict.449 
The potential and use of military force is the implementation of military power, that 
every country possesses to a greater or lesser degree. As most states find it 
advantageous to achieve their objectives without the cost and risk of war if possible, the 
threat of force is employed more often than the physical use of force by states.450 States 
may overtly threaten to employ force under certain circumstances, if for example 
another state takes or fails to take certain actions. However, the threat of force is also 
present in much more subtle expressions and communications. The ability of states to 
employ force may be understood as the "unstated but explicit" threat of force; this 
potential for action is implicit and can be communicated through the statements of 
politicians and negotiations of diplomats, although it is extremely difficult to calculate 
                                                
449 Robert J. Art, "The Fungibility of Force," in The Use of Force: Military Power and International 
Politics, ed. Robert J. Art and Kenneth Neal Waltz (Lanham, MD; Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 
3. 
450 Ibid. 
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the degree of its influence on any particular policy decision or agreed compromise.451  
 
Force assumes many forms. In those instances when military force has been used, 
scholars have identified different categories and methods of conflict. For example, one 
may distinguish between:  geographical wars, be they primarily inter-state, civil, 
internal, or internationalized; programmatic wars, be they in support of liberation, 
resistance, revolutionary or separatist movements, or preemptive in character; unequal 
wars, such as when a hegemonic power imposes its will on a much weaker nation; and 
wars that are defined best by their methodologies, such as guerilla wars.452  
 
States may be unable to entirely control the forces they unleash during times of conflict. 
However, the monopoly that the state holds on the legitimate use of force creates 
stability and sets true government apart from warlordism or criminal activity.453 In fact, 
states serve as the necessary organizations of political community that make efforts to 
limit or outlaw war possible; this is partly why it is sometimes difficult to define and 
manage non-state entities such as sub-state insurgent groups and civilians.454  
 
It should be stressed that historically, force has been used not just for aggrandizement, 
but to safeguard the existence of a community or people. Nations have always been at 
least partially prone to war as a response to threats and to ensure their survival.455 States 
also define themselves by their relations to other states, and use force and the threat of 
force to mark their borders.456 Of course, it has long been recognized that a prime factor 
                                                
451 Ibid., 4. 
452 Ingrid Detter, The Law of War, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 38-61.  
453 Art, "The Fungibility of Force," 5. 
454 Michael Eliot Howard, ed., Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitation of Armed Conflict (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1979) 13. 
455 Michael Eliot Howard, The Invention of Peace and the Reinvention of War, Rev. and extended ed. 
(London: Profile, 2002) 8. 
456 Michael Eliot Howard, War and the Nation State: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered before the 
University of Oxford on 18 November 1977 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978) 8. 
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at play is one of perception. In his classic account of the Peloponnesian War, 
Thucydides recounts his judgment about the true cause of the war. This was that Athens' 
growing power threatened Sparta, and prompted them to begin the war in order to 
protect themselves.457 Similarly, an increasingly powerful Germany threatened Britain 
and contributed to the outbreak of the First World War.458 Sometimes the perception 
that survival is at stake has been enough to start wars; indeed, this is the shadow under 
which nuclear deterrence was said to have kept the peace during the Cold War. 
Perception also plays a part in the escalation of the use of force once hostilities have 
begun.459  
 
Nor has the use of force been consistently viewed as regrettable, or allowed only in the 
last resort. Until the 19th century, war was generally considered to be an inevitable, and 
normal, feature of society and the affairs between nations; efforts focused on how to 
limit its worst or most repugnant aspects.460 Indeed, many thinkers held that war was a 
virtue, and a method by which nations struggled against each other in order to evolve to 
a higher level.461  
 
Accessing Resources and Removing Threats 
 
Force has been used to gain ownership of land and control over geographic access. It 
has also been used to extract treasure and valuable commodities from other peoples and 
places. Force has similarly been used to secure access to natural resources, and to 
                                                
457 Simon Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) 
64-65. Hornblower points out that some analysts believe this judgment to be faulty and biased. 
458 Nye, The Paradox of American Power  7. 
459 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Basic Books, 1992) 23. 
460 Howard, ed., Restraints on War  8. 
461 Howard, War and the Nation State  9-10. Howard points out that Marx adapted this thinking, 
substituting conflict between classes for conflict between nations.  
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establish ownership over them. This can be a reinforcing spiral, with force being used to 
secure resources, and resources leading to increased or maintained power and influence: 
"... although resources alone do not spell power, they are a basic part of the overall 
equation that leads to influence."462 The more resources possessed, the greater the 
number of states that can potentially be controlled or influenced, and the greater the 
variety of issues and behaviors that can be influenced.463  
 
Signaling Intent and Proclaiming Values  
 
The use of force is often the execution of policy; at other times, it may be useful to 
think of force as being a part of, rather than the sum of, that execution. The overarching 
purpose of force is to facilitate the attainment of policy goals.464 That facilitation may 
also involve utilizing force to signal intent or proclaim values.  
 
In order to be credible, force must be physically available to be used for signaling 
purposes, as it must for others. If force is not available, the costs of acquiring it must be 
considered. When considering whether to employ coercive means, the availability of 
force stands as a primary factor in the calculus of states: "Of course military force isn't 
                                                
462 Rothgeb, Defining Power  192. 
463 Ibid.  117. 
464 Here Clausewitz's maxim that "war is a mere continuation of policy by other means" is in view. For 
even the most reprehensible acts of military force are meant to serve a policy; even genocide has a 
programmatic objective of exterminating an entire group of people, as repugnant as that is. As Clausewitz 
stated, "for the political design is the object, while war is the means, and the means can never be thought 
of apart from the object". See Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Washington,: Infantry Journal Press, 1950) 
16. Yet it is also important to remember that the object and the means influence each other; the political 
objective may constrain the use of military force, and military developments during a campaign may 
cause a revision of the political objective. Indeed, this is the principle relied upon by weaker actors in 
asymmetric conflicts who have no hope of militarily defeating their stronger opponent in open battle. 
Rather, they hope that their infliction of damage on the stronger power will lead it to change or abandon 
its political objective. As one scholar put it, in such situations, "politics may become the continuation of 
war by other means". See Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of 
Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics 27, no. 2 (1975): 179. The ends and the means each influence the 
other, but when force is used, it is used in pursuit of some objective.  
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always used just because it's there, but if it isn't there, it can't be used".465 Indeed, the 
availability of force is also a factor in public acceptance of policy. If a sufficient number 
of troops and an adequate stockpile of equipment is maintained, a public may be more 
accepting of their government's use of force than if a rapid buildup of equipment 
disrupts the economy, or if troop call-ups of one sort or another are required for 
particular action.466 Technological advancements have made it possible to tailor military 
action to the policies of national leaders, but it has not become easier to formulate and 
articulate those policies.467 The more articulated the policy, the more closely tailored the 
use of force can be; the less articulated the policy, the less the utility of force.468  
 
Policy objectives may be met by signaling intent or commitment through displays of 
capability or positioning forces that fall short of physical use of force. When such 
signaling is employed, the intended audience and purpose may be either internal or 
external. Signaling may emphasize a state's foreign policy. This is sometimes done with 
the hope of changing the behavior of other states or national leaders. For example, the 
pronouncment of the "Carter Doctrine" was bolstered by the deployment of US naval 
forces in proximity of Middle Eastern oil resources.469   
 
On-going deployments or exercises may serve a similar function. Regular troop 
deployments and the maintenance of military bases are also effective in sending certain 
                                                
465 Adam Yarmolinsky, "American Foreign Policy and the Decision to Intervene," Journal of International 
Affairs (JIA). Intervention and World Politics. 1968. 22(2):165-302. 22, no. 2 (1968): 233. 
466 Ibid., passim, uses the example of US public acceptance of an increase in Vietnam involvement in 
1965, and argues that a significant contributing factor was that military readiness had already been 
boosted, eliminating the need for large numbers of reserves to be activated.  
467 Calhoun, Uses of Force  137. Calhoun cites the US experience in Vietnam as the classic case of abuse 
of force; force was used without clear policy objectives.  
468 Ibid. Calhoun likens the use of force without clear policy objectives to "using a sledgehammer to tune 
a grand piano".  
469 Amitav Acharya, US Military Strategy in the Gulf (London: Routledge, 1989) 49-50.  
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signals.470 Like the potential effectiveness of standing militaries, it is often quite 
difficult to gauge the efficacy of such regular deployments. This is because these 
ongoing operations may prevent an unknown threat from ever arising; likewise, a threat 
may arise in spite of such activities, and would have done so regardless of them.  
 
In contrast to ongoing deployments, some activities involve the targeted use of force in 
support of a discrete objective. It may be possible to ascertain with more confidence the 
effectiveness of these discrete displays of force.471 Blechman and Kaplan published an 
empirical study of such displays made by the US up to 1978, and explored this 
possibility. A significant conclusion of the research was that such uses of force were 
generally effective in attaining, or helping to attain, policy objectives. However, this 
only held in the short-term. So the discrete display of force may be most effective in 
delaying a certain action being taken by another state, or in buying time for other 
diplomacy or maneuverings to take place. Further, sometimes a show of force has no 
effect when the actors involved do not believe that the state making a display of force 
would really use it.472 This points out the importance of perception; that is, whether 
others perceive a state's commitment to use force as credible. Israeli consistency is 
notable in this regard.  
 
Another interesting conclusion of the study emphasized the importance of effective 
supplemental communication accompanying the displays of military force. The study 
ends by urging policymakers to make their intention to use force as clear as possible. 
For example, if policymakers know they will act militarily in a certain circumstance, 
                                                
470 Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political 
Instrument (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978). 
471 "Displays of force" should be understood as the maneuvering, permanent stationing, or actual 
utilization of military forces; as such, they are a display of one distinct kind of power.  
472 Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War  517-518. In the military conflict between India and 
Pakistan in 1971, the US expressed its support for Pakistan; however since neither nation believed the US 
would really use military force, the US dispatch of a carrier group to the Indian Ocean did little to 
influence developments.   
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and if that circumstance appears likely to occur in the foreseeable future, they should 
alert the states involved to express their intention of acting. It may be far more 
dangerous to communicate ambiguity and allow potential problems to develop, partly 
due to others believing that a state is not really committed to acting forcefully to stop 
certain actions from being taken.473  
 
Therefore if a state truly intends to use force, this commitment should be made as clear 
as possible. Yet ambiguity also has uses. Saying an action would be "taken seriously", 
or have "serious consequences", can warn of a response while keeping options open as 
to what that response will be. When a state enunciates a broad national strategy or 
disposition rather than responding to a particular event, it is only natural for it to avoid 
making statements that will limit its freedom of action in future crises. So a balance 
must be sought: the more explicit the communication, the less chance of 
misunderstanding. Yet, the more explicit a state is about the actions it will take, the 
more it limits its own policy options.  
 
All courses of action and inaction, explicit threats and ambiguous threats, entail a 
degree of risk. It is these risks and attendant opportunities that policymakers deal with 
as a matter of course. The balance to be sought between clarity of communication and 
ambiguity of commitment is perhaps best summed up by the following formulation: 
once policymakers have determined force will be used if a certain threshold is crossed, 
it is best to communicate that intent as clearly and as expeditiously as possible. If that 
                                                
473 For example, apparent Argentine disbelief that the UK was prepared to retake the Falklands by force 
in 1982 may have made violent conflict inevitable in that case. See Peter Vaughan Barnett, "British 
Strategy in the Falklands War," Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces 26, no. 1 (2000). Interestingly, 
Blechman and Kaplan also note that in terms of nuclear capability, the US has sent signals through the 
stationing or alert level of strategic nuclear forces, just as it has through conventional forces. However, 
most of these incidents occurred in the 15 years following the end of World War II when the US held a 
more dominant strategic nuclear position over the USSR. Just as permanent ground troops like those 
stationed in Europe during the Cold War might send a more powerful signal than discreet uses of force, 
so the permanent stationing of nuclear forces might be more important than discreet uses of them. See 
Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War  47-49. See also 534.  
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determination has not been made, there may be little to do but fall back on the deterrent 
value of an ambiguous threat or statement of disposition.  
 
Influencing Behavior  
 
While not as contentious as defining the concept of "power", analysts do not utilize 
identical definitions of "force". A number of researchers have drawn the distinction 
between threatened or very limited use of force, and more extensive, ongoing, uses of 
force. Still, some general defining characteristics of force are shared by numerous 
scholars and they will be adopted here.  
 
As there are different types of power, of which force is one, there are different scales or 
degrees of the use of force. The energy required to destroy a single vehicle with an 
unmanned drone, to launch cruise missiles against larger installations, to carry out a 
bombing campaign that is almost completely reliant on air power, or to engage an entire 
nation-state's military in an invasion, can all be differentiated. Degrees of force can be 
distinguished even if, strictly speaking, they do not lie along a seamless continuum.  
 
Art differentiates between "physical use of force" and "peaceful use of force".474 For 
broadly similar purposes, Schelling speaks of "brute force" and "coercion". Calhoun has 
identified five applications in his formulation of the use of force. They are the use of 
force for: protection, retribution, solution, introduction, and association. However, in all 
cases the use of force entails "the application of armed power for a specific, definitive 
                                                
474 Robert J. Art, "When Will Force Be Used?," in International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political 
Economy, and Decision-Making, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 
1985), 208-216. 
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purpose".475  
 
Force is useful in creating the space for other facets of power to be used, and in creating 
opportunities for other tools of force or other courses of action to be pursued. One may 
think of force as a type of power that is sometimes used and sometimes threatened; 
alternatively, the actual implementation of force may be conceptualized as one type of 
power, and the threat of force as another. Calhoun calls the former "force as power" and 
the latter "military power". In either conception, the implementation of force can create 
the space for other forms of power to be brought to bear, such as diplomatic power, 
economic power, moral power, and even the threat of more force.476  
 
6.3  The Threat of Force Inherent in Deterrence      
 
The field of study dealing with nuclear deterrence is a vast one. While fascinating, it is 
simply too enormous to be examined in any detail in the space available here. Further 
the aim of this chapter is to examine the threat of force overall, rather than the particular 
threats posed by strategic or tactical nuclear weapons (or the logic behind nuclear 
policies and postures) that the literature on nuclear deterrence is primarily concerned 
with addressing. The issue at hand is the threat of conventional force inherent in 
conventional deterrence. While the term "deterrence" has become encumbered with 
terminology of nuclear strategy, it retains its more traditional meaning as a basic way 
that states attempt to protect themselves.  
 
                                                
475 Calhoun, Uses of Force  9. 
476 Calhoun, Power and Principle. Elsewhere, Calhoun points out that Wilson did not view force as a 
solution in itself, and allows that even the use of "force for solution" that is part of his formulation only 
provides space or opportunity for other types of diplomatic and economic power to be used. See Calhoun, 
Uses of Force  141. 
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Conventional deterrence has always existed. Displaying military power through military 
exercises or limited use of military capability has utility, and not just in intimidating 
others to acquiesce to a state's wishes – military parades have symbolic power not lost 
on opposition forces in repressive regimes, nor on the militaries of other states. A state's 
conventional forces may cause others to doubt their ability to successfully fight and win 
in a military conflict, or to fear the price of engagement.477  
 
The notion of deterrence in interstate relations existed before the advent of nuclear 
weapons. It is true that technological advances have altered the amount of damage that 
can be inflicted on an enemy, and the speed with which it can be inflicted. However, the 
implications of these facts had begun to be recognized and pondered with the 
emergence of air power, before the advent of nuclear weapons. Because air power 
brought about a significant change in the scale of destruction that could be inflicted on a 
country's population and infrastructure, the concept of deterrence required a new and 
more complex set of calculations.478  
 
With the emergence of air power in the 20th century, statesmen and military planners 
began to think in new ways about their ability to deter other nations from attacking 
through a credible threat of inflicting considerable pain on an opponent's societal 
infrastructure and the civilian population. The degree to which conventional deterrence 
was eclipsed in the age of nuclear weapons is debatable, not least since the continued 
importance of conventional deterrence has been attested to by successive US 
administrations.479   
                                                
477 Perhaps there is little doubt that a military attack will be successful, such as the annexation of Kuwait 
in 1990. It is then that the consequences of taking such an action might deter a state from doing so.  
478 George H. Quester, Deterrence before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1986). 
479 In fact, the first three NSS documents produced after the mandated requirement, in the second Reagan 
administration and George H.W. Bush administration, contained discrete sections dealing with 
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It may be helpful to think about deterrence in terms of the formulation made by 
Blechman and Kaplan. Uses of force may be seen as falling into four categories of two 
broad types: coercion and support. Table 6.2 illustrates these categories. Coercion 
involves deterring or compelling states to take or refrain from taking certain actions. 
Support involves assuring or inducing states to embark on a certain course of action, or 
continue on a course already taken. The reinforcement of existing behavior is 
accomplished through assuring or deterring. The changing of behavior is accomplished 
through inducing or compelling.480 Deterrence may be accomplished by denial or 
punishment; that is, by communicating to the target that its intended action will be 
unsuccessful, or that its intended action will result in a costly punishment.481  
 
 Changing  
behavior 
Reinforcing  behavior 
 
Coercing  (antagonists) Compelling Deterring 
 
Supporting  (non-
antagonists) 
Inducing Assuring 
 
     Table 6.2 (Adapted from Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War) 
 
Blechman and Kaplan's formulation is in line with the term "coercion" as mentioned 
above in the section defining terms (see Table 6.1). Coercion may involve either 
                                                                                                                                          
"conventional deterrence". See United States. President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), "National Security 
Strategy of the United States,"  (Washington, DC: The White House, 1987), 26. Also United States. 
President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), "National Security Strategy of the United States," 18. See also 
United States. President George H.W. Bush (1989-1993), "National Security Strategy of the United 
States," 25. It is notable that these previous administrations publicly articulated that they viewed nuclear 
and conventional deterrence as unique for planning and policy purposes.  
480 Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War  71-74. 
481 Rothgeb, Defining Power  140. 
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compelling or deterring. When the threat of force is used to influence another's 
behavior, coercive diplomacy has some similarity to deterrence. The two differ in that 
coercive diplomacy uses the possibility that force will be used to compel a state to 
change its behavior, for example to withdraw its military from a certain area (such as 
when the Soviet Union withdrew its missiles during the Cuban Missile Crisis). 
Deterrence uses the possibility that force will be used to prevent a state from taking a 
new course of action (such as when an increased show of Allied force helped to prevent 
any East German or Soviet moves to take sole control of the city during the Berlin 
Crisis of 1961).482  
 
The threat of force, and sometimes the use of force, is often utilized as a way of 
deterring a nation from certain action, or coercing it to take certain action. It is often 
utilized with the aim of avoiding war rather than instigating war. The use of force may 
be threatened in order to prevent a broader conflict from developing. However, the 
threat of force itself may sometimes be illegal. The examination of such a threat of force 
certainly brings up questions of law and right authority.483  
 
6.4  The Threat of Force Inherent in Preemption      
 
The use of preemption as a form of the application of force will now be considered. The 
legal issues that attend preemption – that is, preemptive self-defense – will be discussed 
in more detail below in Chapter Eight which deals directly with international law. While 
this section will serve as a foundation for the later discussion, its primary purpose is to 
                                                
482 Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War  71. 
483 These questions of authority concerning the threat and use of force essentially involve many of the 
issues present in the humanitarian intervention debate. 
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explore how "preemption" is understood, and to consider how it relates to the threat of 
force.  
 
While the meaning of preemption might seem self-evident, this consideration is 
necessary given the prominence that preemption receives in the 2002 NSS. That 
Strategy argues that, in contemporary circumstances, deterrence is of less utility than in 
the past and preemption is not only of greater utility, but is approaching necessity, at 
least for the US.484 However it is important to acknowledge that the Strategy states that 
the US "will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats"; further, the 
document asserts that deterrence of "threats against U.S. interests" remains one of the 
main missions of the US military.485  
 
Although far from universal, there is a significant level of agreement that a state may 
justifiably act to defend itself before the first blow against it lands.486 This agreement, 
such as it is, rests upon the understanding that an enemy's attack is imminent: that is, 
that there is clear evidence that it is going to occur, and that an attack is "in motion" as 
it were, even if weapons have not yet been fired or troops have not yet crossed a border.  
 
Yet this scenario is perhaps idealized: knowledge – intelligence – is rarely if ever 
incontrovertible, and its quality must be judged. As one moves away from this near-
perfect depiction, agreement about how "preemption" may be defined, and whether it is 
legal, becomes ambiguous. How certain must a state be that an antagonist is planning to 
                                                
484 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), "The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America," 15. 
485 Ibid., 15, 29.  
486 Thomas M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks, Hersch 
Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures (Cambridge; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 98. The 
International Court of Justice seems to have recognized this as well, as it was unable to rule out the 
legality of the first-use of nuclear weapons, if the very existence of a state was threatened. See 
International Court of Justice, "Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: Advisory Opinion of 8 
July,"  (1996). 
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attack? How pressing must a threat be for one to define it as "imminent"? How remote 
must the possibility be that an enemy will stay the attack at the last moment? Questions 
such as these, and the uncertain answers they may elicit, illustrate the problem of 
defining the bounds of legitimate preemption in such a way that is unambiguous and 
widely accepted.  
 
It is possible that that the threat of preemption can in fact deter. For an announced 
policy favoring preemption to have a deterrent effect, there must be a perception that the 
commitment to use preemptive force is credible (just as with deterrence, there must be a 
perception that the commitment and ability to retaliate is credible). Such perceptions 
can be quite subjective, which makes it hard to discern in advance if announcing a 
policy of deterrence or a policy of preemption will actually have the deterrent effect that 
is hoped.487   
 
The 2002 NSS presents preemption as a clear alternative to deterrence. The purpose of 
the policy is to remove threats as they are developing. And, by the simple fact that the 
policy is announced – because public pronouncements are after all communicative – a 
policy of preemption has a potential deterrent effect, whether intended or not. This 
deterrent effect may constrain the initiative of states who might find themselves the 
target of preventive attack as a consequence of their ambitions.  
 
The Bush administration makes the case that deterrence is of little utility against sub-
state (terrorist) groups and states that operate outside international norms and 
expectations ("rogue" states).488 The argument rests on three points. First, the dictatorial 
                                                
487 Quester, Deterrence before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy  175-178.  
488 The 2002 NSS also argues that the intersection of the two, namely the possibility of rogue states 
sponsoring terrorist groups, gives additional urgency to the problem. See United States. President George 
W. Bush (2001-2009), "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," 13-15.  
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leaders of rogue states are more likely to take risks and so are less susceptible to 
deterrence than other governments constrained by their own polities and international 
law. Second, sub-state terrorist groups are more likely to engage in disproportionate and 
extreme behavior, such as suicide attacks or the willingness to inflict extensive damage 
on civilians. Third, sub-state terrorist groups are much more difficult to find and target 
than states, and so are viewed as less susceptible to deterrence than states.  
 
The further one moves away from imminence – that is, the further into the future, or the 
less concrete, a potential attack is deemed to be – the less certain one can be that it will 
actually occur as predicted. By acting preventatively, a state may be able to deal with a 
growing threat more effectively and safely. However this comes at the cost of dealing 
with a threat that may wane of its own accord. When acting preventatively, a state 
incurs the financial cost of engaging its military, and the diplomatic cost of instigating 
violence against a "growing threat" rather than responding to the imminent use of 
violence against itself.  
 
While the 2002 NSS attempts to draw on the legitimacy of legal opinion validating 
preemptive self-defense, it is vital to not gloss over the difference between preemption 
and prevention. The US Department of Defense itself defines a "preemptive attack" as 
an "attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is 
imminent". "Preventive war" is defined as a "war initiated in the belief that military 
conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater 
risk".489 The 2002 NSS is quite explicit that it seeks to adapt the concept of preemption 
by adapting the understanding of "imminence".490 These adaptations are novel ones, and 
                                                
489 US Department of Defense, US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
2001 [cited 12 Feb 2007]); available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/. 
490 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), "The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America," 15. The updated concept of "imminence" was viewed as central to the document's 
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as applied, "preemption" bears much greater resemblance to the traditional 
understanding of preventive war than to the traditional understanding of preemptive 
self-defense.  
 
6.5  The Threat of Force – Limits  
Capacity to Use Force 
 
The capacity of a state to credibly threaten force, or actually use force, is limited by a 
number of variables. Some of these variables are imposed upon states. Perhaps the most 
basic potential limitation is the lack of practical capacity. When a state lacks the 
wherewithal to act forcefully – or due to this, lacks the credibility to usefully threaten 
the use of force – it can be due to a number of possible reasons. For example, the reason 
may be economic – the state may lack the resources to purchase military hardware and 
pay the salaries of standing troops.  
 
At other times, the reason may be societal, and largely self-imposed. The state may 
have chosen to refrain from increasing its military power as an expression of its values, 
or because other issues are deemed more worthy of government financial support. For 
example, Japan's constitution effectively forbids it from developing offensive military 
forces. Japan's constitution was of course largely formulated by the US in the aftermath 
of World War II. However, the constitution has been societally accepted, and limiting 
                                                                                                                                          
treatment of the preemptive use of force by at least one of the officials involved in the internal review of 
the Strategy before its publication: "I think the more important change here [in NSS 2002] is the 
discussion of how 'imminence' is cast in some broader terms." Hoehn.   
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its military to defensive capabilities has been the policy of Japan since the constitution's 
adoption.491  
 
Alternatively, the capacity to use force may be limited by a lack of public support. Even 
a prosperous nation with the capacity to field military forces relies on some minimum 
segment of the population to endorse its military deployments and authority. This holds 
true even if such endorsement is at the minimum level of attracting a sufficient number 
of people who are willing to enlist in the military or willing to abide by a government's 
conscription policy.  
 
Constraints of this sort may be thought of as practical limitations, but are not the sum of 
such limitations. While the capacity to field military forces is essential to using force as 
a coercive tool of power, the capacity to communicate effectively and credibly can also 
limit the exercise or effectiveness of the use of force. The capacity of a nation's 
leadership or elite to come to agreement on whether and how to use force is also crucial, 
even if military capacity, good communication, and high credibility are all present. As 
mentioned in the section above dealing with "signaling", the communication of intent is 
sometimes the aim of a use of force, or of a threat to use force. Ineffective 
communication is a very real limitation on the ability of the threat of force to effect 
desired behavior changes in a target state. Misunderstandings between adversaries result 
from poor communication, the inability to communicate due to logistical reasons, and 
                                                
491 Harrison M. Holland, Japan Challenges America: Managing an Alliance in Crisis (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1992) 103. There has been increasing discussion about the possibility of altering the parameters of 
Japan's constitution to enable the country to more easily contribute militarily to multilateral actions. The 
issue recently came to the fore when a high court in Japan ruled that the government's use of air force 
personnel in Iraq, in support of US forces there, violates Japan's constitution. See Yoko Kubota and Isabel 
Reynolds, "Court Says Japan's Iraq Operation Unconstitutional," New York Times, 18 Apr 2008. 
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the failure to communicate due to hubris.492 When communicating threats, potential 
difficulties due to cross-cultural barriers also exist.493  
 
Related to communication is credibility. Coercion through force hinges on threatened 
violence being applied or withheld. To modify the behavior of others, it is important 
that they believe that by adopting a certain course of action they will avoid damage. If a 
state believes it will suffer damage regardless, there is little incentive to modify 
behavior.494 Therefore, the credibility of a threat is affected by a state's willingness and 
ability to cause hurt, and the precision with which it communicates this.495  
 
Credibility is no less affected by the state's nonmilitary capacity. If relying heavily or 
solely on military force, an actor's influence or control will extend "only as far as its 
physical reach allows".496 Not only is influence limited in a very physical sense when 
wielding military force, but also by the kinds of objectives that military force can 
reasonably be expected to attain: "[a] nation that wants others to adopt its values cannot 
impose them solely through conquest."497  
 
                                                
492 Rothgeb, Defining Power  117. 
493 Ibid.  100. 
494 Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence," 173. 
495 Ibid., 172. 
496 Rothgeb, Defining Power  109. 
497 Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, eds., International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political Economy, and 
Decision-Making, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1985) 147. 
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Related Limiting Factors 
 
a) Possible Reactions and Unintended Consequences 
 
Other practical limitations on the use of force include the unpredictability of reactions 
and unintended consequences. Use of force does not necessarily indicate that it is being 
used shrewdly for clearly articulated political objectives.498 The threat and use of force 
are not always the result of rational calculation of interests and costs, but sometimes 
result from "frustrations" and "notions of glory, honor, and prestige".499  While 
historical examples exist of the dangers of refraining from using force, examples also 
exist of problems that were unresolved or exacerbated by using force.500  
 
Whether used or threatened, force has the possibility of escalating out of control.501 One 
worrying point that has been made is that a target state may choose to use 
unconventional weapons in response to a preemptive military action that is aimed at 
eliminating WMD. At that point, the preemptive state may feel the need to use WMD 
itself, or to demonstrate that use of unconventional weapons against it is "intolerable". It 
is not a given that predominance in conventional forces will automatically preclude 
escalation to an unconventional level: "…conventional options are unlikely to eliminate 
nuclear [or other WMD] dilemmas."502  
 
One can imagine that in such a scenario, questions of moral acceptability and political 
                                                
498 Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence," 175. 
499 Rothgeb, Defining Power  99. 
500 Craig and George, Force and Statecraft  258. 
501 Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence," 174. 
502 Brad Roberts, "NBC-Armed Rogues: Is There a Moral Case for Preemption?," in Close Calls: 
Intervention, Terrorism, Missile Defense, and 'Just War' Today, ed. Elliott Abrams (Washington, DC: 
Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1998), 96. 
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feasibility – and international ramifications – might be subordinated to the pressure or 
momentum of events. Even the threat of using unconventional forces against weaker 
countries has as great, or greater, possibility of driving them closer to other adversaries, 
as influencing them effectively.503 The threat of overwhelming conventional force may 
have just the same effect. For example, the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq 
demonstrated the considerable conventional military capability of the US, and have 
resulted in a large number of US forces stationed in countries bordering Iran. This use 
of force and the continuing military presence have most likely only increased Iranian 
desire to acquire a nuclear weapon capability in the future.504  
 
Further, use of force by itself, as a coercive tool, has limited effectiveness: threats and 
use of force produce anxiety and antagonism in targets, which lead to unwillingness to 
modify behavior or to unintended and unwanted new behaviors.505 The use of force can 
produce an uncooperative attitude in the target (note the political ineffectiveness of 
aerial bombardments in World War II). Even if the target state cooperates, it may be 
only minimally, with targets only incrementally changing unwanted behavior rather 
than comprehensively changing to desired behavior (Iraq's behavior during the 1990s, 
after the imposition of sanctions and no-fly zones, illustrates this well). In such 
circumstances, continuing or increasing force must be applied to achieve continued 
cooperation.506 Regardless of the capacity and credibility to use force, a target state's 
attitude is important, since a defiant target can limit an actor's choices to giving up its 
goal passively, or acting punitively – neither of which necessarily achieve the goal 
sought.507 Such was the case in 1998 when the US and UK decided to undertake a 
                                                
503 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence  24. 
504 Paul Rogers, "Iran: Consequences of a War (Oxford Research Group Briefing Paper)," no. Feb (2006): 
5-6. 
505 Rothgeb, Defining Power  109. 
506 Ibid.  117, 110. 
507 Ibid.  194. 
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bombing campaign against Iraq known as Operation Desert Fox. The operation was in 
response to Iraq's recalcitrance in complying with the UN arms inspection regime. 
While the legality of the bombing campaign is disputed, it seems fairly clear that the 
operation did not achieve the goal of bringing Iraq around to unconditional acceptance 
of UN monitoring.508   
 
b) Interdependence with Other States in the International Community 
 
Realist approaches have tended to center on military and security concerns, and have 
downplayed the development of interdependence, such as economic factors and soft 
power.509 Realists assert that states are the predominant actors in international politics, 
that states "act as coherent units", that force is "the most effective means of wielding 
power", and that the politics dealing with military and security concerns are of more 
importance than the politics dealing with economic and social concerns.510 Arguments 
for the desirability of relying on the use of force as a coercive tool rely on "the 
traditional conception of the international system" as a premise; such arguments may 
appear strong, but are questionable.511   
 
The role force plays is quite reduced when considering nations who view the possibility 
of war between them as extremely low; also, force is often not useful in achieving goals 
involving economic welfare or environmental stability.512 Likewise, many contentious 
contemporary issues are not easily addressed by military means. Because of 
interdependence and industrialization, no one state can reasonably expect to control all 
                                                
508 Marc Weller, "The US, Iraq and the Use of Force in a Unipolar World," Survival 41, no. 4 (2000): 97. 
509 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence  4. 
510 Ibid.  20. 
511 Rothgeb, Defining Power  97. 
512 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence  23-24. 
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of its needed resources through military conquest.513  
 
The idea of interdependent relationships that lead to synergistic strengths and subtle but 
powerful constraints on action has been explored by Keohane and Nye. Complex 
interdependence and realism are both "ideal types", and so while offering very different 
views of the world, neither wholly encompasses the reality of international politics; 
rather, "[m]ost situations will fall somewhere between these two extremes."514 Complex 
interdependence challenges key Realist assumptions, assuming as it does that non-state 
actors participate directly in international politics, that military, security, economic, and 
social concerns can not be hierarchically ranked in importance, and that force is often 
"an ineffective instrument of policy".515  
 
c)  Context  
 
The utility of military power does not always equate to its actual use. Military power 
can be useful though never used (for example when the mere existence or movement of 
military forces achieves a deterrent or communicative effect). Conversely, the actual use 
of military power can actually be counterproductive (for example when the use of 
military force results in driving an opponent closer to other adversaries, or has 
unintended negative consequences). Then too, there are some ends that are difficult to 
accomplish through military means.  
                                                
513 Rothgeb, Defining Power  160. 
514 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence  21.  
515 Ibid. See also 24. However the importance of force is acknowledged even by those who do not view it 
as fundamental. Keohane and Nye allow that even when "complex interdependence" as a type comes 
close to reality, it must be realized that drastic changes could occur that would elevate force to a place of 
prominence – and that even allies can be influenced by military implements, for example when they are 
benefiting from military protection of another. Military power can sometimes be translated to political 
influence, for example when force is used as a deterrent. Therefore the US could sometimes use the fact 
that it was using its military strength to deter Soviet aggression against European states as leverage when 
negotiating with those European states, even if the negotiations were not directly related to military 
matters.  
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One should not view military power as having more political utility than it really does; 
it is a blunt instrument, a tool of last resort, and is of limited use in encouraging loyalty 
or changing underlying attitudes.516 Then too, military means that are identified through 
an imperfect political process may be flawed or inconsistent with other policy goals of a 
country's leadership. The results of game theory and deterrence theory, both of which 
are often at play in proposed uses of force, rely on an assumption of "rational behavior", 
which is best thought of as a "bench mark for further approximation to reality".517 The 
non-rational can take many forms: inconsistent values and decisionmaking, flawed 
communications, miscalculations, or the merging of opinions held by many individuals 
into a single perspective.518  
 
There are still other factors limiting the utility of force in achieving political ends. The 
use of force against "socially mobilized populations" is of limited usefulness, as shown 
by the US experience in Vietnam, and the failure of colonialism. Using force to address 
one issue with a state may damage other facets of the relationship held with that same 
state.519 Further, in liberal democracies, it is difficult to maintain public support for 
prolonged military engagements.  
 
If the use of force is sometimes crucial, so too is the restraint of its use, all the more so 
if an objective is to avoid costly or catastrophic war.520 Many contemporary adversaries 
                                                
516 Robert J. Art, "Nuclear Weapons and Military Power," in International Politics: Anarchy, Force, 
Political Economy, and Decision-Making, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Co., 1985). 
517 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict  16.  
518 Ibid. 
519 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence  25. 
520 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (London: Free 
Press, 2002) 205. Cohen notes that the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 is often perceived as an example of 
this, although this interpretation is not universally agreed-upon.  
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are nonstate entities, and so are difficult to target.521  The difficulty in locating and 
targeting the leadership of a group like al Qaeda is a prime example, and an issue that 
senior officials in the Bush administration apparently understood only too well.522 
While nation-states may be easier to target, the use of military force is of much more 
efficacy in deterring other parties from involving themselves in a region than in shaping 
politics within a region.523  
 
Applicability of the Weinberger-Shultz Debate 
 
A variety of limitations on the use of force also exist that are largely submitted to by 
states rather than imposed upon them. These limitations are submitted to because they 
are seen by the state to be in the best overall interest of the state, or because they are an 
expression of its values, in effect self-restraint that is in line with a perceived 
categorical imperative held by the citizenry or rulers by that state. Of course, a 
combination of the two – self-interest on the one hand, and the expression of deeply-
held values on the other – is possible and even likely. These are both discernible in 
many debates concerning the wisdom of forceful action.  
 
                                                
521 Rothgeb, Defining Power  160. 
522 As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld put it, "We're dealing with enemies that can – turn inside 
our decision circles. They are – they don't have parliaments and bureaucracies and real estate to defend 
and interact with or to deal with or cope with, and they can do what they want. ...  And it is an 
environment that is vastly more complex because of the fact that we have all of these new realities in 
terms of e-mails and video cameras and wire transfer." See US Department of Defense, Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld Interviews with Mr. Bob Woodward – July 6 and 7, 2006 [News Transcript] 
02 Oct 2006 [cited 18 Apr 2008]); available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3744. Indeed, the difficulty in 
targeting non-state actors like al Qaeda was one reason Vice President Dick Cheney urged defining 
terrorism as broadly as possible after 11 September 2001. As reported by Bob Woodward, Cheney 
counseled, "'To the extent we define our task broadly,' Cheney said, 'including those who support 
terrorism, then we get at states. And it's easier to find them than it is to find bin Laden.'" See Bob 
Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002) 43. 
523 Edward Rhodes, Presence, Prevention, and Persuasion: A Historical Analysis of Military Force and 
Political Influence (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004) 404. 
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There was broad agreement among US policymakers during World War II that a total, 
national military effort was needed to defeat the Axis powers. However beginning with 
the Korean War, a tension surfaced among US policymakers regarding the limits of the 
applications of force, and this has persisted to the present day. Using the Korean War as 
an exemplar, on one side of the debate some essentially side with General MacArthur 
and contend that the US should either not intervene in a conflict at all or should fight 
all-out to win. Others broadly side with President Truman, and contend that in an era of 
nuclear weapons the US will probably have to intervene in conflicts from time to time 
and be flexible about limiting its objectives and tactics in order to avoid escalation.524  
 
In more recent years, the tension central to many disagreements over whether and how 
to employ force is seen most clearly in what is sometimes known as the "Weinberger-
Shultz" debate of the 1980s, although the issues grappled with by these two US 
statesmen preceded them and continue to confront policymakers. The enduring 
contentiousness is due to the fact that when considering the use of force, the stakes are 
generally high. As one scholar put it, "[s]uccess in the application of coercive 
diplomacy is not easily achieved. Disaster is always a single bad decision away."525 The 
possibility of flawed decisionmaking resulting in catastrophic failure attends any use of 
force, but this is heightened in an era of nuclear weapons and other WMD.  
 
Then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger staked out his position in the debate in a 
list of principles stated in a November 1984 speech.526 These principles mostly focused 
on only using military force for matters vital to the US national interest, only when 
public and congressional support is present, and when constant reappraisal of the 
                                                
524 Craig and George, Force and Statecraft  261-263. 
525 Ibid.  199. 
526 Caspar W. Weinberger, The Uses of Military Power: Address Given at the National Press Club, 
Washington, DC on 28 Nov 1984 [cited 18 Dec 2008]); available from http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2004/January%202004/0104keeperfull.pdf. 
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objectives and composition of the force is carried out.527 Then-Secretary of State 
George Shultz essentially took the opposing view, and spoke vigorously against 
Weinberger's principles. Shultz saw them as limiting options available to leadership.528 
The strictures outlined by Weinberger, and later Colin Powell, continue to be seen by 
some as a totally improper attempt (by the military) to dictate to the civilian leadership 
when and how they will be used in combat.529  
 
It is notable that the policy of preemption announced in the 2002 NSS does not fall 
neatly into either side this debate. Those who favor Weinberger's principles might say 
that the US is broadly committing to using preemptive military force without 
ascertaining if the US has the will to fully commit to a total effort aimed at victory, and 
that it is impossible to gauge such willingness when announcing a preference for using 
military force in unknown future situations. Those holding the view of Shultz might 
perceive that the policy is favoring ongoing, intensive use of force without adequately 
taking into account the risks of escalation inherent in such a disposition, and without 
building in the flexibility to modify and limit objectives that might be necessary as the 
context changes and the situation develops.  
 
                                                
527 Cohen, Supreme Command  217-219. The idea of applying "overwhelming force" when using US 
military force was later introduced by JCS Chairman Colin Powell, and reinforced the Weinberger 
principles. Tension is apparent between the just war criterion of proportionality and the use of 
overwhelming force. See Paul Gilbert, "Proportionality in the Conduct of War," Journal of Military 
Ethics 4, no. 2 (2005). 
528 Cohen, Supreme Command  219.  
529 Ibid.  216-217. See also the Appendix, "The Theory Of Civilian Control", for an interesting essay on 
the subject of civilian control of the US military. Overall, Cohen believes it is a mistake to try to starkly 
separate civilian leadership from military planning, and politics from military planning. He reviews four 
case studies (Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben-Gurion) and views each as an exemplary wartime 
leader who was very directly involved in questioning, directing, and challenging the military.  
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Conclusion 
 
11 September 2001 brought about a greatly heightened public determination that the US 
should use its power to increase its safety and security, with an emphasis on preventing 
similar attacks in the future. The question of how best to do this remains.530 For some, a 
divide between Western democracies and less-developed-countries (LDCs) – a divide 
that is projected to become ever greater if present trends continue – indicates a 
concomitant increased reliance on the use of force in the relations between the two 
groups, even as force becomes increasingly less apparent in the relations among the 
Western democracies themselves. This view is taken by those who argue that because 
the Western world has developed shared values, interests, and understandings, that 
maneuvering and the exercise of power between them usually takes the form of 
inducements or persuasion, and such coercion as is employed is usually "subtle" and 
"nonviolent".531 With increasing interdependence comes increasing desire to influence 
those entities with which a state interacts; so interdependence does not obviate the 
exercise of power and influence, but may alter the techniques employed to do so.532 
LDCs lack equivalent commonly shared values, interests, and understandings, making 
coercion in general – and the use of force in particular – much more prominent in the 
interactions between LDCs themselves, and between LDCs and the developed world.533  
 
However, if US goals include changing the character of a large portion of the world, the 
long-term efficacy of coercion though military force is brought into question. Changing 
the outlook and behavior of states and publics around the world requires a significant 
investment in time, and the use of force will sometimes be counterproductive in 
                                                
530 Rhodes, Presence, Prevention, and Persuasion  405. 
531 Rothgeb, Defining Power  132. 
532 Ibid.  194. 
533 Ibid.  132. 
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achieving US goals.534 This being the case, the logical course of action is either to use 
means other than force, or adapt the ends being sought. There may be a need to "scale 
back" stated US goals so they are "consistent with the means at America's disposal"; 
and to accept that many stated US goals as regards the "domestic transformations" of 
other states are extremely difficult to bring about.535   
 
When examining the 2002 NSS in light of the use of force, one must ask whether the 
deficiencies of deterrence are really so different from the deficiencies of preemption. 
Although conceptually the difference between deterrence and preemption is quite clear, 
what classical deterrence and preemption have in common is that both rely on a credible 
threat of force rather than its actual use. While US policymakers may have little hope 
that the policy of preemption will diminish the number of potential terrorist attacks, 
they can be forgiven for hoping that the determination to act preemptively will diminish 
the number of actors willing to attack the US. This is because neither intelligence nor 
the deployment of military force is ever 100% effective.  
 
Scholars and policymakers alike tend to think that preemption is a policy option when 
deterrence is no longer possible, and indeed the Strategy says this explicitly. But both 
preemption and deterrence are intended to prevent actors – target states or substate 
groups – from causing harm to the US. The assumption is that preemption will be 
effective by identifying looming threats, and eliminating them proactively through the 
use of military force.  If this assumption is correct, and if taking preemptive action 
successfully eliminates antagonists, would not one expect that its success would have 
some sort of deterrent effect on other actors planning similar attacks against the US? If 
                                                
534 Rhodes, Presence, Prevention, and Persuasion  405. 
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so, the tactic of preemption would in fact deter some enemies, as classical deterrence 
itself hopes to do.  
 
To be fair, the 2002 NSS does present preemption as but a single option among many 
that the US will use when deemed necessary. However, an explicit preference is 
announced for preemption over deterrence, and over economic and diplomatic and 
cultural tools in cases involving development of WMD or support for substate terrorist 
groups. In order to assess whether a stated preference for preemptive force enhances US 
security and flexibility in dealing with these issues, one must consider them as features 
of the international security environment. It is to this changed and changing 
environment that we turn next.  
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7.0  NSS 2002 as Exceptional In Terms of a Response Necessitated by 
Exceptional Circumstances          
 
7.1  Introduction  
 
The principal criterion by which any national security strategy must be judged is the 
extent to which it is framed to deal with threatening dynamics in the international arena. 
The fact that in practice, US national security strategy documents are not issued yearly 
indicates that volatility in security environments generally takes place within 
predictable bounds.536 Shifting threat patterns will not necessarily challenge the 
fundamental assumptions in any NSS document. However, step changes are possible – 
if not inevitable – and the argument of NSS 2002 is that we have entered a time where 
the international security environment has changed to a degree that requires a 
concomitant change in national security strategy. As described in NSS 2002, "… new 
deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists … the nature and 
motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers 
hitherto available only to the world's strongest states, and the greater likelihood that 
                                                
536 Indeed some US officials involved in the production and review of NSS documents believe they would 
be of more utility if produced quadrennially, rather than every year as mandated by law. In arguing 
against producing a new NSS in the absence of significant changes, one respondent noted, "[o]ne of the 
things I thought that was refreshingly good about this document [NSS 2002], whether you agreed with it 
or not, is it set forth policy direction for sort of, in broad terms, of what it was we sought, what the goals 
were ... I thought that it was clearly, specifically written. It was something that would be, the kind of 
directions that would, last the duration of the administration. It wasn't clear to me how, unless you were 
planning to change some of this, what you were going to do with the new version..." See Hoehn. 
Likewise, Hans Binnendijk, who as a senior official was involved with the production of NSS documents 
during the Clinton years on both the Department of State Policy Planning staff and on the NSC staff, 
suggested "It may well be ... that we ought to do one every four years and not go through this fire drill. In 
fact I think this administration didn't do one every year; they did 2002 and 2006 ... it may be that what the 
Bush administration did de facto is the right way to go." See Hans Binnendijk, Interview, 07 Nov 2006.  
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they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today's security 
environment more complex and dangerous."537  
 
Prominent features of the current security environment include the increased influence 
of, and attention paid to, sub-state terrorist groups after 11 September 2001. The 
continued threat posed by nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons proliferation is 
another key feature. Further, there is a belief that these two threats may intersect to form 
a threat more significant than the sum of its parts. These threats are increasing or 
becoming more noticeable in an international environment defined in large part by US 
prominence.  
 
Since 11 September 2001, the George W. Bush administration has consistently argued 
that the threat of terrorism in the 21st century is one that potentially threatens the 
fundamental security of the US. This argument regarding the seriousness of terrorism 
rests largely on the junction of two distinct threats: that posed by sub-state groups 
willing to use lethal violence against civilian populations, and that posed by the 
proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. It is the capability to obtain 
such a weapon, or to acquire the technology necessary to produce such a weapon, that 
most worries many analysts. Indeed, some view the possibility of a terrorist attack with 
WMD as absolutely central to US security. Even in the midst of the most serious 
financial crisis in two generations, one former Defense official went so far as to say, 
"[t]he No.1 challenge facing the next president is to prevent a terrorist group from 
detonating a nuclear weapon in an American city. If he successfully ended the conflict 
in Iraq, checked Iran, brokered an Israeli-Palestinian peace, cut carbon emissions, 
                                                
537 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), "The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America," 13. 
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stabilized Pakistan, and artfully managed relations with China and Russia—but lost a 
million citizens in a nuclear attack, the nation would not be grateful."538 
 
With these facts in mind, we will now survey the landscape of the contemporary 
security environment, first looking at the spread of WMD capacity. Current states of 
concern and non-state actors with the demonstrated willingness to conduct mass-
casualty terrorist operations will then be discussed. Finally, some judgments will be 
drawn regarding the seriousness of threats posed by the intersection of WMD capacity 
and such non-state actors.  
 
7.2  The Expansion and Extension of WMD Capacity 
 
The immense military power of the US makes the use of non-conventional, 
asymmetrical, weapons against the US more appealing to terrorist groups and perhaps 
even some states.539 Weapons of mass destruction are often subdivided into type, 
usually nuclear, biological, and chemical. Every type is capable of inflicting a large 
amount of damage in human terms. However, weapons of mass destruction differ in 
terms of the extensiveness of that damage, and in terms of ease of production. For 
example, while the detonation of a nuclear bomb would cause extensive damage and 
casualties, the process to produce one is fairly intricate and costly. While a chemical 
weapon is easier to produce, it would cause relatively less damage than a nuclear 
explosion.  
 
                                                
538 Robert L. Gallucci, "The Dream Team," Foreign Policy, no. Nov/Dec (2008). 
539 Joshua Lederberg, ed., Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat, BCSIA Studies in International 
Security (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999) xii. This Forward was written by former Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen.  
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In terms of state-level threats, the US has relied on its conventional and nuclear forces 
to deter the use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons against it. The prospect of 
an overwhelming US response to the use of such nonconventional weapons, employing 
either conventional or nuclear weapons, is hoped to be effective in preventing a nation 
from ever using such weapons against the US. Effective preparedness may also 
contribute to a deterrent effect; if the US develops response capabilities and plans that 
are perceived to be so effective that they would blunt the worst results of a 
nonconventional attack, such an attack may appear less attractive to an attacker.540  
 
Nuclear Material 
 
Many experts believe that non-state actors are far more likely to acquire a biological or 
chemical WMD capability than a nuclear weapon. However, concern about nuclear 
terrorism remains high. This is illustrated by the fact that the first anti-terrorism treaty 
that was adopted after 11 September 2001 is the International Convention on the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which was adopted in 2005 and entered into 
force in 2007.541  
 
A huge investment is required in order to make a nuclear weapon, and the infrastructure 
needed to produce a nuclear device is more easily spotted than the apparatus needed to 
produce a biological agent.542 In this sense, it is difficult to conceal a nuclear weapons 
capability. The dual use nature of nuclear technology complicates this, however. The 
infrastructure used for civilian nuclear programs on the one hand, and for the production 
of nuclear weapons on the other, is much the same. For example, heavy water and 
                                                
540 Ibid.  xiii. 
541 David P. Fidler, "International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism Enters 
into Force," ASIL Insight 12, no. 6 (2007). 
542 Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 1 (1998): 32. 
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enriched uranium can be used in both civilian nuclear programs, and in order to produce 
nuclear weapons. Israel and India have used heavy water, natural uranium reactors in 
order to produce plutonium for use in their nuclear weapons.543 
 
Chemical Agents 
 
Although the potential of chemical weapons to cause fatalities is relatively less than that 
of nuclear and biological weapons, chemical weapons remain a significant concern. 
Chemical agents can cause mass casualties. There exist several kinds of chemical 
agents. Choking agents, such as chlorine or phosgene gas, act upon the victim's ability 
to breathe and can result in death by asphyxiation. Both chlorine and phosgene are 
common chemicals that are commercially available. While relatively easy to produce, 
choking agents tend to be more slow acting, and more easily dispersed, than blistering 
agents. Blistering agents, such as mustard gas, burn exposed skin, cause blindness and 
vomiting, and can result in death by asphyxiation if inhaled. Blistering agents are also 
relatively easy to produce, and most of their ingredients are commercially available 
chemicals. Nerve agents, such as sarin and VX, are deadly in relatively small doses. In 
this regard, they are much more potent than choking and blistering agents. However the 
production of nerve agents requires greater technical expertise, and the chemicals 
needed to produce them are less available, than is the case with choking and blistering 
agents.544 This is not to discount the possibility of chemical nerve agents being used in 
terrorist attacks; indeed a particular concern is the ease with which such agents might be 
                                                
543 Frank Barnaby, How to Build a Nuclear Bomb: And Other Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: 
Nation Books, 2004) xv. 
544 Peter Brookes, A Devil's Triangle: Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Rogue States 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005) 150-151. 
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stolen from stockpiles in Russia, the country that currently possesses the world's largest 
store of chemical weapons.545  
 
Still, one chemical agent viewed as more likely to be used in an attack is cyanide. 
Cyanide could be utilized in the form of hydrogen cyanide gas, or even in liquid or solid 
form.546 Cyanide, like chlorine and phosgene, is a fairly common chemical and easier to 
acquire than nerve agents. For example, a variety of substances that contain cyanide are 
used widely in industrial processes. Worryingly, one research institute has documented 
a number of "possessions, plots, or uses involving cyanide by terrorists".547 Dozens of 
such instances have occurred, including recent incidents in which al Qaeda supporters 
were involved.  
 
Evidence also came to light in 2004 that a group of individuals in the UK were 
exploring the possibility of using a less common substance, osmium tetroxide, as the 
agent in a chemical attack. As far as is known, this was the first time osmium tetroxide 
was planned to be employed as a weapon.548 This engendered concern among 
authorities and researchers, as the substance may be obtained commercially, and is quite 
toxic (it easily becomes a vapor at room temperature, and can cause severe chemical 
burns and permanent blindness). However its availability is less widespread, and its cost 
significantly higher, than other chemicals of concern such as cyanide, chlorine and 
phosgene.549 For this reason, the use of osmium tetroxide as a weapon may be less 
likely than those other chemicals. Nevertheless, the interest taken in the substance 
                                                
545 Paul F. Walker and Jonathan B. Tucker, "The Real Chemical Threat [Op-Ed]," Los Angeles Times, 01 
Apr 2006. 
546 Amy Sands, "Deconstructing the Chem-Bio Threat: Testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee" (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 19 Mar 2002 [cited 21 Nov 2008]); available from 
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547 Ibid.[cited date as above]. 
548 Michelle Baker and Margaret E. Kosal, "Osmium Tetroxide - a New Chemical Terrorism Weapon?" 
(Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 13 Apr 2004 [cited 21 Nov 2008]); available from 
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demonstrates the willingness of groups whose aim is to inflict mass casualties to 
experiment with novel substances and adapt their means of attack.  
 
There exists a degree of overlap between chemical and biological weapons, in that a 
chemical that is derived from a biological source may be considered both a chemical 
agent and a biological agent. If one conceives of  man-made chemicals (such as mustard 
gas) lying at one end of a spectrum, and naturally occurring biological agents (such as 
anthrax bacteria) lying at the other end of the spectrum, then a chemical derived from a 
biological source would lie somewhere in the middle.550 Such a substance – a 
"midspectrum" agent – actually falls within the purview of both the 1972 Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention that entered force 
in 1997.551  
 
Midspectrum agents include toxins and bioregulators. Toxins are substances produced 
by biological organisms which are poisonous. It is possible to synthesize toxins in the 
laboratory rather than harvest them from living organisms. Bioregulators are chemicals 
produced by biological organisms which stimulate or inhibit biological processes within 
an organism. Bioregulators can therefore be lethal if introduced into a body, or if a body 
is caused to produce abnormally high concentrations of a natural bioregulatory 
chemical.552 As an example, Agent Orange was a herbicide used by the US during the 
Vietnam War. Agent Orange acts by mimicking a naturally occurring bioregulator; it 
works by being absorbed by the leaves of the plant and then acting internally on the 
plant's growth process.553 Both bioregulators and toxins tend to produce effects much 
                                                
550 Malcolm Dando, The New Biological Weapons: Threat, Proliferation, and Control (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001) 10-12. 
551 Ibid.  2. 
552 E Kagan, "Bioregulators as Instruments of Terror," Clinics in Laboratory Medicine 21, no. 3 (2001). 
553 Dando, The New Biological Weapons  25. 
PRINCE  222/315  
more quickly than biological weapons agents such as anthrax, which take hours or days 
to produce symptoms.554 
 
Biological Agents 
 
Naturally occurring biological agents (such as anthrax and botulinum toxin) were 
weaponized in large-scale state programs in the 1950s and 1960s. It is quite possible 
that these agents might appeal to terrorist groups or states interested in developing a 
WMD capability, since they have already undergone rigorous testing and been produced 
as viable components of biological weapons. However, more novel agents and 
techniques are also quite worrying. For example, it is known that the Soviet Union 
began applying advances in genetic engineering to its own biological weapons program 
in order to increase the antibiotic resistance of plague bacteria. It is possible that genetic 
engineering could be used by other entities as well. The intent might be to increase 
antibiotic resistance of a variety of harmful agents, or to cause harmless bacteria to 
produce a dangerous toxin, or even to modify biological agents so as to target specific 
ethnic groups.555 Microorganisms might also be engineered to be more easily dispersed, 
or to be less easily detected by warning systems.556 Notably, a research team in 
Australia inadvertently created a genetically modified mousepox virus which was fatal 
to every mouse that contracted it. The virus targets the immune system of its victims. 
While the mousepox virus can not be contracted by humans, it is very similar to the 
human smallpox virus. This raises the possibility that a similarly modified smallpox 
virus could be developed that would be fatal in 100% of cases.557  
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Toxins are produced by a variety of plants and animals. Their toxicity varies, as does 
the ease with which they can be produced and delivered to a target. The less toxic a 
substance, the more of it must be produced for the same effect. The toxins most likely to 
be used as weapons either have a very high toxicity – thus requiring that less of it be 
produced – or a lower toxicity that is offset by the fact that it is relatively easy to 
produce large quantities of it. 
 
Further, if a toxin can be aerosolized, it is more easily dispersed over a large area while 
remaining an effective weapon. Therefore the toxins that would make the most effective 
and practical weapons are those which could be delivered in a respirable form, and have 
high toxicity and/or are easily produced in large quantities. At present, most of the 
toxins that fulfill these requirements are produced by bacteria. Of course, plant toxins 
such as ricin are also a major concern, and continuing advances in technology mean that 
toxins that are difficult to process or aerosolize at present may become more easily 
produced in the future.558  
 
Biological weapons agents can be produced with a relatively minor financial investment 
and only modest technical expertise.559 The technical obstacles to such production have 
diminished over time, making it less difficult and more likely than in years past. A 
principal feature of biological agents that distinguishes them from conventional 
weapons is their potential to inflict an extremely high number of casualties. The most 
lethal terrorist attacks that have been carried out have resulted in a few hundreds or a 
few thousands of deaths. In comparison, it has been estimated that a large-scale terrorist 
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attack employing biological agents could result in hundreds of thousands, or even 
millions, of deaths.560  
 
It is here that some see biological weapons as the most worrisome kind of 
nonconventional weapon. An attack relying on biological weapons could potentially 
cause so many deaths as to make the casualty count comparable to an atomic bomb. As 
one expert put it, biological weapons are "equivalent in potential lethality to nuclear 
weapons."561  
 
Yet, the materials needed to produce a biological agent are relatively affordable and 
easily obtainable.562 There are acknowledged difficulties in the area of weaponizing 
biological agents to such a degree that they can be carried by missiles and survive 
delivery via a warhead. However, equipment to produce large quantities of a biological 
agent has become more accessible in recent years. Further, a substate group could well 
disperse a biological agent in aerosol form by using an airplane or truck, thus negating 
the need for a more highly refined biological agent that could be used in a warhead.563 
A number of biological agents can be produced by individuals at home or in a small lab, 
and without advanced scientific knowledge. The production of other biological agents 
would require more sophisticated training. However, individuals with the level of 
training required are not rare, and a terrorist group would probably have little difficulty 
hiring or recruiting such a person.564  
 
The knowledge required for producing biological agents and modifying microorganisms 
is also relatively easy to obtain, and has extended the capacity of individuals to 
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reproduce known agents and even create new ones. This is due in part to the ease with 
which information is shared electronically around the globe in the 21st century. 
However, it is also the result of accepted practice in scientific research; that is, of 
openly publishing scientific results so the scientific community can review and share in 
newfound knowledge. Results which lay out how to modify microorganisms in harmful 
ways are regularly published in open scientific journals.565 While in many ways this is a 
positive example of shared knowledge and progress, it raises serious concerns with 
regard to the possible use of scientific techniques to develop extremely dangerous 
bioweapons.566  
 
In this globalized world, disseminative systems facilitate physical exchanges (as when 
individuals, objects or organisms are moved about by way of air travel) and electronic 
or knowledge exchanges (as when stocks are electronically traded or information is 
shared on the internet).567 Thus disseminative systems aid in both the physical and 
virtual extension of the ability to produce WMD. It is a troubling fact that such systems 
result in unforeseen consequences and vulnerabilities, such as increasing the probability 
that genetically engineered microorganisms harmful to human life will be created. More 
troubling still is the reality that in the contemporary world it is likely impossible to 
prevent the continued dissemination of such knowledge.  
 
It should be stressed that the same issue of dual use technology mentioned above, with 
regard to nuclear material, also exists in regard to biological material. Almost all 
facilities and material needed to produce the lethal biological agents for a potential 
attack are dual use; that is, the material used to produce illicit, lethal biological agents is 
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also used in legitimate research facilities, and to produce legitimate products such as 
vaccines.568 For example, there are many promising uses of toxins in the treatment of 
disease, and the medical and biotechnology communities possess a high degree of 
interest in researching toxins.569 This is a perfect example of the dilemma posed by dual 
use technology. It is extremely difficult to ascertain with certainty whether research is 
being conducted for legitimate and beneficial reasons or for more nefarious ones 
because the two enterprises require exactly the same resources and equipment. It is an 
exceedingly delicate balance that must be struck between allowing beneficial research 
to continue, while controlling the proliferation of biological weapons technology. In 
fact, in terms of disseminative systems it may be impossible to separate the two.570  
 
Finally, it has been pointed out that both the nature of an attacker and the type of 
intended target affect the amount of biological agent required for an attack; the same 
holds true for chemical agents. For example, a non-state terrorist group targeting a 
civilian population with a single act would likely require substantially less agent than a 
state targeting another state's military in a large-scale strategic way.571 It might be easier 
not only to produce smaller amounts of agent, but also easier to evade detection.  
 
The constraints on the construction of a small-scale WMD capacity by a sub-state group 
differ from the constraints on the construction of a large-scale military WMD capacity. 
                                                
568 One notable expert, Graham Pearson, succinctly described the difficulty dual use technology poses to 
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biological agents. This lesson has important consequences for any future inspection regime in that the 
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A sub-state group might only need to construct a very small number of WMD, or even 
just a single one. When producing only a limited number, the production process could 
afford to be inefficient.572 This WMD could be improvised. It could be more unwieldy 
and less stable than a more professional product produced by a military. Conversely, 
chemical and biological agents could be stored and delivered in containers smaller than 
would be required for military use. In the case that the weapon contained components 
with a limited shelf-life, the problem could be overcome by using the WMD shortly 
after it was made rather than storing it for possible future conflicts. Further, a non-state 
group might be able to compromise on the precision of such a weapon while still 
achieving its goal.573  
 
Radiological Weapons and Cyberterrorism 
 
Radiological weapons and cyberterrorism deserve mention at this point. Although 
neither is classed as WMD, both have the potential for causing large-scale social 
disruption and enormous economic damage. Even significant casualties could result 
from their use, both directly and as a result of ensuing panic.  
 
A radiological bomb, or "dirty bomb", is not considered a WMD. The use of a 
radiological bomb would involve dispersing some sort of radioactive material with 
conventional explosives. The radioactive material that could be used differs from the 
highly refined material, such as enriched uranium, which is needed to construct a 
nuclear bomb. The radioactive material used in a radiological bomb would probably be 
of a type relatively easy to obtain from a medical or industrial facility. The use of such a 
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bomb would not result in as many casualties as would the detonation of a nuclear bomb. 
However, it is mentioned in passing here because some estimate that its economic and 
social impact could be quite large. For example whole blocks of a city would need to be 
decontaminated or even rebuilt after such an attack; while such an area is relatively 
small, if it were to include the heart of a financial district, or national seat of 
government, the disruption could be enormous. The possibility of inflicting a large 
amount of financial damage and social harm, coupled with the relative ease and low 
cost of obtaining radioactive material and conventional explosives, might make the use 
of such a weapon appealing to a would-be attacker.574 
 
In contrast to the threat of a sub-state group acquiring weapons that once only nation-
states could hope to possess is the threat posed by a relatively new mode of attack: 
cyberwarfare or cyberterrorism. For technology plays more than one role in this 
consideration of security. Technological advances have led to the ability to produce 
more lethal and devastating weapons to use in threatening the US and civilian 
populations in general. Technology also plays a key role in how information on how to 
obtain or manufacture such weapons is disseminated.  
 
Technological advances in communications (e.g. the internet and mobile phones) have 
facilitated the planning and coordination of actors who wish to inflict harm on the US, 
at both the sub-state and state levels. Technology also provides a target for such actors, 
in terms of the telecommunications architecture which all modern states depend on. 
While incidents of cyberterrorism have been limited so far, it has become an increasing 
concern to policymakers and analysts.  
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Cyberterrorism includes attacks that target the communications or information 
architecture of a state. To an extent it is defined by what is targeted, rather than what is 
hoped will result from an attack. Cyberterrorists may aim to cause panic in a civilian 
population, inflict financial harm on a government, or even cause mass casualties in 
some way.  
 
To the extent that email and other methods of communication that rely on computer 
networks have already been used by sub-state groups for the purpose of planning and 
coordinating terrorist attacks, cyberterrorism is a present reality. However, when 
considering the possibility that networks themselves will be targeted in order to damage 
a country's infrastructure or essential services, opinion differs on how to classify the 
threat. Significant disagreement exists as to the magnitude of damage a concerted 
cyberterrorist attack could inflict on critical US infrastructure.575  
 
One possibility is that while a cyberattack targeting US infrastructure might not directly 
result in large financial losses or mass casualties, that it might increase such harm if 
carried out in concert with a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack.576 Alternatively, 
computer networks may be harmed if the facilities they are housed in, or transmission 
lines, are physically targeted. Such physical targeting may make use of conventional 
explosives or electromagnetic energy (e.g., an electromagnetic pulse). Networks may 
also be targeted by other computer networks, through hacking, the use of stolen access 
information, or through denial-of-service "swarm" attacks.577 
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It is also likely that as time goes on, supporters of non-state groups wishing to target the 
US will enhance their technical expertise. Further, to the extent that US military and 
intelligence actions have hindered some non-state groups from organizing and carrying 
out physical attacks, they will increasingly use computer networks both for planning 
and as the means of attack itself.578 The object of a cyberattack may be to cause 
economic damage by damaging a computer network itself, or by having negative effects 
on a nation's financial systems. If a critical infrastructure such as the electric grid is 
targeted, physical damage may result, with possible economic effects and human 
casualties. It is conceivable that targeting other infrastructure such as air traffic control 
and public and private communication systems might have similar results.579  
 
7.3  "Rogue" States, Weak States, and Terrorist Organizations 
 
The term "rogue state" became more widely used by the US and others in the post-Cold 
War years, but the term had existed for decades before. Further, US administrations 
have used other epithets to describe states antagonistic to the US who often act outside 
of international norms: pariah states, outlaw states, renegade states, and states of 
concern. There is a danger when using such phrases that crucial differences between 
particular nations and issues can blur together.580 There is likewise a lack of definitional 
consensus in much of the academic literature on weak states, with various terms such as 
                                                                                                                                          
"'Cyberwar' Emerges Amid Russia-Georgia Conflict" [Transcript] (PBS, 13 Aug 2008 [cited 04 Feb 
2009]); available from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/july-dec08/cyberwar_08-13.html. See 
also Travis Wentworth, "You’ve Got Malice" (Newsweek, 23 Aug 2008 [cited 04 Feb 2009]); available 
from http://www.newsweek.com/id/154965. 
578 John Rollins and Clay Wilson, "Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and Policy Issues," 
in Cyberterrorism and Computer Attacks, ed. Lawrence V. Brown (New York: Novinka Books, 2006), 
64-67. 
579 Martin Charles Golumbic, Fighting Terror Online: The Convergence of Security, Technology, and the 
Law (New York: Springer, 2008) 19-22.  
580 Robert S. Litwak, "Rogue States a Handy Label, but a Lousy Policy," Washington Post, 20 Feb 2000. 
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"weak state", "failed state", and "failing state" enjoying wide usage.581 Different terms 
have varying connotations, and can result in a level of ambiguity in scholarly analysis.  
 
However, while such phrases are not always useful, for practical reasons the term 
"rogue state" will be adopted here as it is the term used in NSS 2002. The two examples 
of rogue states mentioned by name in NSS 2002 were Iraq and North Korea.582 A 
primary US concern with such rogue states is that while none can match the destructive 
power of the US, or that possessed by the defunct Soviet Union or other great powers, 
that a more limited nuclear, chemical, or biological attack could be launched against the 
US. Such an attack might occur because the leaders of a rogue state are not effectively 
deterred in the same way the superpowers were during the Cold War. A related concern 
is that a rogue state might acquire a WMD capability and then transfer a weapon or 
agent to a terrorist group for more covert use against the US or other Western nations.583  
 
Weak states are also of concern to the US and other Western states. Weak states lack 
government infrastructure to a significant degree, often due to years of conflict. Social 
support structures are also often absent. The lack of an effective governmental authority 
in weak states tends to foster violence. Often an expression of this is criminal violence, 
when crime increases in the absence of state authority. Political violence may increase 
as well, as the power void is contested by groups competing for dominance.584 The 
existence of a weak state also has consequences external to the country; the economies 
of its neighbors suffer due simply to their proximity to such instability, and illegal 
                                                
581 Usman Hannan and Hany Besada, "Dimensions of State Fragility: A Review of the Social Science 
Literature [Working Paper 33],"  (Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2007), 1-6. 
582 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), "The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America," 14. 
583 Dan Caldwell and Robert E. Williams, Seeking Security in an Insecure World (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006) 50-51. 
584 Hannan and Besada, "Dimensions of State Fragility: A Review of the Social Science Literature 
[Working Paper 33]," 6. 
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narcotics smuggling that often occurs in weak states also has a effects beyond its 
borders.585  
 
Most weak states do not have a WMD capacity, but concern remains that the lack of 
authority within them might facilitate the establishment of safe havens for terrorist 
groups where WMD programs of some sort might be pursued.586 This is because in 
weak states, rules of compliance and monitoring systems do not function well. 
Therefore, a distinctive feature of a weak state is that it allows for "under the radar" 
activities and threats to develop.  
 
Weak states and rogue states are qualitatively different. Weak states are generally 
characterized by a lack of central control, whereas a rogue state such as North Korea 
has a very centralized dictatorial control. These two qualities can combine, as was the 
case in Afghanistan. In that case a weak state with a failed social infrastructure also 
exhibited some "rogue" tendencies, in that the Taliban regime controlling the country 
was little affected by outside pressure and international norms. Further, a very real 
terrorist link did exist in Afghanistan, as the Taliban had allowed al Qaeda the use of its 
territory for training and sanctuary purposes. For its part, al Qaeda was supportive of 
Taliban rule. Weak states and rogue states are both equally problematic, because both 
operate outside the system – that is, in noncompliance with international norms – while 
the usual monitoring mechanisms are not present.  
 
Just how dangerous sub-state groups are, and the kind of threat that they pose, is 
disputed. The use of terrorism may be more effective against liberal democratic states 
than more autocratic ones, as democratic governments are more susceptible to changing 
                                                
585 Ibid., 7-8. 
586 Ibid., 9. 
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public opinion.587 Further, the lethality of terrorist attacks has increased significantly 
over the past several decades, and there is no indication that it will decrease in the 
foreseeable future.588 Still, the threat of terrorism is judged by some as serious but 
manageable through the use of mechanisms such as law enforcement. Others believe it 
poses an existential threat to Western democracies, including the US. These differing 
analyses of the nature and degree of the threat result in drastically different policy 
prescriptions.  
 
No non-state group – some would call it a movement – has inflicted as much damage on 
the US in recent years as al Qaeda. The origin of al Qaeda may be traced to the 
resistance fighters in Afghanistan who fought against the Soviet forces after they 
invaded the country in 1979. A number of attacks on US interests in recent years have 
been associated with the group: the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 
1993; support for attacks against US military personnel in Somalia in 1993; the 
bombing of the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia in 1996; the bombing of US 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; the bombing of the US Navy destroyer USS 
Cole in Yemen in 2000; and the 11 September attacks in New York and Washington in 
2001.589 In the years since 2001, other attacks traced to al Qaeda have occurred in Iraq 
and Afghanistan since the US invasion of those countries.  
 
As the potential capability of non-state actors to inflict mass casualty attacks is a 
relatively novel one, the resilience and linkages between such groups is unique as well. 
Globalized communication is a common factor linking capability and intent. It allows 
for the dissemination of ideologies as well as technical knowledge, while enabling 
groups and individuals to plan and travel worldwide.  
                                                
587 Brookes, A Devil's Triangle  13. 
588 Barnaby, How to Build a Nuclear Bomb  131. 
589 Brookes, A Devil's Triangle  18. 
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At the very heart of the 2002 NSS is the intent to deal forcefully with sub-state actors 
overseas: "[w]e will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by ... defending the 
United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying 
and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders."590 However, by their very 
nature, networked sub-state groups are resistant to traditional military tactics.591 Such 
groups also often present singular challenges in the area of intelligence gathering, where 
the familial basis of groups make it difficult for acquiring human intelligence.592  
 
Of course, the high number of potential fatalities and general panic that would 
accompany a WMD attack actually restrains some terrorist groups from perpetrating 
such an attack. This is true of groups who fear that inflicting too many deaths will 
actually be counterproductive by causing their supporters to turn against them and their 
antagonists to consolidate opposition to them. 593 While not shying away from violence, 
terrorist groups do sometimes temper the magnitude of their attacks so as not to 
sacrifice potential support.  For example, though the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
in Northern Ireland (PIRA) carried out major bombing attacks in England, it seems one 
goal was not to be responsible for too many civilian deaths, which would risk a 
tremendous backlash of negative English public opinion.594  
 
Even so, researchers have identified specific groups who have viewed the use of 
biological agents as being a desirable means of achieving various aims. Though no 
                                                
590 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), "The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America," 6. On the same page is asserted "...we recognize that our best defense is a good 
offense...".   
591 Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict." 
592 Jeffrey H. Norwitz, "Combating Terrorism: With a Helmet or a Badge?," in Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, Readings & Interpretations, ed. Russell 
D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004), 476. 
593 Simon, "Biological Terrorism: Preparing to Meet the Threat," 239. 
594 Malcolm Dando, Biological Warfare in the 21st Century: Biotechnology and the Proliferation of 
Biological Weapons (London: Brassey’s, 1994) 198. 
PRINCE  235/315  
specific group is currently known to possess biological weapons, the mere fact that 
some sub-state groups view biological weapons as a useful means to "murder large 
numbers of people" is sobering.595 The extent to which a particular substate group, such 
as al Qaeda, is likely to use WMD may be debated. However, that group's persistence in 
attacking US interests and attempting to inflict mass casualties – as mentioned above – 
indicates that it would attempt to use any WMD capability it possessed. It is clear that al 
Qaeda has explored the possibility of acquiring biological weapons, as well as nuclear 
and chemical ones.596  
 
Terrorist groups most likely to use weapons of mass destruction are those who have 
constituencies who are not concerned with possible public opinion backlash against 
them. Such groups may include religious cults, white supremacist groups, and global 
revolutionary groups.597 In modern times, the detected use of biological weapons by 
substate groups has to date been very rare and limited. Two examples stand out. The 
first is the use of Salmonella by the Rajneeshee cult in Oregon, USA in 1984. The group 
intended to infect a portion of the population in order to affect the outcome of local 
elections. This case also serves as an example of the difficulty in tracing the use of 
biological agents; although terrorism was suspected, it could not be proven until a cult 
member confessed two years later.598  
 
Equally worrying was the Aum Shinrikyo's sarin attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995.  
Sarin is a chemical nerve agent. However, subsequent investigation of Aum Shinrikyo 
resulted in discovery of a nascent biological weapons program. The group also sent 
                                                
595 W. Seth Carus, "Unlawful Acquisition and Use of Biological Agents," in Biological Weapons: 
Limiting the Threat, ed. Joshua Lederberg (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999), 218. 
596 Barnaby, How to Build a Nuclear Bomb  131-134. 
597 Simon, "Biological Terrorism: Preparing to Meet the Threat," 240. 
598 LTC George Christopher, LTC Theodore Cieslak, MAJ Julie Pavlin, COL Edward Eitzen, "Biological 
Warfare: A Historical Perspective," Journal of the American Medical Association 278, no. 5 (1997). 
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members overseas to acquire the ebola virus (unsuccessfully), and is alleged to have 
attempted staging an anthrax attack (also unsuccessfully).599  
 
Just given the increased ease with which a substate group might acquire WMD is cause 
for serious concern. However this is exacerbated further by the fact that disparate 
groups are becoming more interlinked globally. Many have begun to apply the phrase "a 
network of networks" to describe both the facilitative nature of al Qaeda as a 
movement, and the developing relationship between terrorist groups more generally.600  
 
7.4  An Historically Novel Global Threat 
 
All states seek to protect their interests and enhance their influence in the international 
community, as has been discussed.601 Yet, the US is not uniquely threatened by the 
elements of the current security environment – hence the "Global War on Terror", and 
at least a rhetorical commitment by other states to aid the US in that struggle. This 
shared perception of threat and rhetorical commitment contributes to a consolidation or 
solidification of the rationale driving the US disposition to allow itself preemptive 
action. This holds true even though other states, including Western states, might not 
subscribe to a policy of preemptive action. These states validate the rationale for 
preemption, even if they do not necessarily endorse the response.  
 
And in fact many outside of the US find it difficult to support or agree with the US 
response to the current security environment, as put forth in the 2002 NSS. This is not 
                                                
599 Ibid. 
600 Brookes, A Devil's Triangle  94. See also Ronald J. Deibert and Janice Gross Stein, "Hacking 
Networks of Terror," in Dialog-IO (IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002), 
7. See also MI5, Al Qaida's Structure 2007 [cited 01 Dec 2008]); available from 
http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page543.html. 
601 See Chapter One above.  
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because the Strategy may appear to put US interests ahead of the interests of others, for 
all states have particular interests that are self-serving. However, one reason some 
object to the Strategy is the stated US intention to establish and maintain its power 
beyond challenge. Such a Strategy, far from being universally reassuring to other states, 
is sometimes viewed as rather alarming.602 This stated goal of dominance paired with 
military and diplomatic US actions in international affairs has resulted in a growing 
perception of the US as threatening. How quickly, or if, this might be reversed under the 
next presidency, is not clear.  
 
In short, the probable extension of WMD capacity to rogue nations and non-state 
terrorist groups is a novel and pressing global concern. The ability of non-state actors to 
access the constituent components of WMD, and to access the knowledge necessary to 
construct WMD, is real threat. A number of contributing factors only exacerbate the 
threat. These factors include the easy concealment of small-scale WMD production 
facilities with little outstanding infrastructure, the availability of raw materials with 
which to produce chemical and biological weapons, the ability to genetically alter 
organisms for harmful purposes, and ready access to technical expertise. Strikingly, 
such factors conform to none of the classic indicators of imminent military threat. This 
fact has important legal ramifications for determining if and when a threat is imminent, 
which will be discussed further in Chapter Eight.  
 
                                                
602 Wes Avram, "On Getting Past the Preamble: One Reading of the Strategy," in Anxious About Empire: 
Theological Essays on the New Global Realities, ed. Wes Avram (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 
2004), 30. 
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7.5  Conclusion 
 
It appears clear that the security environment has indeed changed in significant ways; 
novel threats have evolved which may require novel responses. Yet although this much 
clear, it is debatable whether the US response to this changed environment is tailored 
appropriately. One could reasonably argue that the US response is suitable – at least as 
far as it goes. When faced with the myriad possibilities of terrorist attacks utilizing 
WMD, a policy of preemptive self-defense may well be proportional, or exercised in a 
proportional manner.  
 
However, the US response does not seem adequate. Recent US strategy has largely 
ignored larger, more fundamental trends high on the progressive agenda that constitute 
threats as well. There is a growing acceptance among expert scientists and the lay 
American public that pressing threats to security include more than Islamic extremism 
and the rise of other great powers such as China and Russia. A more holistic view of 
contemporary threats might include infectious disease and viral pandemics, climate 
change, ethnic conflict and nationalism, religious fundamentalism, the stability of the 
globalized economy, and mass migration.603 These threats share a commonality: 
integrated policies on the part of the US government and other governments are needed 
to effectively address them.604 Further, though some threats may require a forceful 
response – preemptive or otherwise – other dangers would be more effectively 
addressed through diplomacy and the rule of law. For example, a prominent biological 
                                                
603 Gary Hart, "Op-Ed: America's Next Chapter," New York Times, 25 Jun 2008. 
604 Gary Hart, Under the Eagle's Wing: A National Security Strategy of the United States for 2009 
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weapons expert has argued that the absence of a more effective arms control regime for 
biological weapons poses a real threat to human survival.605  
 
Relatedly, it is highly improbable that states will succeed in preventing every act of 
conventional terrorism from ever occurring. It is just as improbable that acts of 
bioterrorism – terrorism employing biological weapons and/or biological agents – will 
never come to pass. This being the case, it is crucial to focus efforts on two areas. The 
first is prevention, that is attempting to minimize the occurrence of terrorist attacks. The 
second is response, or mitigating the consequences of a terrorist attack when it does 
occur. The importance of prevention and effective response can be recognized when 
considering attacks that employ either conventional means or biological agents. 
Favoring a preemptive use of force doctrine at the expense of response preparedness 
may come to be seen as shortsighted.  
 
In addition, problems exist in gauging the imminence of perceived threats and attacks. 
This derives from the difficulty in accurately measuring another state's real capability 
and ultimate intent. Policy choices, including the decision to use force, are necessarily 
made in the heat of the moment, as situations are developing. Yet it is not unusual to 
observe, with some historical perspective, that those choices have been based on 
inaccurate understandings of another state's true objectives and motivations.606  
 
                                                
605 Dando, The New Biological Weapons  10. 
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But Soviet documents show that the Russians invaded because they feared that the new Afghan leader, 
who'd been educated in the United States, might be an American spy. 'This is something,' Byrne says, 
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The effectiveness of the US strategy for pursuing its goal of terrorism eradication, then, 
is in question. US counterterrorism strategy has continued to be reactive. Further, the 
ability of the US to continue to apply its counterterrorism strategy is in doubt. This is 
due to the fact that US forces are already at capacity dealing with the operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.607 With its military stretched to breaking point, it seems 
impossible for it to continue attempting to confront every possible threat it conceives 
of.608   
 
There is a significant difference between setting a desired goal, and defining with clarity 
the means of achieving it. One may settle decisively on a certain political objective, for 
example the elimination of terrorist groups of global reach.609 Deciding on a detailed 
and executable plan for achieving that objective, however, is a separate matter. When 
considering the overall effectiveness of the Global War on Terror – a conflict that by 
definition has a preeminent military component – one must consider both ends and 
means, strategic and tactical. This consideration is difficult to make when "vital parts of 
the military plan – strategy and tactics – remain an ad hoc process."610  
 
                                                
607 John Davis, "The War on Terrorism: Impact on Al Qaeda," in The Global War on Terrorism: 
Assessing the American Response, ed. John Davis (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2004), 214. 
608 This is what Ron Suskind has dubbed the "One Percent Doctrine", after a statement made by Vice 
President Dick Cheney: "'If there's a one percent chance that Pakistani scietists are helping al Qaeda build 
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Schuster, 2006) 62.  
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States of America," 5. 
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The current US strategy in its struggle against global terrorism has in actuality 
undermined the effectiveness of NATO and the UN, both of which are critical to the 
real success of such a campaign.611 The disposition of the George W. Bush 
administration is itself of undoubted importance  to its commitment to a global war on 
terror undertaken in large part by military means. However, the administration's 
Strategy also exhibits continuity with past US planning. The 2002 NSS amplified a 
preexisting tendency of US government planners to focus extensively on the military 
aspects of security. The preponderant role of the military CINCs has contributed to this 
tendency, as has an accepted representation of national security issues that is heavily 
military in practice.612 These facts have led some to conclude that not much 
improvement has been seen in national strategy formulation since the Goldwater-
Nichols Act was passed, and formal NSS documents were mandated.613  
 
It is far from clear that preemptive use of force is a good choice for dealing with WMD 
threats.614 Even those broadly supportive of preemptive use of force admit that such a 
prescription is fraught with pitfalls and will not necessarily be successful. Some would 
like to see changes to international law in order that such action might be legal and 
more legitimate.  
 
It is impossible to know with certainty that a threatened or actual preemptive military 
strike will not in fact increase animosity towards the US, resulting in a more numerous 
and resolved number of enemies – and thus result in a more dire threat than the one 
                                                
611 Ibid., 215-216. 
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613 Ibid. 
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initially acted against.615 States sometimes intentionally attempt to create a sense of 
pressure and urgency in a confrontation, to demonstrate the seriousness of their 
commitment and in the hope of bringing about a quick resolution; however, this can 
prove to be a risky endeavor, as the very pressure that was hoped would move an 
adversary to quick capitulation or accommodation can actually provoke a preemptive 
attack on the part of the adversary.616 There is perhaps something uniquely American 
about threat perception as it is manifested in the US. After the threat of defeat in World 
War II had passed, the US identified a new great threat in the form of the Soviet Union. 
In response to this looming and global threat, "[t]he nation was to be permanently 
prepared. America's interests and responsibilities were unrestricted and global".617 
Americans are willing to pay a high price for only a small amount of increased safety. 
For there is a real cost for trying to prepare for and eliminate any and every threat. If 
half a century ago the US was to be permanently prepared against communism, it seems 
now it is to be permanently prepared against terrorism – and according to NSS 2002, 
perhaps permanently acting.  
 
In addition to this conceptual, strategic failing in terms of sustainability, current US 
policy falls short pragmatically as well. The security environment is not such that the 
current US strategy is sustainable in practical military terms. Ironically, this is because 
for every success the military has in eliminating a terrorist base of operations, it 
                                                
615 Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century, 1st American ed. (New 
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significantly increases the difficulty in succeeding the next time, as one military 
planning expert has explained.618 
 
However detailed one's characterization of exceptional circumstances and 
environments, it does not necessarily follow that a policy response will be apt or 
sustainable. NSS 2002 signals a disposition – it does not commit the country to 
anything. It does not preempt judgment on particular issues. What it may do is ease 
legal constraints – or challenge them – to give more latitude of action to the US.  
 
Although these conclusions appear sound at present, it is difficult to judge the 
proportionality, adequacy, and sustainability of the 2002 NSS definitively. Indeed, it 
may be impossible to do so in the absence of a sufficient body of action, which might 
develop over time. In addition, the international security environment is not free-
standing from the international legal environment – to which we now turn.  
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8.0  NSS 2002 as Exceptional In Terms of International Law      
8.1  Preemptive Self-Defense: The Legal Context 
 
There is a prima facie case that the 2002 NSS is exceptional in terms of international 
law. It rests on the fact that the US explicitly proclaims a right and an intention to use 
force to act preemptively against perceived threats – even if those actors it perceives as 
threatening have not yet attacked the US.619 This appears to be in direct contradiction to 
the United Nations Charter, which is a negotiated agreement that stands as binding 
international law. Under Article 2 of the Charter, states agree to solve their disputes by 
peaceful means and to respect the physical and political sovereignty of all other 
states.620 As the UN is the premier international membership organization, its Charter is 
generally regarded as a cornerstone of international order. The stated willingness of the 
US to use force preemptively and unilaterally certainly appears to be at odds with 
international law – the UN Charter.  
 
However, the US asserts that its intention to use force preemptively does have a basis in 
international law. First, the US argues that this legal basis pre-dates the UN Charter, 
since preemptive self-defense is recognized in customary international law: "For 
centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they 
can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent 
danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the 
legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat — most often a visible 
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mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack."621  Second, since the 
UN Charter allows for self-defense, preemptive force used for this purpose can credibly 
be argued as consistent with the Charter.  
 
The next section begins with a consideration of international law, and how customary 
international law and codified international law are related. Codified law agreed 
between states is not the sole source of international law. The customary behavior of 
states, over time, can either challenge codified law or be regarded as having formal 
legal status for which the term "customary international law" is generally employed. 
The difficulty is that there is no universally agreed means by which to determine what is 
customary international law, and what is really a more limited pattern of state practice. 
For this reason, assertions that state custom have legal force are a particularly 
interesting and contentious source of legal debate. Typically, arguments mounted 
against assertions of customary international law are on the basis of inclusion, duration, 
and consistency. Although customary international law has not frequently been invoked 
to justify preemptive self-defense, it has nevertheless been a line of argumentation 
employed for another class of challenges to Article 2.4 – the humanitarian intervention 
debate. We will return to this after considering codified international law as it applies to 
preemptive self-defense. 
 
                                                
621 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), "The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America," 15. 
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8.2  Self-Defense under the UN Charter 
 
Thinkers through the centuries have been sympathetic to states which have been seen to 
take forceful action in response to an initial attack leveled at them.622 Although more 
difficult for a state to prove, as well as for others to ascertain, the notion of forcefully 
preempting an undeniable and imminent attack about to be leveled against it has also 
enjoyed a degree of acceptance, if not enthusiasm.  
 
The inherent right of individuals, and states, to protect themselves and perhaps their 
very existence has long been regarded legitimate, when similar violent action would not 
be employed if they had not been attacked first. In our own time, self-defense is 
authorized under Article 51 of the UN Charter.623 Although self-defense might appear 
to be a precise concept, the nature of perceived threats has a powerful bearing on how 
states identify what merits defensive action. Often a state will cite self-defense as 
validating its decision to use force, even when the claim seems ill-fitting and third-party 
observers consider the claim as less than credible.624 Although the wording of the UN 
Charter has intensified scrutiny surrounding what might or might not constitute "self-
defense", the propensity to characterize forceful action as defensive was in play long 
before 1945. In his study of Wilsonian use of force, Calhoun notes that self-defense (or 
the "use of force for protection" in Calhoun's formulation) was cited so often by Wilson 
that one must attempt to determine when it was truly a primary motivating factor, and 
when it was a secondary or lesser factor being used to invoke an air of legitimacy.625  
 
                                                
622 For example, the ecclesiastical scholar Raymond of Pennaforte viewed self-defense as always 
justified, even in the absence of sanction by church or sovereign: "'it is always lawful to meet force with 
force'"; see Maurice Hugh Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages, Studies in Political History 
(London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1965) 67. 
623 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations." 
624 Franck, Recourse to Force  112. See also Detter, The Law of War  86. 
625 Calhoun, Uses of Force  12. 
PRINCE  247/315  
Response to Actual Armed Attack  
 
The drafters of the UN Charter intended that the primary method of ensuring protection 
from aggression would be through collective action as decided upon by the UNSC. Self-
defense was embedded in the Charter largely as a fallback measure in the event that 
members failed to take collective measures to defend a state under attack.626 Several 
reasons lie behind the need for this fallback. One is that the activation of a collective 
response lies with a political body. A United Nations collective security response to 
aggression requires UNSC recognition of a threat to the peace, and UNSC authorization 
of collective use of force.627 Another reason is that in the absence of a binding UNSC 
resolution there is no obligation on individual states to come to the aid of one under 
attack.628  
 
Yet another reason to include such a fail-safe is the lack of a permanent law 
enforcement entity in the international system. By the time of the San Francisco 
conference in 1945, it was apparent that the standing forces mentioned in Article 43, 
meant to serve at the discretion of the UNSC, would not be established in the 
foreseeable future.629 The lack of standing forces, combined with the political element 
of UNSC identification and response to threats, made some sort of self-defense 
necessary and desirable.630  
 
From the beginning, Article 51 contained a good deal of ambiguity in order to make it 
acceptable to states, with terms such as "'inherent right', 'self-defence' or 'armed attack'" 
                                                
626 Franck, Recourse to Force  45. 
627 Ibid.  46. 
628 Ibid. New Zealand led an effort during the drafting to make such aid mandatory regardless of UNSC 
action, but was not successful.  
629 Ibid.  48. 
630 Ibid. 
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not finding definition in the Charter.631 There are trade-offs, and some obvious 
consequences, arising from the ambiguity of Article 51, the failure to establish the 
standing forces called for in the Charter, and basing all collective security decisions 
with the UNSC. Yet, looked at in a positive light, making identification and response so 
dependent on the UNSC may be seen as "embed[ing] the centrality of politics" into UN 
collective security.632  
 
Self-defense as allowed under the Charter is restricted to making a response to an armed 
attack. Even so, questions exist as to the extent to which Article 51 "limits the right of 
self-defence".633 Article 51 would seem to grant a relatively narrow right to self-
defense, as it is allowed in response to an "armed attack". States may defend themselves 
in the absence of UNSC action; however, Article 51 limits the right to take defensive 
military action by permitting it only "until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security".634  
 
Questions arise as to whether an action can unequivocally be self-defense, if it is not 
taken in immediate and direct response to an attack.635 If an actual armed attack has not 
occurred, there is a question as to whether a state can legitimately claim to be 
responding to "something closely analogous to an armed attack such as foreign 
subversion, or a massive, foreign-induced flow of refugees", as a number have done.636  
                                                
631 Ibid.  51. China proposed a detailed definition of 'aggression' which included acts of support for sub-
state or insurgent groups, but it was not adopted.  
632 Ibid.  46. 
633 Detter, The Law of War  85. 
634 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations." 
635 For instance, the US attacked Iranian oil platforms after Iran struck a tanker registered in the US with a 
missile; in Detter's opinion, this action would really be classed as a reprisal (which may well be 
prohibited by the Charter, although perhaps not in an absolute sense) rather than self-defense, since it was 
carried out after the Iranian attack had ended. While it seems unreasonable to expect states to always 
exercise their right of self-defense within a set number of hours, the amount of time that has passed 
between the initial incident and the response would appear to be an issue; see Detter, The Law of War  
86. 
636 Franck, Recourse to Force  112. 
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Infrequently, rather than couching its justification in terms of self-defense, a state may 
cite "extreme necessity" in the face of inaction by others; this is what is known as "self-
help".637 In the few uses of force that have been explicitly asserted as self-help, the 
international community has seemed willing to consider each on a case-by-case basis, 
and has sometimes decided to refrain from taking action against the offending state.638 
All justifications for using force, including varieties of self-defense, "turn on the facts"; 
each will have to be judged, by other states and the UNSC, on the particular 
circumstances that surround and inform each case.639  
 
Overall, over the years, what constitutes allowable self-defense in terms of the Charter 
has been adapted and expanded.640 Franck views these changes as occurring "through 
institutional practice"; by how the UN system has viewed, interpreted, and responded to 
acts of force claimed to have been made in self-defense.641 Debate continues as to how 
exactly to define when the right of self-defense might legitimately be invoked.642 
Franck writes that the drafters of the Charter may have been somewhat short-sighted in 
their intent of limiting self-defense to situations involving armed attacks. This is due to 
advances in nuclear weapons and missile technology, as well as situations involving 
surrogate states, rogue states, state sponsors of terrorism, and sub-state terrorist groups 
– all of which increase the likelihood that a real threat might not involve a traditional 
armed attack by the forces of one state on the territory of another.643  
 
                                                
637 Ibid. 
638 Ibid. 
639 Detter, The Law of War  86. 
640 Franck, Recourse to Force  45. 
641 Ibid. 
642 Detter, The Law of War  85. 
643 Franck, Recourse to Force  50. Franck notes that the Spanish Civil War just before World War II had 
provided a surrogate situation for outside forces to take part in, and so the issue should have been fresh in 
the minds of the drafters.  
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Response to Imminent Attack (Preemption) 
 
There exists a degree of inconsistency in the literature with regard to terms dealing with 
military action taken in preemptive self-defense. The words "preemptive", 
"anticipatory", and "preventive" are sometimes used interchangeably, or to identify 
different types of forceful action. For the purposes of this work, "anticipatory" will 
apply to any forceful action taken by a state before an attack has been launched against 
it. "Preemptive" and "preventive" actions will both be considered as anticipatory. 
Preemptive self-defense can be defined as a state taking action on the basis of 
compelling evidence that an attack is about to be launched against it. Preventive action 
can be defined as a state resorting to force against another in the hope of averting or 
nullifying a future attack, but is not in response to a threat that is clearly imminent in the 
traditional understanding of the term, such as troops massing on a border.  
 
The traditional legal understanding of preemptive self-defense is based on US Secretary 
of State Daniel Webster's formulation, which was devised in the wake of the Caroline 
case of 1837. This involved a forceful exchange between the US and Britain in which a 
US ship was destroyed and two US citizens were killed at Niagara Falls. Webster 
subsequently wrote that in order for preemptive action to be justifiable as self-defense, 
it must be taken in response to a threat that is "'instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice 
of means, and no moment for deliberation'".644 Webster's formulation was used by 
prosecutors in the Nuremberg Tribunal after World War II. The UNGA voted to affirm 
                                                
644 B. Welling Hall, Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon: Addendum Relating 
to Self-Defense (September) (ASIL Insights, American Society of International Law, 2001 [cited 15 Feb 
2004]); available from http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm. The destruction of the Caroline 
occurred in 1837; Webster's formulation forms part of the correspondence between himself and the 
British negotiator Lord Ashburton in 1842. See the Avalon Project at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britian/br-1842d.htm.  
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the Tribunal's judgment, and is thus seen as legitimizing Webster's characterization.645 
However, it is important to point out that a consensus on the legality of preemption does 
not exist. A powerful legal argument has been made that since the UN Charter 
supercedes previous customary law, that the use of force in any anticipatory manner is 
prohibited by Article 51.646  
 
Even prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US, it was claimed that the use of 
preemptive action was becoming increasingly frequent.647 The notion of preemptive 
military action has always been fraught with questions of how to ascertain if a 
compelling threat really exists, and how to gauge whether a preemptive action is 
proportional to the perceived threat.648 Even if one accepts that a state may sometimes 
legitimately act preemptively in the case of a great and imminent threat, it is still 
extremely difficult to judge specific instances. One can see that determining the 
"imminence" of a threat, the degree of the threat, and the proper and proportionate 
response to it, can each be difficult to ascertain and gain objective agreement on.  
 
Preemptive action entails the use of force, and as such is proscribed by Article 2.4 of the 
Charter; this validates the presumption that such action is unlawful. The particular 
details of every situation must be weighed to ascertain the existence and degree of threat 
that might be present; however, what must also be considered is the character and past 
action of the state taking (or wishing to take) preemptive action.649 Even if some sort of 
limited right of self-defense on preemptive terms exists, it has been argued that a state 
                                                
645 Ibid.[cited date as above]. 
646 Albrecht Randelzhofer, "Article 51," in The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, ed. Bruno 
Simma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 803. 
647 Detter, The Law of War  87. For example, Israel has attacked positions outside its borders, and NATO 
threatened to attack Iraq over its WMD possession and capabilities. Detter perceived a need for greater 
scholarly attention to preemption – its effects on international stability and international law, as well as its 
legality – before 2001.  
648 Ibid.  86. 
649 Ibid.  86-87. 
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which has exhibited aggressive action in the past, or used the excuse of preemption in 
the past without general agreement of an actual imminent threat existing, has in effect 
forfeited its right due to irresponsible, illegal behavior.650  
 
Protection of Nationals Abroad 
 
In the past, states have attempted to characterize threats to their nationals abroad as 
threats to the state as well. Such attempts pre-date the UN Charter. For example in the 
early 1900s, by often citing the protection of US "interests, citizens, or ideals, Woodrow 
Wilson was grasping for the legitimacy implicit in the assertion".651 In fact, other 
reasons were also at play for US actions at that time, and were sometimes more 
important to the decision to intervene. Without discounting states' concern for the 
welfare of their citizens abroad, the plight of those individuals can be, and has been, a 
useful legitimating device for both national and international purposes. Some legal 
scholars view the protection of nationals abroad to be quite legitimate – that both 
citizens and land are facets of a state's existence, and that an attack on either would 
justify the invocation of self-defense.652 The opposing view is that since ordinary 
nationals abroad are not functioning as agents of their state, or in the territory of their 
state, that invoking self-defense on their behalf is not allowable.653 An absolute 
application of this line of thinking – that attacks on a state's citizens abroad may never 
constitute an attack on the state itself – appears unreasonable to some.654 However, this 
is countered by the argument that since attacks on citizens abroad can not possibly 
                                                
650 Ibid. As an example of this, Detter cites the fact that the UNSC disapproved of South Africa's 
incursions into Angola, although such action might have found more acceptance had South Africa been 
considered to be a reliable, law-abiding entity.  
651 Calhoun, Uses of Force  12. 
652 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defense, 3rd ed. (Cambridge [England]; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) 181. Dinstein cites Christopher Greenwood as a proponent of this 
particular line of thinking, and provides a useful overall summary of this legal disagreement.  
653 Randelzhofer, "Article 51," 798. 
654 Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defense  181.  
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threaten the very existence of a state, that resort to forceful self-defense is not called for 
or allowed.655 As with preemption, a consensus does not exist regarding the legality of 
using force for the protection of nationals abroad. The right of states to protect nationals 
abroad is thus disputed, principally due to the possibility of using such a right as a 
pretext for aggression.  
 
Responding to Terrorist Organizations and Sponsoring States 
 
A single, generally agreed upon definition of terrorism does not exist. Of course, 
terrorism is a "technique" rather than an agent or entity, and as such it may be 
impossible to fight it, or eradicate it.656 This means that attempts to minimize terror 
focus on the entities who utilize it as a method. The Pentagon's definition of terrorism is 
limited to non-state actors; this would include pro-democracy groups fighting an 
insurgency against a repressive regime, and exclude state violence and use of terror, 
such as the USSR under Stalin, Cambodia under Pol Pot, or Iraq under Saddam 
Hussein.657 It is important to note that often what determines whether an event will be 
counted as terrorism is the evaluation and judgment of other states according to their 
particular circumstances and interests. Of particular pertinence are the nature of the state 
being opposed, the latitude for political action open to opposition groups, and "the 
moral situation in which the violence occurs".658  
 
Basic agreement on what constitutes "aggression" has remained elusive during state-
level discussions concerning the crime of aggression and the respective roles of the 
                                                
655 Randelzhofer, "Article 51," 798. 
656 Record, Dark Victory  48. 
657 Ibid.  46. 
658 Ibid. Record attributes this phrase to Conor Gearty.  
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UNSC and the International Criminal Court.659 However, states are increasingly 
considered justified in responding to terrorist attacks with the use of force in self-
defense. Some states have argued in the past that such self-defense includes the right to 
strike at "territory from which the attackers originate".660 A legal consensus has now 
begun to emerge that terrorist attacks may be considered "armed attacks" as set out in 
Article 51.661 This may indicate an evolving understanding or interpretation of the law. 
In 1986, the ICJ ruled that providing logistical support to groups who carried out attacks 
on another state did not amount to an armed attack. However, the ICJ also held that an 
armed attack that triggers the right to self-defense would not have to take the form of 
regular military forces crossing a border.662 Thus, in determining the degree to which 
the support or harboring of groups may amount to an armed attack, it appears that the 
degree to which the groups operate on behalf of, or as organs of, the harboring state are 
an issue.663 More recently, in the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001, the UN 
Security Council recognized the right of the US and its allies to use force in self-
defense; the Council also asserted that "those responsible for aiding, supporting or 
harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts" were accountable for 
the attacks.664 The nascent consensus on the legitimacy of using force against states who 
harbor terrorists is still somewhat controversial, and the details of each case would 
appear to be important.665  
                                                
659 Anja Seibert-Fohr, "The Crime of Aggression: Adding a Definition to the Rome Statute of the ICC," 
ASIL Insight 12, no. 24 (2008). 
660 Franck, Recourse to Force  64. 
661 Ibid. 
662 International Court of Justice, "Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua V. United States of America) (Merits): Judgment of 27 June 1986 
(Summary),"  (1986). The ICJ ruled in part that "... an 'armed attack' ... is to be understood as meaning not 
merely action by regular armed forces across an international border, but also the sending by a State of 
armed bands on to the territory of another State, if such an operation, because of its scale and effects, 
would have been classified as an armed attack had it been carried out by regular armed forces".  
663 Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defense  183. 
664 UNSC, Resolution 1368 Adopted on 12 Sep [cited date as above].  See also UNSC, Resolution 1373 
Adopted on 28 Sep [cited date as above]. 
665 Franck, Recourse to Force  66. For example, in some cases the UNSC has explicitly ruled out a right 
to self-defense, such as in limiting Rwanda's response to insurgents operating out of the territory of 
another state.  
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Recent statements and actions taken by the US government have emphasized the actual 
and potential intersection of terrorist organizations and "rogue states" which display a 
general antipathy toward the US, and operate outside of the diplomatic fold.666 Terrorist 
organizations and rogue states often exhibit some common characteristics such as a 
hostility to the existing international order (including its legal strictures), the US as the 
preeminent power in that order, and Israel (if the organization and state share a regional 
or ideological focus).667 Further, the fact that terrorist organizations and rogue states 
share a similar international isolation sometimes leads to communication, cooperation, 
and contact between the two; but contact and cooperation should be viewed as very 
dependent on particular circumstances, rather than a formal or permanent alliance.668 
Thus, while there appears to be a current tendency to assume that most sub-state groups 
that utilize terrorist tactics have or will attract the support of a state sponsor, this is not 
necessarily the case.  
 
Preventive Self-Defense (Responding to a Threat that is not Imminent) 
 
It has been pointed out by Michael Walzer that the distinction between preemption and 
prevention is becoming increasingly difficult to determine due to the possibility of 
WMD being targeted at civilian population centers by sub-state groups.669 However, the 
distinction between the two is not yet only nominal. Preemptive action entails the 
response to an attack that is about to occur – "imminent" in the classical formulation 
                                                
666 United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009), "The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America," 13-15. See also United States, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 14 Feb 
2003 [cited 19 Aug 2005]); available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-
7.html. 
667 Record, Dark Victory  49. 
668 Ibid. 
669 Walzer, "No Strikes," 21. 
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made by Webster in the 1837 Caroline dispute. Preventive action is taken proactively in 
the belief that a future threat will be averted. Interestingly, when the negotiations 
surrounding the drafting of the UN Charter were taking place, it was US representatives 
who led efforts to include the provision "if an armed attack occurs" in Article 51; this 
was a deliberate attempt to prevent uses of force taken for reasons of anticipatory self-
defense.670  
 
This kind of preventive self-defense has been used by states in the past as a pretense for 
other actions, particularly as an excuse for aggressive action against others.671 It is 
possible that such aggressive action may appear to the initiating state as justified, or it 
may be a cruder form of realpolitik. In either case, there is ample reason to question the 
motives of a state which unilaterally determines a country to be "an instrument for a 
future attack", and so strikes it first in order "to prevent the possibility of such an attack 
taking place".672  
 
Although arguments for, and cases of, preventive self-defense are rare in post 1945 
international affairs, Israel's 1981 bombing of an Iraqi nuclear facility indicates the 
degree to which legal formulations of self defense enshrined in the Charter can be 
severely tested, and not merely contested.673 Whatever one makes of the political and 
legal consequences of the Israeli action, it is not difficult to comprehend that a state 
                                                
670 Franck, Recourse to Force  50. 
671 Detter, The Law of War  86. 
672 Adolf Hitler, The British War Bluebook No. 20: Speech by Herr Hitler at Wilhelmshaven on April 1, 
1939. (The Avalon Project  at Yale Law School, 1939 [cited 22 Sep 2005]); available from 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/bluebook/blbk20.htm. Hitler said in respect of Czechoslovakia, 
"We would, nevertheless, have had nothing against an independent Czech State if this State had not, 
firstly, oppressed Germans, and, secondly, if it had not been an instrument for a future attack on 
Germany. But when a former French Air Minister writes in a newspaper that it is the task of this Czechia, 
because of her splendid geographical position, to strike at Germany's industry by air attacks in a war, then 
one will understand that it is not without interest to us, and that we drew certain conclusions therefrom. It 
would have been a matter for England and France to defend this air base. It was our affair, at any rate, to 
prevent the possibility of such an attack taking place."  
673 See Bennett Ramberg, "Attacks on Nuclear Reactors: The Implications of Israel's Strike on Osiraq," 
Political Science Quarterly 97, no. 4 (1982). See also Anthony D'Amato, "Israel's Air Strike Upon the 
Iraqi Nuclear Reactor," American Journal of International Law 77, no. 3 (1983). 
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which perceives its very existence to be imperiled by developments in another state 
would respond proactively and deal with the legal and political consequences 
subsequently. Violations of the law that are circumstantially exceptional and anomalous 
in practice pose less of a threat to international legal order than repeated actions by one 
or more states. Israel's more recent bombing of Syria may yet come to have serious 
legal and political ramifications.674  
 
8.3  Self-Defense and Customary International Law 
 
Although there is no formal procedure for determining which customs count as 
customary international law, the importance of opinio juris is essential. In the case of 
nation-states, adherence to custom is not imposed by an external or superior power; 
however, states' adherence to custom may be formalized and imposed on its own 
citizens. Moreover, while not forced to comply with custom, custom can accrue a 
consistency and authority by dint of which states feel obligated to comply. This is 
opinio juris – the felt obligation on the part of states to comply with a practice perceived 
to be the rule of law. In combination with codified international law, it is this obligation 
– and the potential reactions from peers if it is abrogated – that informs and conditions 
international order.  
 
The international legal system has two sources: codified law, which is comprised of 
bilateral and multilateral treaties; and general international law, i.e. customary 
international law.675  There are two crucial components involved when a practice is 
                                                
674 See Seymour M. Hersh, "A Strike in the Dark: What Did Israel Bomb in Syria?," New Yorker  (2008). 
See also Ewen MacAskill, "US Claims North Korean Link to Israeli Bombing of Syria," Guardian, 24 
Apr 2008. 
675 Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United 
Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) 1-2.  
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considered to be customary international law:  the practice must be generally accepted 
and adhered to; and the practice must be perceived as a duty – that is, as legal 
obligation.676 The same criteria inform the rulings of the ICJ.677 As Higgins puts it, 
customary international law is "customary rules which are evidenced by the practice of 
states".678  
 
It is notable that in the years following the creation of the UN, newly independent non-
Western states perceived that what counted as "customary" in the West was at variance 
to what was "customary" to them: "The vast increase in treaty law after 1945 is not only 
due to the increased number of states, but as a trend also reflects the inherent lack of 
faith of new states, which preferred to subscribe to international law rules only if they 
had played a part in their formulation."679 The applicability of customary law is not 
conditional on the date which a state was admitted to the UN. This is true regardless of 
the date a state was admitted to the organization. Customary international law evolves 
continuously; and this usually occurs incrementally rather than in big shifts.680 It is 
difficult to ascertain "the point at which a repeated practice has hardened into a rule of 
                                                
676 Mark E. Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties: A Manual on the Theory and Practice of 
the Interrelation of Sources, Fully rev. 2nd ed., Developments in International Law; V. 28 (London: 
Kluwer Law International, 1997) 47. 
677 International Court of Justice, "Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua V. United States of America) (Merits): Judgment of 27 June 1986 
(Summary)." Other relevant ICJ judgments include the 1996 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, the 
1950 Asylum case (Villiger points out the ICJ ruled that adherence had to be as a result of felt duty, rather 
than other reasons such as "political expediency"), and the 1969 North Sea case.  
678 Higgins, The Development of International Law  1. For a consideration of the possibility that the UN 
General Assembly may possess a sort of international "limited legislative competence" in terms of the 
creation of international law – as well as the idea that legal obligation may exist in the absence of state 
consent – see Richard A. Falk, "On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly," 
American Journal of International Law 60, no. 4 (1966).  
679 Eibe Riedel, "Standards and Sources: Farewell to the Exclusivity of the Sources Triad in International 
Law?," European Journal of International Law 2, no. 2 (1991): 61. 
680 Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 5. 
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law".681 Thus customary international law is a normative structure in perpetual flux that 
informs or regulates state behavior.682  
 
The mere existence of opinio juris has been criticized as inadequate in explaining how 
customary law is first formed, then modified. The reason for this is that consensus on 
the obligatory character of any custom emerges over time. It is therefore the case that 
what comes to be accepted as customary international law most often begins as more 
limited exercises in mutual self-interest.  
 
In other words, customary law arises not solely from established practice, but from 
activity engaged in by some states, that comes to be reciprocated by other states. These 
other states may expect their peers to act reciprocally towards them as well, and over 
time the practice that was initially confined to only some states hardens into a rule of 
customary international law.683 In such a conception, the complex interplay between the 
majority of states also tempers the ability of powerful ones to impose their own norms.  
 
This idea is put succinctly by Michael Byers, who sees it as challenging traditional 
Realist assumptions:  
 
[R]ules of customary international law are the result of an interactive and 
evolving process whereby different States contribute, in differing ways and 
degrees, to the ongoing development, maintenance and change of generally 
applicable rules. However, as part of that interactive and evolving process, 
the frequently unequal contributions of States occur within, and are 
qualified by, a structured system of those States' own creation. Social 
inequality thus interacts with sovereign equality in what amounts to a social 
process of self-regulation.684 
 
                                                
681 Higgins, The Development of International Law  5-6. 
682 Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules  4. 
683 Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties  53. 
684 Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules  216. 
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Some legal scholars contend that customary law can be created in an instant under 
certain circumstances, for example as the result of unanimous UNGA resolutions. 
Anthony D'Amato argues that new customary law can come into being "instantly" when 
consensus has been reached between states on the form of the new rule.685 The 
emphasis in this argument is on the importance of state practice rather than UN 
resolutions.686 For example, when the conflict between two states finds resolution – 
through negotiation, war, or another process – that resolution is an act of consensus 
between them that is in essence the "birth" of a rule of customary law. While distinct, 
D'Amato's argument is closely related to arguments that customary international law 
may be created instantly by way of UNGA declarations.687  
 
From Rosalyn Higgins' viewpoint, the practice of states includes their voting records in 
the UN and their publicly stated views. State declarations regarding perceived 
customary international law are themselves evidence of custom, and may serve to 
further the development of that law. While UNGA resolutions do not of themselves 
amount to binding customary international law, "as a whole, taken as indications of a 
general customary law, [they] undoubtedly provide a rich source of evidence."688 A 
distinction must be drawn between custom and usage, for while the growth of a practice 
may be seen in terms of usage, that practice can not be considered customary unless it 
arises from a sense of legal obligation. The difficulty in separating usage from custom is 
apparent when attempting to pinpoint when a practice has become customary 
international law.689  
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687 Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States 1999 [cited 03 
Nov 2005]); available from http://www.law.duke.edu/fac/morris/morris.htm#_ftn1. 
688 Higgins, The Development of International Law  5. See also 2-4.  
689 Ibid.  2, 6. 
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Drafting processes undertaken as part of the work of the UN have helped to ascertain 
opinio juris through the record of statements or procedural voting. However, such 
drafting processes have also created uncertainty, due to the sheer number and variety of 
statements made by states in protracted negotiations.690 The ambiguities or rhetorical 
positions and instances of contestation over fundamentals further cloud the issue. And 
while weak states may resist novel practices undertaken by powerful states by refusing 
to acknowledge their validity, the practice of powerful states may have such inertia that 
weaker states will likely follow their lead.  
 
Written rules, the increase in the number of forums where they are negotiated – at 
international conferences as well as in the UN – and the increased access to information 
around the world, may all contribute to an acceleration in the creation of customary 
law.691 Relatedly, the pace of change in international society apparent in the years since 
the formation of the UN may have shortened the time necessary for new custom to 
develop.692 The UNGA, as the most representative UN body, provides a valuable forum 
for identifying and expressing consensus among nations about perceived and enunciated 
customary obligations. The ICJ, as the UN body whose primary focus is international 
law, provides other means. Through its judgments, it is able to cite and reinforce what it 
determines to be customary practice. Concurrently, its judgments have bolstered past 
practice, or have contributed to changes in custom through its acknowledgment of 
changed state practice.  
 
Because international law generally lacks enforcement mechanisms, the principle of 
reciprocity is a key reason why both codified and customary international law are 
adhered to. Just as individual states expect others to follow commonly agreed rules, 
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they also reasonably expect that their breaking of rules will result in reciprocal 
responses, which may well not be in their interest.693 The principle of reciprocity also 
holds true for international organizations as well as states; Higgins offers the UN as an 
example: were the UN to ignore customary international law, its ability to interact with 
states and offer credible mediation would be lessened.694  
 
Although most states obey most international laws most of the time, they do violate 
international law when the stakes are high, when the cost-benefit analysis is favorable, 
or when they feel themselves or their fundamental interests threatened. Few violations 
of international law, however egregious, are committed with the intention of offering a 
fundamental challenge to the rule of law more generally. The US and the UK went to 
strenuous lengths to forward a legal justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and have 
subsequently maintained its legality, even in the face of international opprobrium.  
 
Violations of international law which contest one or more of its principles and expose 
tensions between its purposes are particularly interesting. The humanitarian intervention 
debate is one of these. It is particularly compelling in that it contests the legal 
prohibition on the non-sanctioned use of force, as enshrined in the UN Charter.  
 
8.4  The Humanitarian Intervention Debate  
 
J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane have defined "humanitarian intervention" as "the 
threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at 
preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights 
of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within 
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whose territory force is applied".695 Unsanctioned humanitarian intervention comes into 
direct conflict with the prohibition on the use of force contained in the UN Charter. 
Some have argued that a customary legal right to undertake humanitarian interventions 
exists. This takes two forms. The first is that unsanctioned humanitarian intervention is 
a form of self-help that pre-dates the Charter and is still recognized as an "inherent right 
of self defense". The second is that a new norm has emerged since 1945 that has 
modified Charter law.696 However, it is important to note that the International Court of 
Justice has generally emphasized the principle of non-intervention when considering the 
unsanctioned use of force by states.697 Notably, the UNGA has likewise favored the 
principle of non-intervention in its declarations, which are an important source for 
determining customary international law.698 As typically portrayed, the humanitarian 
intervention debate posits a moral imperative against legal prohibition, here 
characterized by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan:  
 
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is 
the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might 
say: leave Kosovo aside for a moment, and think about Rwanda. Imagine 
for one moment that, in those dark days and hours leading up to the 
genocide, there had been a coalition of states ready and willing to act in 
defence of the Tutsi population, but the council had refused or delayed 
giving the green light. Should such a coalition then have stood idly by while 
the horror unfolded?699  
 
However, Annan was also quick to point out the risks entailed in the contravention of 
the cornerstone of post-1945 international order: Article 2.4 of the UN Charter:  
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To those for whom the Kosovo action heralded a new era when states and 
groups of states can take military action outside the established mechanisms 
for enforcing international law, one might equally ask: Is there not a danger 
of such interventions undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, security 
system created after the second world war, and of setting dangerous 
precedents for future interventions without a clear criterion to decide who 
might invoke these precedents and in what circumstances? Nothing in the 
UN charter precludes a recognition that there are rights beyond borders. 
What the charter does say is that "armed force shall not be used, save in the 
common interest." But what is that common interest? Who shall define it? 
Who shall defend it? Under whose authority? And with what means of 
intervention? In seeking answers to these monumental questions, I see four 
aspects of intervention which need to be considered with special care.700  
 
What Annan's description evinces, is that advocates and opponents alike recognize that 
it is a matter of serious legal and political contestation, and not merely either a 
disposition dismissive of the law or one entailing rigid or unthinking adherence to it. 
Much the same can be said about the contestation over preemptive self-defense: NSS 
2002 is by no means dismissive of the UN Charter or international law more generally; 
the issue engages the legal foundations of international order; and there is little denying 
that the stakes for international security posed by a combination of terrorism and WMD 
could scarcely be higher.  
 
8.5  Legal Challenges as Developmental  
 
Both an asserted right of states to undertake humanitarian intervention, and the asserted 
right of the US to engage in preemptive self-defense, offer an apparent challenge to the 
fundamental of law based international order, Article 2.4 of the UN Charter. In fairness, 
both positions evince disposition rather than defiance, in other words signaling an 
intention that under certain circumstances the states in question will not conform to the 
legal strictures of Article 2.4. The assertion of a right to preemptive self-defense by the 
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US has the stronger character in that it is publicly proclaimed policy, where as the 
largest part of the humanitarian intervention debate is conducted along abstract lines, 
looking back to actual cases and forward to hypothetical ones. But neither theme can be 
relegated to discreet instances of lawbreaking, past or possible. The nature and extent of 
the debates they have inspired is greatly reinforced by existential developments of 
strategic and/or moral importance of the highest order.  Such developments modulate 
the character of the challenge. In other words, they are not a challenge to the rule of law 
but to the compass and effectiveness of a specific law or laws.  
 
In this regard, it is noteworthy that NSS 2002 is careful to recognize the danger of a 
wholesale retreat from routine adherence to Article 2.4: "[t]he United States will not use 
force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a 
pretext for aggression."701 Of course, the preemption aspects of NSS 2002 are not 
normative in intent, but essentially self-interested. Nevertheless, state actions taken for 
proclaimed security reasons have normative consequences, as do all state actions – 
particularly when they are at variance with codified international law. There is no more 
compelling illustration of this than the Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).702  
 
The Responsibility to Protect emphasizes historical instances of humanitarian 
intervention as a developmental pattern, it reconceptualizes a legal concept 
(sovereignty), and presents a call to action linking moral imperative to political 
obligation. Although it does not directly assert a right of states to undertake 
humanitarian intervention, it addresses the legal obstacle of unsanctioned humanitarian 
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intervention by declaring that the legal quality of sovereignty is conditional rather than 
absolute. The ICISS attempts to create a normative climate in which not only will 
credible instances of humanitarian intervention be seen as acceptable, but also an altered 
understanding of the purpose of Article 2.4 which makes it more consistent with the 
human rights purposes of the Charter without undermining its order creating quality.  
 
The ICISS report was itself a consolidation of legal, political, and academic debate both 
practical and theoretical. For example, the Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo characterized the 1999 intervention in that country as "illegal but legitimate".703 
Although unambiguous cases of humanitarian intervention and of preemptive self-
defense have both been rare, the former have been distinguished by the fact that a 
widely shared moral expectation and not merely the self interested impulses of states 
are at least on occasion at variance with prohibitive law – hence an illegal act of 
considerable magnitude characterized as legitimate. The aftershock of our failure to 
protect Rwandans in 1994 is arguably in excess of any lego-political shock that might 
have followed any illegal humanitarian intervention in that instance. To date, by 
contrast, instances of preemptive self-defense have been lego-political shocks that the 
international community has absorbed, with little normative appeal and scarce 
international support.  
 
If hitherto any legal argument for preemptive self-defense had to be circumstantial, 
there is now a plausible case that the potential for a terrorist WMD attack requires 
preemptive self-defense as a ready disposition rather than as a matter of protracted 
deliberation. After all, there is nothing in the UN Charter that requires states to subject 
themselves to reckless self-endangerment. Nevertheless, the enactment and enforcement 
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of international law takes place in a political arena. So, it is unlikely that the US 
assertion of its own right to preemptive self defense will forever remain freestanding 
from the perceptions and dispositions of other states, particularly when the threats 
which stand as its justification are global in nature and extent. If a terrorist WMD 
outrage is indeed plausible, the broader implications of a right to preemptive self-
defense are not diminished as a consequence. It is to these broader implications that we 
now turn.  
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9.0  Conclusions and Research Implications      
 
Having examined the possible consequences of NSS 2002, it is now necessary to return 
to the research question: is the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States 
exceptional in its formulation and implications? The question of exceptionality 
(exceptional to whom? exceptional with regard to what?) had to be broken down. The 
question of exceptionality, then, was broadly divided into two sections. The first section 
dealt with internal exceptionality, in terms of planning and disposition, in the US. The 
second section dealt with external exceptionality in terms of possible consequences: to 
the area of the threat of force in international affairs; to the changing security 
environment; and to the integrity of a law-based international order.  
 
This division aided in demarcating how NSS 2002 might be exceptional in US-specific 
policymaking terms, from how it might be exceptional in broader terms outside the US. 
In structuring the dissertation this way, the "internal" and "external" sections also aide 
in laying out the grounds that explain why the research question is worthy of 
investigation. For example, although there is a prima facie case that NSS 2002 offers a 
fundamental challenge to the rule of law, Chapters One through Five establish the 
rationale for looking into this. This section effectively provides a rationale for 
determining what NSS 2002 should be measured against when assessing its 
exceptionality. It is useful to briefly review this section here.  
 
Chapter One discussed what national security means in general, and focused on the US 
in particular – including the approach the US has taken to national security since the 
end of World War II. The particular US national security objectives that were brought 
about by changes to the international system were considered; then the particular 
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national security objectives that were occasioned by changes within the international 
system were touched upon. Chapter Two explored the national security structures and 
processes that the US has intentionally developed or that have grown up around US 
needs, including planning and policymaking processes and appropriations processes. 
Chapter Three considered NSS reports. The post-1945 tradition of national security 
pronouncements made by US Presidents, the modern NSS reports that Presidents are 
mandated to produce, and the place of the NSS as a tool for forming and announcing 
policy (and its place as a product of compromise and negotiation) were then explored. 
In Chapter Four, the various facets of the NSS issued by the administration in 
September 2002 were presented. Chapter Five reviewed the reactions to the release of 
NSS 2002, with particular focus on those reactions enunciated before the US invasion 
of Iraq, after which discussion of preemptive self-defense took on a less document-
specific character.   
 
NSS 2002 identified threats which were perceived as revolutionary, and offered a 
response to meet them. Possible consequences of this proposed US response were 
considered in three key areas in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight:  in terms of the threat of 
force in international affairs, the changed security environment, and international law. 
Chapter Six reviewed the use and threat of force in international affairs. Chapter Seven 
investigated the international security environment in order to assess whether a stated 
preference for preemptive force enhances US security in dealing with the threatening 
features of that environment. Chapter Eight explored the prima facie case that NSS 
2002 offers a direct challenge to international law, in light of the fact that legal 
challenges can themselves be developmental.  
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Overall it is now apparent that the ways in which the preemptive self defense provisions 
of NSS 2002 are exceptional are really less stark – less immediately destabilizing, and 
more dispositional than tactical – than many of its critics suppose. Expressed succinctly, 
the elements of continuity both within the US government and in terms of US foreign 
policy are at least as important as the elements of change. A caveat must be added. 
Critics are right to point out that the asserted right of preemption does offer a challenge 
to a keystone of law-based international order; and it is by no means certain that the few 
brief years since the publication of NSS 2002 are sufficient for a definitive judgment to 
be made of its effect on international affairs. In addition, some combination of events 
and crises together with the disposition evinced in NSS 2002 could yet manifest the 
worst fears of its critics. Therefore, although the research has shown that much more 
continuity exists than one might suppose – and the challenge posed by the claim to 
preemptive self defense is less novel than one might suppose – indications remain that 
serious dangers and concerns attend NSS 2002.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Having examined the research question by way of the structure described above, five 
principal findings stand out. In large part, the first three of these pertain to policy 
formulation internal to the US. The final two focus on broader implications for 
international security and international law.  
 
1) Even though NSSs have more than rhetorical weight, they do not drive 
decisionmaking, procurement, or the nature of response to crises. Research and 
respondents indicate that although NSS documents sometimes attract a lot of 
international notice, it amounts to less than one might expect. Rather, NSS documents 
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are more broadly indicative of an administration's security posture – they are a tour 
d'horizon.   
 
One way of ascertaining a government's actual commitment to its announced policies is 
whether significant resources have been devoted to implement those policies. If a 
government's actual approved budget matches its rhetoric as regards a certain program, 
it is rightly seen as indicative of concrete support for that program. Yet, it would be a 
mistake to base one's evaluation of government policies, its commitment to certain 
policy stances, and its disposition solely on whether or not corresponding line items 
may be found in that year's budget.  
 
One reason for this, in terms of the US budget, is the enormous size of government 
expenditures and the duration of those ongoing programs that make up those costs. One 
prominent budget analyst pointed out that even when the US government supports a 
particular policy through the adoption or expansion of identifiable budget items, it 
sometimes amounts to little more than symbolic support. For example, a US 
administration which advocates the strengthening of its capability to meet certain types 
of threats might include in its budget recommendation an increase in funding for the 
rapid reaction elements of its military. However, even a large boost for discrete 
programs – in terms of the percentage increase over the previous year's budget – often 
amounts to "a tiny fraction of the US budget or even the national security budget".704 
Thus rhetorical support for certain policies can be as good of a sign of government 
commitment as is the inclusion of particular items in the national budget.  
 
                                                
704 Steve Kosiak, Interview, 08 Nov 2006.  
PRINCE  272/315  
Just as importantly, broad strategy documents are not so detailed as to allow individuals 
to draw specific budgetary guidance from them. The same ambiguity that makes the 
extrapolation of particular budget items difficult may at times be a boon to 
policymakers. As with ambiguity when making threats concerning the use of force (as 
discussed in Chapter Six), ambiguity affords government leaders with room to 
maneuver. In the US, each budgetary request made by the executive – be that through 
the annual process or in a more emergency ad hoc way – must be formulated in light of 
the current security, financial, and domestic social issues weighing on the nation's 
leadership at that time.  
 
Just as policymakers are rightly loath to commit to particular diplomatic or military 
responses to threats that may present themselves in the future, they also are disinclined 
to commit to the particular form that future budget requests will take. This is not to say 
that policymakers will not present those future budget requests as congruent with any 
previously articulated strategies – they often do. Rather, they would understandably 
prefer to match particular responses to an announced general strategy, than to confine 
themselves to any predetermined response when forced in the moment to react to a 
range of unforeseen events or dangers.  
 
Indeed the same function can be seen when considering what type of guidance can be 
gleaned from a National Security Strategy document when tailoring responses to 
particular crises that have developed after that Strategy was formulated. While the 
ability of politicians to devise specific strategies that address specific security problems 
is usually lauded by the public, it is important to point out that the ambiguity exhibited 
in broad strategy documents is both necessary and practical.  
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2) Within the brief historical span of NSS production, 2002 shows greater commonality 
with previous NSS reports and US strategy than the emphasis on preemption might 
suggest. The assertion of a preemptive right in NSS 2002 overshadows the other 
thematic parts of the Strategy, which actually account for the bulk of the document. But 
the assertion of preemptive force also shows great similarity with previous US 
administrations and reports.  
 
As was shown in the exploration of NSS documents in Chapter Three, past changes that 
have occurred in US national strategy have tended to manifest themselves over a period 
of time, as with the successive refinements of containment fashioned during the Cold 
War. The so called Carter Doctrine, although not explicitly mentioning preemption, is 
certainly suggestive of it – it was meant to deter, and stood at least as a retaliatory 
threat. In the January 1980 State of the Union Address, President Carter noted that the 
1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan presented serious concerns to the international 
community at large and the US in particular. The Soviet invasion posed humanitarian 
concerns, using an immense military capacity against a much weaker nation. Indeed it 
was nothing less than "colonial conquest", at once a continuation of Soviet tyranny and 
a return to the discredited project of colonialism. The invasion was also seen as a threat 
to stability and order, as destabilizing the international environment.  
 
In addition to these significant concerns, the US perceived its own particular national 
security interests to be directly threatened by the Soviet move. The Soviet Union's 
movement of military forces into Afghanistan put them dangerously close to the Persian 
Gulf, and thus to a majority of the world's exportable oil. This fact seemed to count 
more than all others where the possible use of force by the US was concerned.  
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As President Carter pointed out,  
 
The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of 
great strategic importance: it contains more than two-thirds of the world's 
exportable oil... The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a 
strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement 
of Middle East oil... Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any 
outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as 
an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an 
assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.705  
 
The other sections of NSS 2002 cover a variety of topics seen as affecting US security 
and offering opportunities for the US to constructively wield its influence, as was noted 
in the review of the Strategy in Chapter Four above. NSS 2002 is comprised of eight 
sections, leaving aside the Introduction and the document's accompanying transmittal 
letter. Of these eight sections, three deal explicitly with the US intention to work 
multilaterally, and the desirability of doing so. The use of multilateralism is viewed as 
advisable in order to increase US security in specific areas. These include the struggle 
to eliminate global terrorism and prevent future terrorist attacks from being carried out 
against the US and its allies; the attempt to reduce conflict around the world and 
increase regional stability; and engaging constructively with other great powers in order 
to develop "agendas for cooperative action". Other sections are less explicitly focused 
on multilateral initiatives but nonetheless pertain to subject areas long supported by the 
US. These areas include support for aspirational human rights, the promotion of global 
economic growth in line with US-style free market capitalism, the expansion of 
democracy alongside development around the world, and (with a more distinctly 
internal focus) the transformation of US national security apparatuses.706  
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PRINCE  275/315  
Even the section most expressly dealing with preemption, however, is not entirely at 
odds with previous NSS documents. For example, one must consider successive NSS 
documents issued by President Clinton. Both the NSS of 1999 and the NSS of 2000 
assert that "[a]s long as terrorists continue to target American citizens, we reserve the 
right to act in self-defense by striking at their bases and those who sponsor, assist or 
actively support them."707 Further, while NSS reports published during the Clinton 
administration do not contain the word "preemption", neither is their disposition in stark 
contrast NSS 2002 — at least in terms of the use of force when the US perceives its 
vital interests to be threatened. Such vital interests are  
 
…those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality 
of our nation. Among these are the physical security of our territory and that 
of our allies, the safety of our citizens, our economic well-being and the 
protection of our critical infrastructures.  We will do what we must to 
defend these interests, including—when necessary—using our military 
might unilaterally and decisively.708  
 
3) Individuals and personalities are more important to making the NSS formulation 
process and final form what it is, than is the process itself. As pointed out in Chapter 
Three, a published NSS document should be seen as a product influenced by 
international circumstances, the internal disposition of the administration, and the 
intended audiences and purposes of the policy. It is often true that "[a] Presidential 
strategy report can never be more than it really is, a statement of preference from the 
executive branch as to current, and perhaps future, grand strategy."709 Just as any 
process for producing NSS documents is contingent on the particular individuals 
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involved – perhaps because of that fact – the ability to assess such Strategy documents 
by drawing direct comparisons between them is limited.  
 
The significance and impact of such documents can vary greatly, in both perceptual and 
in real terms. Individuals decide what drafting process to employ or eschew, which 
institutional or personal viewpoints to include or exclude. Our understanding of any 
NSS document is highly conditioned by the nature of the issuing administration, the 
assertiveness of the personalities associated with a Strategy's formulation, and the 
relative strengths of the individual agencies involved in the process (or disallowed from 
participating). There is not a regularized way of judging NSSs because there is not a 
static process by which they are produced across administrations.  
 
In the case of NSS 2002, Philip Zelikow was the single person responsible for 
producing the working draft of the document. Yet this initial draft subsequently 
received a degree of interagency input:  
 
The White House did seek input from other cabinet departments. This 
occurred in four ways. First we had the material that had already been 
assembled by State with some interagency input. Second, I reached out to 
the various offices within the NSC staff, since they were responsible for 
monitoring interagency views within their areas of responsibility. Third, I 
reached out personally to a few people at other agencies whom I felt could 
help… Fourth, Rice circulated the draft (I think after the President had taken 
a first look at it) directly to relevant cabinet principals to invite their 
comments.  Several edits and contributions from the various secretaries 
were incorporated in the final text.710  
 
It is difficult to tease out personal and/or departmental interests from the finished 
document. However, the drafting process is not designed to screen them out, although 
of course it ensures that contributions do not overtly contradict each other or the overall 
message of the president.  
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However, the fact that individuals play such a central role in the formulation of strategy 
documents would suggest that institutional adherence to the NSS "message" may be less 
rigid than is supposed by readers of the finished product – especially when the broad 
strategy is applied to particular circumstances. Further, the production of an NSS is a 
good deal less directive than the title of the document – National Security Strategy – 
signals to many, especially those outside of policy-making circles. As one experienced 
respondent noted, he did not strive to become heavily involved in the drafting of NSS 
2002 because he believed "… that documents like that [NSSs], at the end of the day, are 
useful public projections, but that they don't drive policy".711  
 
4) Alarm over the US declaration of a preemptive right needs to be tempered by a 
recognition that the document itself evinces an awareness that the asserted right could 
have unwelcome consequences if adopted, or adapted, by other states. In addition, NSS 
2002 makes plain that preemption is not a substitute for established forms of gaining 
and maintaining US security – and not only because the combination of terrorist groups 
and WMD comprise only one kind of threat the US faces. So the preemptive element of 
2002 does not lock the US into an irrevocable course of action, or force a preemptive 
response to a perceived threat of a certain size or character.  
 
After publication, the subsequent invasion of Iraq would first appear to validate the 
most alarmed reactions to NSS 2002. Although the administration of George W. Bush 
never explicitly invoked the preemption provisions NSS of 2002 to justify the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, there is a prima facie case for linking the WMD-terrorist nexus in NSS 
2002 with the strenuous efforts made by the administration to link Iraq with al Qaeda, 
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and its accusations that Iraq was engaged in manufacturing weapons of mass 
destruction.  
 
Evidence supplied by interviewees, and more recent publications by former members of 
the Bush administration and military historians, point to lines of thinking and strategic 
planning concerning Iraq that existed separately from and predated the production of 
NSS 2002. For example, in November 2001 – ten months before the publication of NSS 
2002 – Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld directed US Central Command to review and 
update the military contingency plan for a war with Iraq.712 Rumsfeld in turn was acting 
at the behest of President Bush, who that same day had requested that war plans for Iraq 
be reassessed and updated as quietly as possible. 713 This review was begun 
immediately despite the stress it put on US Central Command, which was then 
prosecuting the war in Afghanistan that President Bush had ordered the month 
before.714 Even at this early date President Bush viewed war with Iraq as a distinct 
possibility. Yet, while the updating of Iraq war plans appears to have begun just before 
NSS 2002 was starting to be drafted in winter 2001-2002, the two processes were 
completely separate; "Iraq issues played no part whatever" in the drafting of NSS 
2002.715   
 
In his memoir, former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet writes that he is 
unsure when war with Iraq became inevitable. However, members of the Bush 
administration expressed particular interest in the possibility of military action against 
                                                
712 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation 
of Iraq, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006) 24. 
713 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004) 1-2.  
714 Ibid.  8. 
715 Zelikow. 
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Iraq even before 11 September 2001.716 After 11 September, Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Paul Wolfowitz and individuals in the Office of the Vice President were 
extremely interested in any information that might be used to link the Iraqi government 
with members of al Qaeda. In his opinion, Tenet believes the primary reason for the US 
invasion of Iraq was to install a democratically elected Iraqi government that would act 
as a catalyst for democratic change in the Middle East, rather than to preempt an Iraqi 
WMD threat.717  
 
The kind of strategic thinking that imbued the Bush White House informed both NSS 
2002 (prefigured in the West Point speech) and the invasion of Iraq, as one might 
expect. However, it does not follow that NSS 2002 has the authoritative standing to 
have driven a strategic initiative of such moment. As interviewees made plain, NSSs are 
not directive (notwithstanding their importance to strategic military planning purposes, 
such as production of the National Military Strategy). They signal disposition rather 
than determined courses of action. They signal long-term strategy rather than specific 
direction for foreign policy actions. In other words, one must guard against "post hoc, 
ergo propter hoc".  
 
5) The consideration of the changed security environment in Chapter Seven – taken 
together with the evaluation of international law in Chapter Eight – raises an important 
point, at least indirectly. That is, that Article 2.4 and Article 51 are probably inadequate 
in terms of the 21st century security environments. Some have argued that the Geneva 
Convention safeguards must be updated and strengthened for increased effectiveness 
                                                
716 Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul 
O'neill (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004) 70-75. Indeed, former Secretary of the Treasury Paul 
O'Neill was surprised to find the first full NSC meeting of the George W. Bush administration on 30 
January 2001 almost entirely devoted to Iraq. O'Neill remembers thinking to himself after the meeting, 
that Iraq "…was now the administration's focus, that much was already clear." See 75.  
717 George Tenet and Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA, 1st ed. (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2007) 321. 
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protections in the 21st century; the same is true of UN Charter law as concerns the use of 
force.718  
 
The difficulty is that neither Article 2.4 nor Article 51 exists to be facilitative. They are 
prohibitive; they exist to maintain order in an anarchic state system. The essential 
prohibition on wars of adventure is no less important today than it was in 1945. But, as 
indicated in Chapter Seven, the confluence of WMD and terrorism presents states with a 
unique security challenge that has come to the fore only relatively recently. The 
willingness of non-state actors to inflict mass civilian casualties, and diminishing 
impediments to the production of WMD – especially biological agents – makes the 
possibility of such an attack at least as worrying as acts of aggression between states.  
 
As suggested in Chapter Eight, when a state perceives its survival – or a core 
component of its security – as threatened, it may well act proactively. Legal and 
diplomatic consequences of action will be dealt with after the fact. When faced with 
evidence that a terrorist attack utilizing WMD is being planned, putting at risk the lives 
of a large number of citizens, it may be quite difficult for a state to adhere to a 
prohibitive reading of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. While one can 
not predict future developments, the increasing potential of groups to mount mass 
casualty attacks argues against a decreasing likelihood of such attacks taking place. 
This kind of threat appears, then, to remain present for some time – and to imperil other 
states in addition to the US.  
 
One of the problems involved when focusing so powerfully on US capability and 
intentions is that it distracts attention from a developing security issue that besets more 
                                                
718 Jack L. Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment inside the Bush Administration (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2007) 121. 
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than the US, and for which a rational response to a real threat will almost certainly be 
illegal. The prohibition of aggression in the UN Charter exists to protect individual 
states as well as the stability of the system as a whole. A plausible case can now be 
made that the potential for terrorist WMD attacks might well require preemptive self-
defense to be available as an option. As argued above, there is nothing in the UN 
Charter that requires states to subject themselves to reckless self-endangerment. So 
there is a conundrum: how do we maintain an international legal order that protects 
sovereignty but does not prevent preemptive action against very considerable threats, 
such as the use of WMD by terrorist groups?  
 
Research  Implications 
 
In addition to these five principal findings, two salient research implications stand out: 
the first lego-political in character, the second normative.  
 
1) One of the most unfortunate aspects of the US invasion of Iraq is it diminishes 
attention from the reality that the WMD-terrorist nexus is a very real possibility. The 
weighty difficulties that were created by sending military forces into Iraq have 
distracted from the problem posed by potential terrorist attacks utilizing WMD. 
However, those difficulties have certainly not made this problem disappear. The WMD-
terrorist nexus will remain a compelling challenge, even if some strategic thinkers 
remain focused on threats posed by states controlled by autocratic regimes, perhaps 
even a slew of new "rogue" states.719  
                                                
719 Neoconservative Robert Kagan has recently argued that democratic expansion will be extremely 
difficult if not impossible as resilient autocratic regimes across the world seem poised to assert 
themselves anew in the 21st century. Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, 1st ed. 
(New York: Knopf, 2008). While democracy seemed to enjoy an inexorable rise in the years following 
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As pointed out in Chapter Seven, a crucial point to remember is that frighteningly lethal 
agents need not be weaponized to the degree that an industrialized nation might in a 
military WMD production facility. This fact poses the risk or even likelihood that a 
WMD attack will emanate from a sub-state group or individual rather than a state. 
When one considers this together with dissemination of knowledge unprecedented in 
human history, even a single field of knowledge such as synthetic biology provides the 
practical basis for horrifying weapons. The relatively straightforward modification of 
mousepox in order to infect humans with a virus whose lethality approaches 100%, as 
described in Chapter Seven, is but one example.  
 
One of the unfortunate and less noted negative outcomes of the invasion of Iraq, is that 
it consolidates alarm about the declared policy of preemption in a way – and to a degree 
– that masks the rationale that drove it in the first place. The fact that there was no Iraq-
al Qaeda connection, and the fact that there were no WMD in Iraq, conveys an 
understanding that NSS 2002 drove a more generalized preemptive disposition on the 
part of the US (the qualification in the document notwithstanding). The most vociferous 
critics of NSS 2002 will be vindicated by the invasion of Iraq, not least because the al 
Qaeda connection and WMD were not there. But the WMD-terrorist connection 
remains just as plausible or even likely, and so the peril has not been dispelled.  
 
The likelihood that this peril will remain a perennial problem results in significant legal 
implications. These implications are distinct from but not unlike those identified in the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) final report, 
                                                                                                                                          
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, even Kagan does not see the recent US rhetoric and military policy 
designed to further democratic expansion around the world as successful. 
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The Responsibility to Protect (R2P).720 The ICISS effort represents the intellectual 
community's attempt to engage with the serious conundrum posed by humanitarian 
intervention. R2P identified "large-scale loss of life" and "ethnic cleansing, underway or 
anticipated" as prime examples of the points at which sovereignty should yield to 
international responsibility.  
 
While sovereignty is viewed as crucial to protection of human rights (as the state is the 
only institution who can sustain protection on an ongoing basis), it is also viewed as 
bounded rather than absolute. Recognizing that the UN Charter's enshrinement of 
sovereignty often came into conflict with other humanitarian concerns and legal 
obligations, R2P advocated a consensual revision of the understanding of sovereignty. 
That is, R2P proposed the basis upon which the international community should 
conceptualize the next evolutionary step of international law toward a more limited 
understanding of sovereignty.  
 
NSS 2002 itself had an impact on this discussion about the use of force in the future, 
leading some to believe re-strengthening of sovereignty to be more important than a 
bolstering of a R2P right to intervene.721 Leaving aside this direct linkage between NSS 
2002 and R2P, one can discern similarities in the issues they each engage with. Both 
attempt to bridge the divide between prohibitive law (protection of sovereignty in the 
case of R2P, prohibition on the use of force in NSS 2002) with other pressing moral and 
legal obligations (the alleviation of mass human suffering in the case of R2P, the 
prevention of mass human casualties in the case of NSS 2002). Therefore, the 
underlying question implicit in NSS 2002 is, if not preemption then what? What 
                                                
720 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: 
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.  
721 Thomas G. Weiss, "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a 
Unipolar Era," Security Dialogue 35, no. 2 (2004): 143. 
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response is most appropriate to a threat such as that posed by the WMD-terrorist nexus? 
And if preemption threatens the legal order, then how should a responsible actor 
behave?  
 
Thus, there is serious legal research to be done on how the international legal limits to 
self-defense can at the same time retain their coherence and yet accommodate responses 
to threats that were not foreseen when they were drafted. As touched upon in Chapter 
Eight, this should include how "imminence" is to be defined as it touches upon Article 
2.4 and Article 51. This work, which should extend to international norms as well as 
codified international law, might usefully be linked to the humanitarian intervention 
debate and recent attempts to forward the matter through the R2P. The R2P model 
should likely not be adapted directly to address WMD and terrorists, but may prove 
useful as it also touches on the heart of international law, Article 2.4.  
 
2) The policy of preemption featured in NSS 2002 can very easily generate a 
"normative wave" that will be highly undesirable and difficult to control. Such a 
development, in the absence of agreed legal understanding, would only reinforce the 
need for additional lego-political research of the sort described above. Instances of 
preemption both prior to, and subsequent to, the publication of NSS 2002 argue that the 
document may have contributed to, consolidated and catalyzed such a normative 
movement. This is indicated by large scale acts of preemption such as the 1981 Israeli 
bombing of the Osirik nuclear facility, and the more recent Israeli bombing of an 
alleged nuclear facility in Syria.722 Small scale acts of preemption, such as cross-border 
                                                
722 Mark Mazzetti and Helene Cooper, "An Israeli Strike on Syria Kindles Debate in the U.S.," New York 
Times, 10 Oct 2007. 
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US incursions and use of armed predator drones into Yemen, Pakistan and Syria add to 
the evidence.723  
 
The expressed hope in NSS 2002, that US use of preemption will not be used as a 
pretext for aggression, implicitly recognizes that other states might employ preemption 
in extreme circumstances or employ it as a policy disposition. Whether an apparent 
increase in cross-border preemption signals a more general adoption of preemption by 
US security forces or the US government needs to be researched further, as does 
whether such an increase is likely to remain confined to the US. In other words, 
interesting questions exist regarding the extension of the preemption strategy laid out in 
NSS 2002. There is interesting work to be done about the level at which such incursions 
have been authorized. At what level has approval for cross border action been given? Is 
it at the field commander level? Does such approval depend on circumstance? The 
bounds appear to be extending.  
 
Unilateral proclamations often have normative effects that are unforeseen and 
unintended – and these can be very considerable:  
 
Shortly after World War II, a unilateral move by the U.S. in the Truman 
Proclamations of September 1945, declaring ownership of the continental 
shelf seabed resources and announcing a policy for extended US jurisdiction 
of coastal fisheries far out to sea beyond the then dominant three mile limit, 
diplomatically backfired for the U.S. as the Proclamations resulted in a bevy 
of national claims by other nations. These nations claimed jurisdiction or 
even sovereignty over waters as much as 200 miles off their coasts – a 
development fraught with negative consequences for U.S. naval operations, 
shipping, and distant water fishery interests. The next three decades of U.S. 
oceans diplomacy were dedicated to containing this explosion of offshore 
claims.724  
                                                
723 AI (Amnesty International), AI Report 2003 [cited 12 Feb 2005]); available from 
http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/usa-summary-eng. See also Candace Rondeaux, "Airstrike Kills 12 in 
Northwest Pakistan," Washington Post, 08 Nov 2008. See also Ernesto Londoño, "US Airstrike Allegedly 
Kills 8 inside Syria," Washington Post, 27 Oct 2008. 
724 David D. Caron and Harry N. Scheiber, "The United States and the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty," 
ASIL Insight 12, no. 4 (2007). 
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It is difficult to determine if NSS 2002 has had a wider normative effect, and has begun 
to facilitate a similar disposition in other states. One important and pressing line of 
investigation is to examine the US – Israel – Iran nexus in which US and Israeli shared 
concerns about Iranian development of WMD must be seen in the light of long-standing 
Israeli determination to act preemptively against perceived nuclear threats.725 Current 
developments, together with the professed US willingness to use preemption, is 
particularly important in this case. Note for example, that  
 
Iranian Defence Minister Ali Shamkhani has warned that Iran might launch 
a pre-emptive strike to prevent an attack on its nuclear facilities. He said this 
in an interview with Aljazeera TV. . . . 'We will not sit (with arms folded) to 
wait for what others will do to us. Some military commanders in Iran are 
convinced that preventive operations which the Americans talk about are 
not their monopoly,' Shamkhani said when asked about the possibility of a 
US or Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear facilities.726  
 
Normatively, the US adoption of a policy of preemption will not cause Israel to feel 
more constrained to preempt WMD threats. Further, shared US-Israeli concerns give 
rise to additional questions: Is the US restraining Israel from taking preemptive action 
against Iran? Will the US use Israel to take preemptive action against Iran? This attitude 
is unlikely to be confined to Iran. Monitoring such developments is quite important.  
                                                
725 Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, "US Says Israeli Exercise Seemed Directed at Iran," New York 
Times, 20 Jun 2008. See also Jonathan Steele, "Israel Asked US for Green Light to Bomb Nuclear Sites 
in Iran," Guardian, 25 Sep 2008. See also Yaakov Katz, "IDF Preparing Options for Iran Strike," 
Jerusalem Post, 04 Dec 2008. See also MacAskill, "US Claims North Korean Link to Israeli Bombing of 
Syria." See also Hersh, "A Strike in the Dark: What Did Israel Bomb in Syria?." 
726 Aljazeera, Iran May Strike If Sites Threatened (Aljazeera.net, 14 Aug 2004 [cited 28 May 2005]); 
available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/B19236FC-6A23-4FB4-B499-
E7AF900949DE.htm. 
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It may be that the NSS 2002 will appear most dated, soonest, with making the link 
between terrorists and rogue states; the simple link between terrorists and WMD may 
well be more lasting. Preemptive self defense is unlikely to carry the same type of 
repercussions when directed against nonstate actors than against nation states.  
 
###  
PRINCE  288/315  
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
 
INTERVIEWS 
 
Bernath, Cliff. Interview, 29 Mar 2006. 
Binnendijk, Hans. Interview, 07 Nov 2006. 
Bouchard, Joe. Interview, 03 Nov 2006. 
Crowley, P.J. Interview, 05 Apr 2006. 
Destler, I. M. Interview, 10 Nov 2006. 
Hoehn, Andy. Interview, 20 Dec 2007. 
Korb, Larry. Interview, 06 Nov 2006. 
Kosiak, Steve. Interview, 08 Nov 2006. 
Miller, Franklin. Interview, 06 Nov 2006. 
Zelikow, Philip. Personal Communication, 19 Dec 2007. 
 
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS  
 
107th Congress. Authorization for Use of Military Force. 1st Session, S. J. RES. 23. 
Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (U.S.). Discriminate Deterrence: Report 
of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. Washington, DC: U.S. 
G.P.O., 1988. 
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Public Law 99-
433. October 1, 1986. 
Greenwood, Christopher. The Legality of Using Force against Iraq [Memorandum]. 24 
Oct 2002 [cited 24 Jan 2009]. Available from 
PRINCE  289/315  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/196/2102
406.htm. 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo. The Kosovo Report: Conflict, 
International Response, Lessons Learned. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000. 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The Responsibility to 
Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001. 
International Court of Justice. "Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua V. United States of America) 
(Merits): Judgment of 27 June 1986 (Summary)." 1986. 
———. "Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: Advisory Opinion of 8 
July." 1996. 
National Security Act of 1947. Public Law 80-253. July 26, 1947. 
NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (April 14, 1950): 
A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of January 31. 
1950 [cited 18 Aug 2005]. Available from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-
hst/nsc-68.htm. 
President's Special Review Board. Report of the President's Special Review Board. 
Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1987. 
United Nations. "Charter of the United Nations." 1945. 
United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1368 Adopted on 12 Sep 2001 [cited 13 
Oct 2006]. Available from http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm. 
———. Resolution 1373 Adopted on 28 Sep 2001 [cited 13 Oct 2006]. Available from 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm  
United States. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 14 Feb 2003 [cited 19 Aug 
2005]. Available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html. 
United States Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States 1946. Edited 
by United States Department of State, Historical Office and Bureau of Public 
Affairs. Vol. I: General, The United Nations; Department of State Publication 
8573. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1972. 
———. Foreign Relations of the United States 1948. Edited by United States 
Department of State, Historical Office and Bureau of Public Affairs. Vol. IX: 
PRINCE  290/315  
The Western Hemisphere; Department of State Publication 8626. Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1972. 
———. Foreign Relations of the United States 1949. Edited by United States 
Department of State, Historical Office and Bureau of Public Affairs. Vol. I: 
National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy; Department of State 
Publication 8850. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1976. 
———. Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968. Edited by United States 
Department of State, Office of the Historian and Bureau of Public Affairs. Vol. 
XXXII: Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana. Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 2005. 
———. Foreign Relations of the United States 1969-1976. Edited by United States 
Department of State, Office of the Historian and Bureau of Public Affairs. Vol. 
I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972; Department of State Publication 
11017. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2003. 
United States Department of the Treasury. "The Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It" 
19 May 2006 [cited 25 May 2006]. Available from 
http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/opd/opdpdodt.htm. 
United States Supreme Court. Per Curiam Opinion in Bush V. Gore; Rehnquist, C. J., 
Concurring; Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Jj., Dissenting 2000 [cited 
12 Oct 2006]. Available from http://www.supremecourtus.gov/florida.html. 
United States. President George Washington (1789-1797). The Address of Gen. 
Washington to the People of America, on His Declining the Presidency of the 
United States 1796 [cited 13 Dec 2006]. Available from 
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel06.html. 
United States. President James Monroe (1817-1825). President's Annual Message to 
Congress [Delivered 02 Dec 1823] [cited 13 Dec 2006]. Available from 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=llac&fileName=041/llac041.db&recNum=4. 
United States. President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961). Special Message to the 
Congress on the Middle East Situation Delivered in Person before a Joint 
Session on 05 Jan 1957 [cited 11 Dec 2006]. Available from 
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/midleast.htm. 
United States. President John F. Kennedy (1961-1963). Radio and Television Report to 
the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba on 22 Oct 1962 [cited 
13 Dec 2006]. Available from 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Spee
ches/JFK/003POF03CubaCrisis10221962.htm. 
United States. President Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969). The President's News 
Conference of June 1 [Transcript]. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, eds. 
PRINCE  291/315  
The American Presidency Project, University of California Santa Barbara, 1965 
[cited 26 Feb 2009]. Available from 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27013. 
United States. President Richard M. Nixon (1969-1974). Vietnamization: Address to the 
Nation on 03 Nov 1969 1969 [cited 21 Apr 2005]. Available from 
http://www.nixonfoundation.org/Research_Center/Nixons/speeches/Vietnamizat
ion.shtml. 
United States. President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981). State of the Union Address 
[Delivered 23 January] 1980 [cited 16 May 2006]. Available from 
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml. 
United States. President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989). Address before a Joint Session of 
the Congress on the State of the Union on 06 Feb 1985 [cited 16 Dec 2006]. 
Available from 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/20685e.htm. 
———. "National Security Decision Directive Number 32 (NSDD-32)." 1982. 
———. "National Security Strategy of the United States." Washington, DC: The White 
House, 1988. 
———. National Security Strategy of the United States. 1st ed. Washington, DC: 
Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1988. 
———. "National Security Strategy of the United States." Washington, DC: The White 
House, 1987. 
———. Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals 
in Orlando, Florida on 08 Mar 1983 [cited 15 Dec 2006]. Available from 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech_srch.html. 
United States. President George H.W. Bush (1989-1993). National Security Review 
(NSR) 12: Review of National Defense Strategy 1989 [cited 15 Dec 2006]. 
Available from http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/nsr/nsr12.pdf. 
———. "National Security Strategy of the United States." Washington, DC: The White 
House, 1990. 
———. National Security Strategy of the United States: 1990-1991. 1st ed. 
Washington, DC: Brassey's (US), Inc., 1990. 
———. Remarks at the Aspen Institute Symposium in Aspen, Colorado, on 02 Aug 
1990 [cited 15 Dec 2006]. Available from 
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1990/90080206.html. 
PRINCE  292/315  
———. "National Security Strategy of the United States." Washington, DC: The White 
House, 1991. 
United States. President William Jefferson Clinton (1993-2001). "A National Security 
Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement." Washington, DC: The White House, 
1994. 
———. "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement." Washington, 
DC: The White House, 1995. 
———. "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement." Washington, 
DC: The White House, 1996. 
———. "A National Security Strategy for a New Century." Washington, DC: The 
White House, 1997. 
———. "A National Security Strategy for a New Century." Washington, DC: The 
White House, 1998. 
———. "A National Security Strategy for a New Century." Washington, DC: The 
White House, 1999. 
———. "A National Security Strategy for a Global Age" Washington, DC: The White 
House, 2000. 
United States. President George W. Bush (2001-2009). A Distinctly American 
Internationalism: Speech Delivered at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 
Simi Valley, California on 19 Nov 1999 [cited 12 Oct 2006]. Available from 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm. 
———. Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People on 20 
September 2001 [cited 02 Feb 2006]. Available from 
http://whitehouse.fed.us/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html. 
———. President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point United States 
Military Academy on 01 Jun 2002 [cited 02 Feb 2006]. Available from 
http://whitehouse.fed.us/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3.html. 
———. President Bush Thanks Germany for Support against Terror: Remarks by the 
President to a Special Session of the German Bundestag on 23 May 2002 [cited 
02 Feb 2006]. Available from 
http://whitehouse.fed.us/news/releases/2002/05/print/20020523-2.html. 
———. President Salutes Troops of the 10th Mountain Division: Remarks by the 
President to Troops and Families of the 10th Mountain Division on 19 Jul 2002 
[cited 02 Feb 2006]. Available from 
http://whitehouse.fed.us/news/releases/2002/07/print/20020719.html. 
PRINCE  293/315  
———. Presidential Address to the Nation on 07 Oct 2001 [cited 13 Oct 2006]. 
Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-
8.html. 
———. Remarks by the President at United Nations Financing for Development 
Conference on 22 Mar 2002 [cited 08 Feb 2006]. Available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/print/20020322-1.html. 
———. Remarks by the President on Global Development on 14 Mar 2002 [cited 08 
Feb 2006]. Available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/print/20020314-7.html. 
———. Remarks by the President to the World Bank on 17 Jul 2001 [cited 02 Feb 
2006]. Available from 
http://whitehouse.fed.us/news/releases/2001/07/print/20010717-1.html. 
———. Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation on 11 Sep 2001 [cited 
02 Feb 2006]. Available from 
http://whitehouse.fed.us/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010911-16.html. 
———. Text of a Letter from the President to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and 
Roberts on 13 Mar 2001 [cited 13 Oct 2006]. Available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html. 
———. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America." Washington, 
DC: The White House, 2002. 
———. The President's State of the Union Address on 29 Jan 2002 [cited 02 Feb 2006]. 
Available from http://whitehouse.fed.us/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129-
11.html. 
———. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America." Washington, 
DC: The White House, 2006. 
United States. White House. Statement by the Press Secretary: Announcement of 
Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty on 13 Dec 2001 2001 [cited 12 Oct 2006]. 
Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-
2.html. 
War Powers Resolution. Public Law 93-148. November 7, 1973. 
PRINCE  294/315  
 
OTHER SOURCES 
 
Abrams, Elliott, ed. Close Calls: Intervention, Terrorism, Missile Defense, and 'Just 
War' Today. Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1998. 
Acharya, Amitav. US Military Strategy in the Gulf. London: Routledge, 1989. 
AI (Amnesty International). AI Report 2003 [cited 12 Feb 2005]. Available from 
http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/usa-summary-eng. 
Ali, Mohamed M, and Iqbal H Shah. "Sanctions and Childhood Mortality in Iraq." The 
Lancet 355, no. 9218 (2000): 1851-1857. 
Ali, Mohamed M., John Blacker, and Gareth Jones. Excess Mortality in Iraq Centre for 
Population Studies, 2003 [cited 11 May 2008]. Available from 
http://www.lshtm.ac.uk/cps/public/excess%20mortality%20in%20Iraq.pdf. 
Aljazeera. Iran May Strike If Sites Threatened Aljazeera.net, 14 Aug 2004 [cited 28 
May 2005]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/B19236FC-
6A23-4FB4-B499-E7AF900949DE.htm. 
Annan, Kofi A. "Two Concepts of Sovereignty." The Economist (1999). 
Arend, Anthony Clark. "International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force." 
The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2003): :89–103. 
Art, Robert J. "Nuclear Weapons and Military Power." In International Politics: 
Anarchy, Force, Political Economy, and Decision-Making, edited by Robert J. 
Art and Robert Jervis, :251-. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1985. 
———. "The Fungibility of Force." In The Use of Force: Military Power and 
International Politics, edited by Robert J. Art and Kenneth Neal Waltz, :3-22. 
Lanham, MD; Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. 
———. "When Will Force Be Used?" In International Politics: Anarchy, Force, 
Political Economy, and Decision-Making, edited by Robert J. Art and Robert 
Jervis, :208-216. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1985. 
Art, Robert J., and Robert Jervis, eds. International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political 
Economy, and Decision-Making. 2nd ed. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1985. 
Avram, Wes. "On Getting Past the Preamble: One Reading of the Strategy." In Anxious 
About Empire: Theological Essays on the New Global Realities, edited by Wes 
Avram, 27-41. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2004. 
PRINCE  295/315  
Baker, Michelle, and Margaret E. Kosal. "Osmium Tetroxide - a New Chemical 
Terrorism Weapon?" Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 13 Apr 2004 [cited 21 
Nov 2008]. Available from http://cns.miis.edu/stories/040413.htm. 
Baker, Peter, and Michael Abramowitz. "A Governing Philosophy Rebuffed: Ruling 
Emphasizes Constitutional Boundaries." Washington Post, Friday, June 30, 
2006 2006. 
Barnaby, Frank. How to Build a Nuclear Bomb: And Other Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. New York: Nation Books, 2004. 
Barnett, Peter Vaughan. "British Strategy in the Falklands War." Journal of the 
Singapore Armed Forces 26, no. 1 (2000). 
Barrell, Ray, Ali Al- Eyd, and Olga Pomerantz. "Dollars and Deficits: The US Current 
Account Deficit and Its Exchange Rate Consequences." National Institute 
Economic Review, no. 191 (2005): 31+. 
Beck, Chen Aizhu and Lindsay. "Chinese-African Summit Yields $1.9 Billion in 
Deals." Washington Post, 06 Nov 2006, A17. 
Berenskoetter, Felix, and Michael J. Williams, eds. Power in World Politics. New York: 
Routledge, 2007. 
Bernstein, Richard, and Ross H. Munro. The Coming Conflict with China. 1st ed. New 
York: A.A. Knopf : Distributed by Random House, 1997. 
Best, Richard A. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. 
Huntington, NY: Novinka Books, 2001. 
Betts, Richard K. "Striking First: A History of Thankfully Lost Opportunities." Ethics 
and International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003): :17+. 
———. "The New Threat of Mass Destruction." Foreign Affairs 77, no. 1 (1998): 26-
41. 
Biscop, Sven, and David Mendeloff. "Power to the System: The UN High-Level Panel 
and the Reinvigoration of Collective Security Conference Proceedings." Studia 
Diplomatica LVIII, no. 2 (2005). 
Blechman, Barry M., and Stephen S. Kaplan. Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as 
a Political Instrument. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978. 
Bobbitt, Philip. Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century. 1st 
American ed. New York: A.A. Knopf, 2008. 
PRINCE  296/315  
Boyle, Francis Anthony. Foundations of World Order: The Legalist Approach to 
International Relations, 1898-1921. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 
1999. 
Brecher, Irving. "In Defence of Preventive War: A Canadian's Perspective." 
International Journal 58, no. 3 (2003): :253-280. 
Broder, John M., and Robin Toner. "Report on Iraq Exposes a Divide within the 
G.O.P." The New York Times, 10 Dec 2006. 
Brookes, Peter. A Devil's Triangle: Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and 
Rogue States. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American 
Superpower. New York: Basic Books, 2007. 
Buchan, Glenn C. Future Roles of U.S. Nuclear Forces: Implications for U.S. Strategy. 
Santa Monica, CA: Rand : Project Air Force, 2003. 
Buchanan, Allen, and Robert O. Keohane. "The Preventive Use of Force: A 
Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal." Ethics and International Affairs 18, no. 1 
(2004): :1-22. 
Butler, Adrienne Stith, Allison M. Panzer, and Lewis R. Goldfrank, eds. Preparing for 
the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism: A Public Health Strategy. Edited 
by Institute of Medicine (U.S.). Committee on Responding to the Psychological 
Consequences of Terrorism Board on Neuroscience and Behavioral Health. 
Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2003. 
Byers, Michael. Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and 
Customary International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
Caldwell, Dan, and Robert E. Williams. Seeking Security in an Insecure World. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006. 
Calhoun, Frederick S. Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign 
Policy. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1986. 
———. Uses of Force and Wilsonian Foreign Policy, American Diplomatic History. 
Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1993. 
Carlson, Peter. "Eyes Only: (Redacted): In Its ___ Offices, the National Security 
Archive Houses Stockpiles of ___, Gotten from the Government by ___ [Sic]." 
Washington Post, 08 May 2008. 
Caron, David D., and Harry N. Scheiber. "The United States and the 1982 Law of the 
Sea Treaty." ASIL Insight 12, no. 4 (2007). 
PRINCE  297/315  
Carter, Ralph G. "Budgeting for Defense." In The President, the Congress, and the 
Making of Foreign Policy, edited by Paul E. Peterson, :161-178. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1994. 
Carus, W. Seth. "Unlawful Acquisition and Use of Biological Agents." In Biological 
Weapons: Limiting the Threat, edited by Joshua Lederberg, 211-231. 
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999. 
Chesterman, Simon. Just War or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Law. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Christopher, LTC George, LTC Theodore Cieslak, MAJ Julie Pavlin, COL Edward 
Eitzen. "Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective." Journal of the American 
Medical Association 278, no. 5 (1997): 412-417. 
Cimbala, Stephen J. "The Role of Military Advice: Civil Military Relations and Bush 
Security Strategy." In U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition?, 
edited by Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew, :88-112. Washington, 
DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1995. 
Clarke, Richard A. Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror. London: Free 
Press, 2004. 
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Washington,: Infantry Journal Press, 1950. 
Cohen, Eliot A. Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime. 
London: Free Press, 2002. 
Coleman, Fred. The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Empire: Forty Years That Shook the 
World, from Stalin to Yeltsin. 1st ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. 
Colombani, Jean-Marie. "We Are All Americans." Le Monde, 12 Sep 2001. 
Corwin, Edward Samuel. The President, Office and Powers, 1787-1957; History and 
Analysis of Practice and Opinion. 4th rev. ed. New York,: New York University 
Press, 1957. 
Crabb, Cecil Van Meter, Glenn J. Antizzo, and Leila E. Sarieddine. Congress and the 
Foreign Policy Process: Modes of Legislative Behavior. Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 2000. 
Crabb, Cecil Van Meter, and Pat M. Holt. Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the 
President, and Foreign Policy. 4th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1992. 
Craig, Gordon Alexander, and Alexander L. George. Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic 
Problems of Our Time. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
PRINCE  298/315  
Crenshaw, Martha. "Terrorism, Strategies, and Grand Strategies." In Attacking 
Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, edited by Audrey Kurth Cronin and 
James M. Ludes, :74-96. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004. 
D'Amato, Anthony. "Customary International Law: A Reformulation." International 
Legal Theory 4 (1998). 
———. "Israel's Air Strike Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor." American Journal of 
International Law 77, no. 3 (1983): 584-588. 
———. "Trashing Customary International Law." American Journal of International 
Law 81, no. 1 (1987): :101-105. 
Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Lindsay. America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in 
Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003. 
Daalder, Ivo H., James M. Lindsay, and James B. Steinberg. "The Bush National 
Security Strategy: An Evaluation." The Brookings Institution Policy Brief #109 
(2002). 
Daggett, Stephen. "The American Economy, the Defense Budget, and National 
Security." In U.S. Domestic and National Security Agendas: Into the Twenty-
First Century, edited by Sam Charles Sarkesian and John Mead Flanagin, :62-
81. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994. 
Dando, Malcolm. Biological Warfare in the 21st Century: Biotechnology and the 
Proliferation of Biological Weapons. London: Brassey’s, 1994. 
———. "The Bioterrorist Cookbook." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Nov/Dec 
(2005): 34-39. 
———. The New Biological Weapons: Threat, Proliferation, and Control. Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. 
Dando, Malcolm, and Paul Rogers. The Death of Deterrence: Consequences of the 
Nuclear Arms Race. London: CND Publications, 1984. 
Davis, John. "The War on Terrorism: Impact on Al Qaeda." In The Global War on 
Terrorism: Assessing the American Response, edited by John Davis, 181-220. 
New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2004. 
Davis, Mark W. "Reagan's Real Reason for SDI." Policy Review (2000). 
Deibert, Ronald J., and Janice Gross Stein. "Hacking Networks of Terror." In Dialog-
IO, 1-14: IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. 
PRINCE  299/315  
Dent, David W. The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine: A Reference Guide to U.S. 
Involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean. Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1999. 
Depuy, William E. "For the Joint Specialist: Five Steep Hills to Climb." Parameters 
Summer (1995): 141-150. 
Dershowitz, Alan M. Preemption: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways. 1st ed, Issues of Our 
Time. New York: W.W. Norton, 2006. 
Destler, I. M., Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake. Our Own Worst Enemy: The 
Unmaking of American Foreign Policy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. 
Detter, Ingrid. The Law of War. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Dinh, Viet D. "How We Won in Vietnam." Policy Review (2000): :51+. 
Dinstein, Yoram. War, Aggression, and Self-Defense. 3rd ed. Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
Dulles, John Foster. War or Peace. London: Harrap, 1950. 
Dumbrell, John. Evaluating the Foreign Policy of President Clinton - or, Bill Clinton: 
Between the Bushes. London: British Library, 2005. 
Dumbrell, John, and David M. Barrett. The Making of US Foreign Policy. 2nd ed. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997. 
Edwards, George C. III. "Congress and National Strategy: The Appropriate Role?" In 
U.S. National Security Strategy for the 1990s, edited by Daniel J. Kaufman, 
David S. Clark and Kevin P. Sheehan, :81-98. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1991. 
Ekeus, Rolf. "New Challenges for the United Nations." In Turbulent Peace: The 
Challenges of Managing International Conflict, edited by Chester A. Crocker, 
Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela R. Aall, :517-528. Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 2001. 
Ellis, Jason D. "The Best Defense: Counterproliferation and U.S. National Security." 
The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2003): :115–133. 
Elsea, Jennifer. "U.S. Policy Regarding the International Criminal Court." 
Congressional Research Service; The Library of Congress, 2002. 
Enriquez, Arnel B. "The US National Security Strategy of 2002: A New Use-of-Force 
Doctrine?" Air & Space Power Journal (2004). 
PRINCE  300/315  
Evangelista, Matthew. Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold 
War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. 
Falk, Richard. "What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?" American 
Journal of International Law 97, no. 3 (2003): 590-599. 
Falk, Richard. "On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly." 
American Journal of International Law 60, no. 4 (1966): 782-791. 
Falkenrath, Richard A., Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer. America's 
Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, 
BCSIA Studies in International Security. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. 
Farer, Tom J. "The Prospect for International Law and Order in the Wake of Iraq." 
American Journal of International Law 97, no. 3 (2003): 621-628. 
Feaver, Peter. Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the 
United States, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca; London: Cornell 
University Press, 1992. 
Feinstein, Lee, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. "A Duty to Prevent." Foreign Affairs 83, no. 
1 (2004): :136-150. 
Ferguson, Charles D. "On the Loose: The Market for Nuclear Weapons." Harvard 
International Review 27, no. 4 (2006): :52+. 
Fidler, David P. "International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism Enters into Force." ASIL Insight 12, no. 6 (2007). 
Franck, Thomas M. Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and Armed 
Attacks, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures. Cambridge; New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
———. "What Happens Now? The United Nations after Iraq." American Journal of 
International Law 97, no. 3 (2003): 607-620. 
Franck, Thomas M., and Edward Weisband. Word Politics: Verbal Strategy among the 
Superpowers, Studies in Peaceful Change. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1971. 
Freedman, Lawrence. "Prevention, Not Preemption." The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 
2 (2003): :105–114. 
———. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. 3rd ed. Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 
Gaddis, John Lewis. "A Grand Strategy of Transformation." Foreign Policy, no. 
November/December (2002): :50-57. 
PRINCE  301/315  
———. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National 
Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. 
———. Surprise, Security, and the American Experience, Joanna Jackson Goldman 
Memorial Lecture on American Civilization and Government. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2004. 
———. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford, New York: Clarendon 
Press, Oxford University Press, 1997. 
Gallucci, Robert L. "The Dream Team." Foreign Policy, no. Nov/Dec (2008). 
Gardner, Richard N. "Neither Bush nor the 'Jurisprudes'." American Journal of 
International Law 97, no. 3 (2003): 585-590. 
Gilbert, Paul. "Proportionality in the Conduct of War." Journal of Military Ethics 4, no. 
2 (2005): 100-107. 
Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981. 
Goldsmith, Jack L. The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment inside the Bush 
Administration. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2007. 
Golumbic, Martin Charles. Fighting Terror Online: The Convergence of Security, 
Technology, and the Law. New York: Springer, 2008. 
Gordon, Michael R., and Eric Schmitt. "US Says Israeli Exercise Seemed Directed at 
Iran." New York Times, 20 Jun 2008. 
Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor. Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion 
and Occupation of Iraq. 1st ed. New York: Pantheon Books, 2006. 
Gray, Colin. "Deterrence and Strategic Defense: A Positive View." In The Strategic 
Defense Debate: Can "Star Wars" Make Us Safe?, edited by Craig Snyder. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986. 
Greene, Nathanael, and et al. "Growing Energy: How Biofuels Can Help End America's 
Oil Dependence." viii; 78. Washington: National Resources Defense Council, 
2004. 
Grewe, Wilhelm G. "The History of the United Nations." In The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary, edited by Bruno Simma, :1-23. Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995. 
Grimmett, Richard F. "The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty Years." Congressional 
Research Service, 2004. 
PRINCE  302/315  
Guoliang, Gu. "Redefine Cooperative Security, Not Preemption." The Washington 
Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2003): :135–145. 
Haass, Richard. "Congressional Power: Implications for American Security Policy." 
Adelphi Papers, no. 153 (1979): 39pp. 
Haass, Richard N. "Wars of Choice." Washington Post, 23 Nov 2003, B07. 
Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck. "American Foreign Policy in the Middle East and Its Impact 
on the Identity of Arab Muslims in the United States." In Diversity and U.S. 
Foreign Policy: A Reader, edited by Ernest J. Wilson, :240+. New York: 
Routledge, 2004. 
Haine, Jean-Yves, and Gustav Lindstrom. An Analysis of the National Security Strategy 
of the United States of America European Union Institute for Security Studies 
Analyses, 2002 [cited 02 Apr 2008]. Available from 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/index.php?id=214&no_cache=1&L=0&tx_ttnews[cat]
=25&tx_ttnews[pS]=1009839600&tx_ttnews[pL]=31535999&tx_ttnews[arc]=1
&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=670&tx_ttnews[backPid]=139&cHash=bf78c07918. 
Hall, B. Welling. Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon: 
Addendum Relating to Self-Defense (September) ASIL Insights, American 
Society of International Law, 2001 [cited 15 Feb 2004]. Available from 
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm. 
Hannan, Usman, and Hany Besada. "Dimensions of State Fragility: A Review of the 
Social Science Literature [Working Paper 33]." Centre for International 
Governance Innovation, 2007. 
Hart, Gary. "Op-Ed: America's Next Chapter." New York Times, 25 Jun 2008. 
———. Under the Eagle's Wing: A National Security Strategy of the United States for 
2009. Golden, CO: Fulcrum Pub., 2008. 
Heavens, Andrew. "Darfur Mission May Last 10 Years: Unamid General." Washington 
Post, 13 Mar 2008. 
Heisbourg, François. "A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences." 
The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2003): :75–88. 
Hersh, Seymour M. "A Strike in the Dark: What Did Israel Bomb in Syria?" New 
Yorker (2008). 
Higgins, Rosalyn. The Development of International Law through the Political Organs 
of the United Nations. London: Oxford University Press, 1963. 
Hitler, Adolf. The British War Bluebook No. 20: Speech by Herr Hitler at 
Wilhelmshaven on April 1, 1939. The Avalon Project  at Yale Law School, 1939 
PRINCE  303/315  
[cited 22 Sep 2005]. Available from 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/bluebook/blbk20.htm. 
Hoffman, Stanley. "America Goes Backward." New York Review of Books 50, no. 10 
(2003). 
Holland, Harrison M. Japan Challenges America: Managing an Alliance in Crisis. 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1992. 
Holzgrefe, J. L. "The Humanitarian Intervention Debate." In Humanitarian Intervention: 
Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, edited by J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. 
Keohane, :15-52. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Hornblower, Simon. A Commentary on Thucydides. 2 vols. Vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1991. 
Howard, Michael Eliot. The Invention of Peace and the Reinvention of War. Rev. and 
extended ed. London: Profile, 2002. 
———. War and the Nation State: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered before the 
University of Oxford on 18 November 1977. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. 
———, ed. Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitation of Armed Conflict. Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1979. 
Howorth, Jolyon. "The US National Security Strategy: European Reactions." In 
Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations, edited by Roland Dannreuther and 
John Peterson, :30-44. New York, NY: Routledge, 2006. 
Huntington, S. P. "The Evolution of U.S. National Strategy." In U.S. National Security 
Strategy for the 1990s, edited by Daniel J. Kaufman, David S. Clark and Kevin 
P. Sheehan, :11-18. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. 
Ikenberry, G. John. "America's Imperial Ambition." Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5 (2002): 
:44-60. 
———. "Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order." In 
International Order and the Future of World Politics, edited by T. V. Paul and 
John A. Hall, :123-145. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1999. 
Inderfurth, Karl, and Loch K. Johnson, eds. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National 
Security Council. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
Institute of Medicine (US), Committee on R&D Needs for Improving Civilian Medical 
Response to Chemical and Biological Terrorism Incidents, and National 
Research Council (US) Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology. 
PRINCE  304/315  
Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Research and Development to Improve 
Civilian Medical Response. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999. 
International Institute for Strategic Studies. "The Bush National Security Strategy: What 
Does 'Pre-Emption' Mean?" Strategic Comments 8, no. 8 (2002): 1-2. 
Jablonsky, David. "The State of the National Security State." Parameters (2002): :4-20. 
Jervis, Robert. "Understanding the Bush Doctrine." Political Science Quarterly 118, no. 
3 (2003): :365-388. 
Johnson, David E., Karl P. Mueller, and William H. Taft. Conventional Coercion across 
the Spectrum of Operations: The Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging 
Security Environment. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002. 
Johnson, Glen. "Bush Fails Quiz on Foreign Affairs." Washington Post, 04 Nov 1999. 
Jordan, Amos A., William J. Taylor, and Michael J. Mazarr. American National 
Security. 5th ed. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 
Kagan, E. "Bioregulators as Instruments of Terror." Clinics in Laboratory Medicine 21, 
no. 3 (2001): 607-618. 
Kagan, Robert. The Return of History and the End of Dreams. 1st ed. New York: 
Knopf, 2008. 
Kaiser, Karl. "The New World Order." Internationale Politik Global Edition 4, no. 2 
(2003): 3-9. 
Kamp, Karl-Heinz. "Prevention in US Security Strategy." Internationale Politik Global 
Edition 4, no. 1 (2003): 17-20. 
Kaplan, Fred. Paul Nitze: The Man Who Brought Us the Cold War. Posted in Slate 21 
Oct 2004 [cited 02 Dec 2005]. Available from 
http://www.slate.com/id/2108510/. 
Katz, Yaakov. "IDF Preparing Options for Iran Strike." Jerusalem Post, 04 Dec 2008. 
Katzman, Kenneth. "Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional 
Research Service; The Library of Congress, 2002. 
———. "Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research 
Service; The Library of Congress, 2003. 
Kaufman, Daniel J., David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan, eds. U.S. National Security 
Strategy for the 1990s. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. 
PRINCE  305/315  
Keen, Maurice Hugh. The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages, Studies in Political 
History. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1965. 
Kennan, George. Long Telegram 1946 [cited 05 Jan 2006]. Available from 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm. 
———. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (1947): :566-582. 
———. American Diplomacy, 1900-1950. Chicago; London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1970. 
Kennan, George F., and John Lukacs. George F. Kennan and the Origins of 
Containment, 1944-1946: The Kennan-Lukacs Correspondence. Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1997. 
Kennedy, Paul. "Not So Grand Strategy." The New York Review of Books, 12 May 
1988. 
Kennedy, Paul M. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and 
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. London: Fontana, 1989. 
Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. 
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence. 3rd ed. London: 
Longman, 2001. 
Kimball, Daryl G. "National Insecurity Strategy." Arms Control Today (2002). 
Kirshner, Jonathan. "Prevent Defense: Why the Bush Doctrine Will Hurt U.S. 
Interests." In Iraq and Beyond: The New U.S. National Security Strategy, 
Occasional Paper #27: Peace Studies Program, Cornell University 2003. 
Klare, Michael T. "A Blueprint for Endless Intervention." The Nation, 30 Jul 1988, 
:77+. 
Knaus, John Kenneth. Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for 
Survival. 1st ed. New York: PublicAffairs, 1999. 
Korb, Lawrence J., and Council on Foreign Relations. A New National Security 
Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Three Options Presented as Presidential Speeches. New York, NY: Council on 
Foreign Relations Press, 2003. 
Kosiak, Steven M. "Funding for Defense, Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism 
since 9-11: Where Has All the Money Gone?". Washington: Center for Strategic 
and Budgetary Assessments, 2003. 
PRINCE  306/315  
Krauthammer, Charles. "Wars of Choice, Wars of Necessity." TIME, 05 Nov 2001. 
Kubota, Yoko, and Isabel Reynolds. "Court Says Japan's Iraq Operation 
Unconstitutional." New York Times, 18 Apr 2008. 
Kucia, Christine. "Counterproliferation at Core of New Security Strategy." Arms 
Control Today (2002). 
Kupchan, Charles A. "Empires and Geopolitical Competition: Gone for Good?" In 
Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, edited by 
Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela R. Aall, 39-52. 
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001. 
Lauren, Paul Gordon. "Coercive Diplomacy and Ultimata: Theory and Practice in 
History." In The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, edited by Alexander L. George 
and William E. Simons, 23-50. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. 
Lebow, Richard Ned. Coercion, Cooperation, and Ethics in International Relations. 
New York: Routledge, 2007. 
Lebow, Richard Ned, and Janice Gross Stein. We All Lost the Cold War, Princeton 
Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1994. 
Lederberg, Joshua, ed. Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat, BCSIA Studies in 
International Security. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999. 
Leffler, Melvyn P. A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman 
Administration, and the Cold War, Stanford Nuclear Age Series. Stanford, Calif: 
Stanford University Press, 1992. 
Leffler, Melvyn P., and David S. Painter, eds. Origins of the Cold War: An International 
History. 2nd ed. New York; London: Routledge, 2005. 
Leiser, Burton M. "The Catastrophe of September 11 and Its Aftermath." In Terrorism: 
The Philosophical Issues., edited by Igor Primoratz, :192-208. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004. 
Levering, Ralph B. Debating the Origins of the Cold War: American and Russian 
Perspectives, Debating Twentieth-Century America. Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2002. 
Lippmann, Walter. U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic. Boston: Little Brown, 
1943. 
Lipton, Eric. "A Nation Challenged: The Tally; Officials Say Number of Those Still 
Missing May Be Overstated." New York Times, 22 Sep 2001. 
PRINCE  307/315  
Litwak, Robert S. "New Calculus of Preemption." Survival 44, no. 4 (2002): :53-79. 
———. "Rogue States a Handy Label, but a Lousy Policy." Washington Post, 20 Feb 
2000. 
Locher, James R. III. "Has It Worked?: The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act." 
Naval War College Review LIV, no. 4 (2001): 95-115. 
Londoño, Ernesto. "US Airstrike Allegedly Kills 8 inside Syria." Washington Post, 27 
Oct 2008, A09. 
Lord Ismay. "NATO: The First Five Years 1949-1954" 06 Mar 2001 [cited 05 Feb 
2009]. Available from http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/1.htm. 
Lord Robertson. The Future of the Transatlantic Link 2001 [cited 13 Oct 2006]. 
Available from http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011024a.htm. 
Lukes, Steven. Power: A Radical View. London; New York: Macmillan, 1974. 
———, ed. Power. New York: New York University Press, 1986. 
Lynch, Colum. "China Filling Void Left by West in U.N. Peacekeeping: Despite Its 
Misgivings, Nation Is Now 13th-Largest Contributor to Missions as Major 
Powers Withdraw." Washington Post, 24 Nov 2006, A12. 
MacAskill, Ewen. "US Claims North Korean Link to Israeli Bombing of Syria." 
Guardian, 24 Apr 2008. 
Mack, Andrew. "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric 
Conflict." World Politics 27, no. 2 (1975): :175-200. 
Manning, Frederick J., and Lewis R. Goldfrank, eds. Preparing for Terrorism: Tools for 
Evaluating the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program. Edited by 
Institute of Medicine (U.S.). Committee on Evaluation of the Metropolitan 
Medical Response Program. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2002. 
May, Ernest R. "National Security in American History." In Rethinking America's 
Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order, edited by Graham T. Allison 
and Gregory F. Treverton, :94-114. New York; London: Norton, 1992. 
Mazzetti, Mark, and Helene Cooper. "An Israeli Strike on Syria Kindles Debate in the 
U.S." New York Times, 10 Oct 2007. 
McCall, Malcolm, and Oliver Ramsbotham, eds. Just Deterrence: Morality and 
Deterrence into the Twenty-First Century. 1st ed. London: Brassey's, 1990. 
McFadden, Robert D. "After the Attacks: The Overview; a Shaken Nation Struggles to 
Regain Its Equilibrium, but Remains on Edge." New York Times, 14 Sep 2001. 
PRINCE  308/315  
McKinzie, Richard D. Oral History Interview with Thomas C. Mann Harry S. Truman 
Library, 1974 [cited 14 Jul 2006]. Available from 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/mannt.htm. 
Mead, Walter Russell. Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It 
Changed the World. 1st ed. New York: Knopf, 2001. 
MI5. Al Qaida's Structure 2007 [cited 01 Dec 2008]. Available from 
http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page543.html. 
Morgan, Matthew J. "The Origins of the New Terrorism." Parameters 34, no. 1 (2004): 
:29+. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 3d ed. 
New York: Knopf, 1960. 
Morris, Madeline. High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States 
1999 [cited 03 Nov 2005]. Available from 
http://www.law.duke.edu/fac/morris/morris.htm#_ftn1. 
Muravchik, Joshua. "The Bush Manifesto." Commentary 114, no. 5 (2002): :23-30. 
Murdock, Clark A. Improving the Practice of National Security Strategy: A New 
Approach for the Post-Cold War World, Significant Issues Series; V. 26, No. 1. 
Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2004. 
National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Science and Technology for 
Countering Terrorism. Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and 
Technology in Countering Terrorism. Washington, DC: National Academy 
Press, 2002. 
Newshour. "'Cyberwar' Emerges Amid Russia-Georgia Conflict" [Transcript] PBS, 13 
Aug 2008 [cited 04 Feb 2009]. Available from 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/july-dec08/cyberwar_08-13.html. 
Norwitz, Jeffrey H. "Combating Terrorism: With a Helmet or a Badge?" In Terrorism 
and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, Readings 
& Interpretations, edited by Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, 470-481. 
Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004. 
Nowak, Rachel. "Disaster in the Making: An Engineered Mouse Virus Leaves Us One 
Step Away from the Ultimate Bioweapon." New Scientist 13 (2001): 4-5. 
Nye, Joseph S. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: 
Basic Books, 1990. 
———. The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go 
It Alone. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
PRINCE  309/315  
O'Hanlon, Michael E., Peter R. Orszag, Ivo H. Daalder, I. M. Destler, David Gunter, 
Robert E. Litan, and James Steinberg. Protecting the American Homeland. 
Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2002. 
O'Hanlon, Michael E., Susan E. Rice, and James B. Steinberg. "The New National 
Security Strategy and Preemption." The Brookings Institution Policy Brief #113 
(2002). 
Pearson, Graham S. The Search for Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: Inspection, 
Verification, and Non-Proliferation. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
Pfiffner, James P. "Presidential Decision Making: Rationality, Advisory Systems, and 
Personality." Presidential Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (2005): :217+. 
Pincus, Walter. "Democrats Who Opposed War Move into Key Positions: New 
Committee Chairmen Had Warned of Postwar Disorder." Washington Post, 04 
Dec 2006, A04. 
———. "Gates May Rein in Pentagon Activities: Nominee Has Opposed Defense 
Department's Dominance in Intelligence Efforts." Washington Post, 14 Nov 
2006, A12. 
Ping, Jonathan H. Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Asia Pacific. 
Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT, USA: Ashgate, 2005. 
Pirog, Robert. "World Oil Demand and Its Effect on Oil Prices." Washington: 
Congressional Research Service; The Library of Congress, 2005. 
Podhoretz, N. "In Praise of the Bush Doctrine." Commentary 114, no. 2 (2002): :19-28. 
Pollitt, Mark. "Cyberterrorism, Fact or Fancy?" In Cyberterrorism and Computer 
Attacks, edited by Lawrence V. Brown, 87-94. New York: Novinka Books, 
2006. 
Pratt, Cranford. Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension. 
Kingston; Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990. 
Priest, Dana. The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military. 
New York: W.W. Norton, 2004. 
Prins, Gwyn, ed. Defended to Death: A Study of the Nuclear Arms Race. 
Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Eng.; New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1983. 
Quester, George H. Deterrence before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background of 
Modern Strategy. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1986. 
PRINCE  310/315  
Rabe, Stephen G. "After the Missiles of October: John F. Kennedy and Cuba, 
November 1962 to November 1963." Presidential Studies Quarterly 30, no. 4 
(2004): :714+. 
———. "The Johnson Doctrine." Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (2006): :48+. 
Ramberg, Bennett. "Attacks on Nuclear Reactors: The Implications of Israel's Strike on 
Osiraq." Political Science Quarterly 97, no. 4 (1982): 653-669. 
Randelzhofer, Albrecht. "Article 51." In The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary, edited by Bruno Simma, :788-806. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002. 
Record, Jeffrey. Dark Victory: America's Second War against Iraq. Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 2004. 
———. Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of 
Force from Korea to Kosovo. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002. 
———. "The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq." Parameters 33, no. 1 (2003): :4-21. 
Reiter, Dan. "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never 
Happen." International Security 20, no. 2 (1995): 5-34. 
———. "Preventive War and Its Alternatives: The Lessons of History." Strategic 
Studies Institute (2006). 
Rhodes, Edward. Presence, Prevention, and Persuasion: A Historical Analysis of 
Military Force and Political Influence. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004. 
Rice, Condoleeza, and Rosalyn Higgins. Responses to Question from the Author, ASIL 
Conference, 29 Mar 2006. 
Riedel, Eibe. "Standards and Sources: Farewell to the Exclusivity of the Sources Triad 
in International Law?" European Journal of International Law 2, no. 2 (1991): 
58-84. 
Ritchie, Nick, and Paul Rogers. The Political Road to War with Iraq: Bush, 9/11, and 
the Drive to Overthrow Saddam, Contemporary Security Studies. London; New 
York: Routledge, 2006. 
Roberts, Brad. "NBC-Armed Rogues: Is There a Moral Case for Preemption?" In Close 
Calls: Intervention, Terrorism, Missile Defense, and 'Just War' Today, edited by 
Elliott Abrams, :83-107. Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 
1998. 
Rogers, Paul. "Iran: Consequences of a War (Oxford Research Group Briefing Paper)." 
no. Feb (2006). 
PRINCE  311/315  
———. Losing Control: Global Security in the Twenty-First Century. 2nd ed. London; 
Sterling, Va.: Pluto, 2002. 
Rogers, Paul, Malcolm Dando, and Peter Van den Dungen. As Lambs to the Slaughter: 
The Facts About Nuclear War. London: Arrow Books, 1981. 
Rollins, John, and Clay Wilson. "Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and 
Policy Issues." In Cyberterrorism and Computer Attacks, edited by Lawrence V. 
Brown, 59-86. New York: Novinka Books, 2006. 
Rondeaux, Candace. "Airstrike Kills 12 in Northwest Pakistan." Washington Post, 08 
Nov 2008, A14. 
Rosner, Jeremy D. "The Know-Nothings Know Something." Foreign Policy, no. 101 
(1995): :116+. 
———. The New Tug-of-War: Congress, the Executive Branch, and National Security. 
Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995. 
Rostow, Eugene V. Toward Managed Peace: The National Security Interests of the 
United States, 1759 to the Present. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993. 
Rothgeb, John M. Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary 
International System. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 
Russell, Bertrand. Power: A New Social Analysis. New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1938. 
Rutledge, Ian. Addicted to Oil: America's Relentless Drive for Energy Security. 
London; New York: I.B. Tauris ; Distributed by Palgrave Macmillan in the 
United States and Canada, 2005. 
Sale, Sara L. The Shaping of Containment: Harry S. Truman, the National Security 
Council, and the Cold War. Saint James, NY: Brandywine Press, 1998. 
Sands, Amy. "Deconstructing the Chem-Bio Threat: Testimony for the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee" Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 19 Mar 2002 [cited 
21 Nov 2008]. Available from http://cns.miis.edu/testimony/asands.htm. 
Sands, Philippe. Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global 
Rules. London: Allen Lane, 2005. 
Sanger, David E. "Dueling Views on Diplomacy Pit Baker against Rice." The New 
York Times, 08 Dec 2006. 
Sapiro, Miriam. "Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense." American 
Journal of International Law 97, no. 3 (2003): 599-607. 
PRINCE  312/315  
Sarkesian, Sam Charles, John Allen Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala. U.S. National 
Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics. 3rd ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2002. 
Schelling, Thomas C. "The Diplomacy of Violence." In International Politics: Anarchy, 
Force, Political Economy, and Decision-Making, edited by Robert J. Art and 
Robert Jervis, :171-184. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1985. 
———. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge,: Harvard University Press, 1960. 
Schmitt, Eric, and Thom Shanker. "U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists." 
New York Times, 18 Mar 2008. 
Seibert-Fohr, Anja. "The Crime of Aggression: Adding a Definition to the Rome Statute 
of the ICC." ASIL Insight 12, no. 24 (2008). 
Sempa, Francis P. U.S. National Security Doctrines Historically Viewed: A 
Commentary AmericanDiplomacy.org, 19 Apr 2004 [cited 06 Mar 2006]. 
Available from http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2004_04-
06/sempa_nsd/sempa_nsd.html. 
Sherry, Michael S. The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987. 
Shoemaker, Christopher C. The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council. Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1991. 
Shultz, Richard, and Andreas Vogt. "It's War! Fighting Post-11 September Global 
Terrorism through a Doctrine of Preemption." Terrorism and Political Violence 
15, no. 1 (2003): :1-30. 
Simon, Jeffrey D. "Biological Terrorism: Preparing to Meet the Threat." In Biological 
Weapons: Limiting the Threat, edited by Joshua Lederberg, 235-248. 
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999. 
Slocombe, Walter B. "Force, Pre-Emption and Legitimacy." Survival 45, no. 1 (2003): 
:117-130. 
Smith, Dan. Alternatives to War Friends Committee on National Legislation, 2004 
[cited 19 Mar 2008]. Available from http://www.fcnl.org/smith/peace_org_212-
04.htm. 
Snider, Don M. "The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision 
(Second Edition)." Strategic Studies Institute, 1995. 
Snyder, Jack. "Imperial Temptations." The National Interest 71 (2003): :29-40. 
PRINCE  313/315  
Steele, Jonathan. "Israel Asked US for Green Light to Bomb Nuclear Sites in Iran." 
Guardian, 25 Sep 2008. 
Steinbruner, John. "Confusing Ends and Means: The Doctrine of Coercive Pre-
Emption." Arms Control Today (2003). 
Stoll, Richard J., and Michael Don Ward, eds. Power in World Politics. Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989. 
Struble, Danny H. "Contextual Influences in the Development of the National Security 
Council System." University of Southern California, 1993. 
Suskind, Ron. The One Percent Doctrine: Deep inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies 
since 9/11. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006. 
———. The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of 
Paul O'neill. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004. 
Taft, William H. IV, and Todd F. Buchwald. "Preemption, Iraq, and International Law." 
American Journal of International Law 97, no. 3 (2003): 557-563. 
Taylor, William J., and Don M. Snider. "U.S. National Security Agenda and U.S. 
National Security Policy: Realities and Dilemmas." In U.S. Domestic and 
National Security Agendas: Into the Twenty-First Century, edited by Sam 
Charles Sarkesian and John Mead Flanagin, :103-118. Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1994. 
Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. 1st 
ed. New York: HarperCollins, 2007. 
Tritten, James John. Our New National Security Strategy: America Promises to Come 
Back. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992. 
Tritten, James John, and Paul Stockton. Reconstituting America's Defense: The New 
U.S. National Security Strategy. New York: Praeger, 1992. 
UN News Centre. Peacekeeping Grows yet International Support Uneven – UN 
Officials 11 Mar 2008 [cited 19 Mar 2008]. Available from 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25933&Cr=peacekeeping&Cr
1=dpko. 
US Department of Defense. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Interviews with Mr. 
Bob Woodward – July 6 and 7, 2006 [News Transcript]. 02 Oct 2006 [cited 18 
Apr 2008]. Available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3744. 
———. US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 2001 
[cited 12 Feb 2007]. Available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/. 
PRINCE  314/315  
Vasquez, John A. The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to 
Neotraditionalism. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1998. 
Villiger, Mark E. Customary International Law and Treaties: A Manual on the Theory 
and Practice of the Interrelation of Sources. Fully rev. 2nd ed, Developments in 
International Law; V. 28. London: Kluwer Law International, 1997. 
Vogel, Heinrich. "The End of the “Old West” " Internationale Politik Global Edition 4, 
no. 3 (2003): 17-21. 
Walker, Paul F., and Jonathan B. Tucker. "The Real Chemical Threat [Op-Ed]." Los 
Angeles Times, 01 Apr 2006, B15. 
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical 
Illustrations. 2nd ed. New York: Basic Books, 1992. 
———. "No Strikes: Inspectors Yes, War No." The New Republic 227(14), no. 4576 
(2002): :19-22. 
Wedgwood, Ruth. "The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and 
Preemptive Self-Defense." American Journal of International Law 97, no. 3 
(2003): 576-585. 
Weinberger, Caspar W. The Uses of Military Power: Address Given at the National 
Press Club, Washington, DC on 28 Nov 1984 [cited 18 Dec 2008]. Available 
from http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2004/January%202004/0104keepe
rfull.pdf. 
Weiss, Thomas G. "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to 
Protect in a Unipolar Era." Security Dialogue 35, no. 2 (2004): :135-153. 
Weller, Marc. "The US, Iraq and the Use of Force in a Unipolar World." Survival 41, 
no. 4 (2000): 81-100. 
Wentworth, Travis. "You’ve Got Malice" Newsweek, 23 Aug 2008 [cited 04 Feb 2009]. 
Available from http://www.newsweek.com/id/154965. 
Whitman, Jim. "Disseminative Systems and Global Governance." Global Governance 
11, no. 1 (2005): 85-102. 
———. "Humanitarian Intervention in an Era of Pre-Emptive Self-Defence." Security 
Dialogue 36, no. 3 (2005): 259-274. 
Williams, John Allen. "The National Security Establishment: Institutional Framework 
for Policymaking." In National Security Strategy: Choices and Limits, edited by 
Stephen J. Cimbala, 323-344. New York: Praeger, 1984. 
PRINCE  315/315  
Wilson, Clay. "Computer Attack and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues 
for Congress." In Cyberterrorism and Computer Attacks, edited by Lawrence V. 
Brown, 1-58. New York: Novinka Books, 2006. 
Winer, Anthony S. "The Reagan Doctrine, the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, and the Role of a 
Sole Superpower." Law and Inequality Journal 22, no. 2 (2004): :169-194. 
Woodward, Bob. Bush at War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002. 
———. Plan of Attack. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004. 
———. State of Denial. London: Simon & Schuster, 2006. 
Wrage, Stephen D. "Civil-Military Relations and the War on Terror." White House 
Studies 4, no. 2 (2004): :197+. 
Yarmolinsky, Adam. "American Foreign Policy and the Decision to Intervene." Journal 
of International Affairs (JIA). Intervention and World Politics. 1968. 22(2):165-
302. 22, no. 2 (1968): :231-235. 
Yergin, Daniel. Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security 
State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977. 
———. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. New York; London: 
Pocket Books, 1993. 
Yoo, John. "International Law and the War in Iraq." American Journal of International 
Law 97, no. 3 (2003): 563-576. 
Zegart, Amy B. Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1999. 
Zelikow, Philip. "The Transformation of National Security." The National Interest 71, 
no. Spring 2003 (2003): :17-28. 
 
 
 
